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A Minimalist Approach to the Development of Episodic Memory.Robert Hanna James Russell - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):29-54.details
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Philosophy of mind: critical concepts in philosophy.Sean Crawford (ed.) - 2011 - New York: Routledge.details
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Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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Sense data: The sensible approach.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.details
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Can nonconceptual content be stored in visual memory?Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):639-668.details
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Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214.details
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Abstract Artifacts in Pretence.Sarah Sawyer - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (2):183-198.details
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Sense, Description and the Necessary A Posteriori.Finn Spicer - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):315-338.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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A Defense of Russellian Descriptivism.Brandt H. van der Gaast - unknowndetails
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Singular Thought and Mental Files: An Introduction.Rachel Goodman & James Genone - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.details
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Learning Philosophy in the 21st Century.Abduljaleel Alwali - 2018 - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies: Volume 12.details
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Fregean Particularism.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-233.details
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Singular Thought and the Contingent.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 243 (1):79-98.details
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Quantification and Contributing Objects to Thoughts.Michael Glanzberg - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):207-231.details
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Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos.João Miguel Biscaia Branquinho, Desidério Murcho & Nelson Gonçalves Gomes (eds.) - 2006 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Martins Fontes.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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Self-verification and the content of thought.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):59 - 75.details
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Self-verification and the content of thought.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):59-75.details
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Unifying Three Notions of Concepts.Edward N. Zalta - 2019 - Theoria 87 (1):13-30.details
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Taking Frege's name in vain.James Zaiss - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (2):167 - 190.details
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Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.details
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Truth Analysis of the Gettier Argument.Yussif Yakubu - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):449-466.details
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Burgeoning skepticism.Willem A. deVries - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):141-164.details
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Burgeoning Skepticism.Willem De Vries - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):141 - 164.details
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A Defence of Fregean Propositions.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 26.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Smart and tensed beliefs.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):313-325.details
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Mental Files and Times.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):233-240.details
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Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision.Josefa Toribio - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):621-642.details
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Institutional Externalism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1):67-85.details
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Identity, intensionality, and intentionality.James E. Tomberlin - 1984 - Synthese 61 (1):111 - 131.details
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Why Be an Agent?Evan Tiffany - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):223 - 233.details
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The Standard of Correctness and the Ontology of Depiction.Enrico Terrone - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):399-412.details
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De Re And De Dicto: Against The Conventional Wisdom.Ken Taylor - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):225-265.details
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De Re Belief Ascriptions and Action Explanations.Eric Stiffler - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):513 - 525.details
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The Life and Death of a Metaphor, or the Metaphysics of Metaphor.Josef Stern - 2007 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3.details
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The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.details
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The ins and outs of perception.David Woodruff Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (March):187-211.details
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Content and context of perception.David Woodruff Smith - 1984 - Synthese 61 (October):61-88.details
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The ontology of meanings. [REVIEW]Mark Siebel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):417 - 426.details
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Why be an anti-individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.details
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The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
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Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.details
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Against the Russellian open future.Anders J. Schoubye & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Mind 126 (504): 1217–1237.details
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The Epistemic Divide.Sarah Sawyer - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):385-401.details
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