Changes in environmental context between encoding and retrieval often affect explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. One proposal is that conceptual but not perceptual priming is influenced by context manipulations. However, findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study examined the effects of environmental context on conceptual explicit and implicit memory . Explicit recall was reduced by context change. The implicit test results depended on test awareness . Among test-unaware participants, priming was (...) equivalent for same-context and different-context groups, whereas for the test-aware, the same-context group produced more priming. Thus, when explicit contamination is controlled, changes in environmental context do not impair conceptual priming. Context dependency appears to be a general difference between implicit and explicit memory rather than a difference between conceptual and perceptual implicit memory. Finally, measures of mood indicated no changes in affect across contexts, arguing against mood mediation for the context effects in explicit recall. (shrink)

The present experiment investigates the involvement of awareness in functional dissociations between explicit and implicit tests. In the explicit condition, participants attempted to recall lexically or semantically studied words using word stems. In the implicit condition, they were instructed to complete each stem with the first word which came to mind. Subjective awareness was subsequently measured on an item-by-item basis. As voluntary retrieval strategies are known to be time consuming, the time taken to complete each stem was recorded. In the (...) explicit task, semantically studied words were associated with higher levels of recall and faster response times than lexically studied words. By contrast, in the implicit task, these effects failed to reach significance, although deep encoding made the contents of memory more accessible to awareness. As expected, performance was slower in the explicit than in the implicit task, but in the latter condition, times to produce old words with and without awareness were comparable, and both of these responses were produced more quickly than control words. This finding suggests that although participants may become aware in implicit paradigms, they do not adopt voluntary retrieval strategies. (shrink)

Carruthers, P. (2006). The architecture of the mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 462 pp. ISBN 0-19-92708-9, £55/$99 (hbk); 0-19-920707-0, £25/$45 (pbk).There is much to admire about this b...

General anesthesia provides an alternative to typical laboratory paradigms for investigating implicit learning. We assess the evidence that a simple type of learning—priming—can occur without consciousness. Although priming has been shown to be a small but persistent phenomenon in surgical patients there is reason to question whether it occurs implicitly due to problems in detecting awareness using typical clinical signs. This paper reviews the published studies on priming during anesthesia that have included a measure of awareness or of anesthetic depth. (...) We conclude that perceptual priming, but not conceptual priming, takes place in the absence of conscious awareness. (shrink)

Do dissociations imply independent systems? In the memory field, the view that there are independent implicit and explicit memory systems has been predominantly supported by dissociation evidence. Here, we argue that many of these dissociations do not necessarily imply distinct memory systems. We review recent work with a single-system computational model that extends signal-detection theory (SDT) to implicit memory. SDT has had a major influence on research in a variety of domains. The current work shows that it can be broadened (...) even further in its range of application. Indeed, the single-system model that we present does surprisingly well in accounting for some key dissociations that have been taken as evidence for independent implicit and explicit memory systems. (shrink)

In agreement with some of the ideas expressed by Perruchet & Vinter (P&V), we believe that some phenomena hitherto attributed to processing may in fact reflect a fundamental distinction between direct and reflexive forms of consciousness. This dichotomy, developed by the phenomenological tradition, is substantiated by examples coming from experimental psychology and lesion neuropsychology.