Johansson, in “Parfit on Fission,” rejects Parfit’s thesis that fission demonstrates that identity does not matter in survival based on the following assumption (call the person who fissions, “Mr. Fissiony” and the fission products, “Lefty” and “Righty”): It is determinately true that Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty or that he is identical to Righty, but it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty and it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Righty. Johansson argues that there (...) are identity-based answers to the following questions that apply in fission case: (Future Time) Concerning any future time, what matters in my relation to it? (Future Person) Concerning any future individual, what matters in my relation to him? The identity-based answers are these: (Future Time Answer) That I am identical with someone at that time. (Future Person Answer) That it is not false that I and that future individual are identical and that this relation of it not being false that we are identical is not close to not obtaining. I argue that the combination of these answers is inconsistent with the implication that if person C1 at t1 stands in the mattering relation to person C2 at t2, then C1 gets what matters with respect to t2 and that the degree to which the relation specified in Future Person Answer holds between Mr. Fissiony and Lefty in the fission case does not match up to the degree to which Mr. Fissiony gets what matters with respect to Lefty. (shrink)