In light of Laura Sizer's and Robert Thayer's models of mood, I propose a functional theory to explain in what sense moods are adaptive. I argue that mood involves a mechanism which monitors our physical and mental energy levels in relation to the perceived energy demands of our environment, and generates corresponding cognitive biases in our reasoning style, attention, memory, thought, and creativity. The function of this mechanism is to engage us in the right task with the right amount of (...) energy by maintaining equilibrium between the energy we possess and the energy our environment demands. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify and reformulate the conceptual relationship between emotions and moods in light of recent researches in philosophy and cognitive psychology. I argue that the mechanism of mood may produces cognitive biases that affect the appraisals involved in emotions, whereas the mechanism of emotion may produce physiological and behavioral responses that affect the energy level being monitored by mood. These two distinct mechanisms can affect each other repeatedly and continuously, which form the mood-emotion loop. I argue that (...) this model may help explain the interaction between emotions and mood, and may shed light on the understanding of the regulation of emotion and mood disorders. (shrink)

Appraisal theory assumes that the individual variability of emotional reactions to the same situation is due to individual differences in appraisal. However, the question of how interindividual differences in appraisal come about has been rarely formally addressed. We focus on one of the central dimensions of appraisal—problem-focused coping potential—and attempt to explain individual differences in appraisals along this dimension using self-efficacy theory. We integrate outcome expectancies, self-efficacy expectations, and problem-focused coping potential into a single framework and outline their personality antecedents. (...) Using generalized self-efficacy beliefs as an example, we then discuss the mechanisms underlying the effects of personality dispositions on appraisal and the conditions that moderate their influence. We conclude with the implications for theory, research, and practice. (shrink)

What it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality? It is commonly assumed that the cognitive rationality of an affective state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the state is about, its so called intentional object; but, given that moods do not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see how they can be in the offing (...) for rational assessment. In the first part of the paper I outline three ways of attributing intentionality to moods, raising for each one of them a series of problems, thus casting doubt on the viability of an intentionalist grounding for the rationality of moods. I then move to an examination of the view of moods as background feelings, which are intimately related to how we perceive the world; however, in my view, that approach fails to provide standards of assessment that would permit appraising the mood itself as rational or irrational. Finally, I look at an account of moods as mechanisms whose function is to monitor the balance between environmental demands and one’s physical or psychological resources. That is a promising way to proceed in our exploration of mood states; it faces though some formidable phenomenological challenges. All in all, defending the rationality of moods calls for a rethinking of the assumptions that are prevalent in the current literature over the representational dimension of affective states. (shrink)

Mental time travel is the ability to mentally project oneself into one’s personal past or future, in terms of memories of past events or projections of possible future events. We investigated the frequency and valence of involuntary MTT in the context of high trait worry. High and low worriers recorded the frequency and valence of involuntary memories and future projections using a structured notebook and completed measures probing individual differences related to negative affectivity. Involuntary future projections were as frequent as (...) involuntary memories. We found a positivity bias for both past and future MTT, in that fewer negative events were reported than positive or neutral ones. This positivity bias was greater for future than for past events. Individual differences related to negative affectivity were positively associated with the proportion of negative events, indicating a reduced positivity bias in individuals with a general tendency to experience negative affect. (shrink)