A review of data concerning the uneven distribution of phobias suggests that nonassociative, ethological models can account for most of tile important findings that cannot be attributed to expectancy biases. The origin of a variety of fears that appear in fixed developmental patterns across divergent cultures and species can best be explained by biological models.

In his critique of preparedness theory, Davey does not address the limitations of adaptationism. The purpose of this commentary is to outline problems that arise when one assumes that mental illness (e.g., phobic disorder)musthave had adaptive significance for it to have survived the vicissitudes of natural selection.

Most phobias are focussed on a small number of fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders). A review of the evidence supporting biological and cognitive explanations of this uneven distribution of phobias suggests that the readiness with which such stimuli become associated with aversive outcomes arises from biases in the processing of information about threatening stimuli rather than from phylogenetically based associative predispositions or “biological preparedness.” This cognitive bias, consisting of a heightened expectation of aversive outcomes following fear-relevant stimuli, generates and maintains (...) robust learned associations between them. Some of the features of such stimuli which determine this expectancy bias are estimates of how dangerous they are, the semiotic similarity between them and their aversive outcomes, and the degree of prior fear they elicit. Ontogenetic and cultural factors influence these features of fear-relevant stimuli and are hence important in determining expectancy bias. The available evidence does not exclude the possibility that both expectancy biases and specific evolved predispositions coexist, but the former can explain a number of important findings that the latter cannot. (shrink)

Over two decades ago, Davids et al. (1994) and Handford et al. (1997) raised theoretical concerns associated with traditional, reductionist, mechanistic perspectives of movement coordination and skill acquisition for sport scientists interested in practical applications for training designs. These seminal papers advocated an emerging consciousness grounded in an ecological approach, signalling the need for sports practitioners to appreciate the constraints-led, deeply entangled and non-linear reciprocity between the organism (performer), task and environment subsystems. Over two decades later, the areas of skill (...) acquisition, practice and training design, performance analysis and preparation, and talent development in sport science have never been so vibrant in terms of theoretical modelling, knowledge generation and innovation, and technological deployment. Viewed at an ecological level of analysis, the work of sports practitioners has progressively transitioned toward the facilitation of an evolving relationship between an organism (athlete, team) and its environment (sports competition). This commentary sets out to explore how these original ideas from Davids et al. (1994) and Handford et al. (1997) have been advanced through the theoretical lens of Ecological Dynamics. Concurrently, we provide case study exemplars, from applied practice in high-performance sports organisations, to illustrate how these contemporary perspectives are shaping the work of sports practitioners (sport ecology designers) in practice and performance preparation. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

Studies on associative learning in normals and patients need appropriate dependent measures which are sensitive enough to reflect stimulus-specific responses and also consider the context in which the conditioning takes place. Patient's fear responses, once acquired, seem to be maintained by specific cognitive biases such as individual belief systems and a tendency to stay consistent with their previous judgments.

We reflect upon quantification in biology in two ways. First, from a sensory scientific perspective, we address theories and methods for studying sensation, perception, and cognition. Sensory science concerns action of the human senses, which are not passive receivers but operate in an active and fundamental way for human beings in various social and environmental contexts. In the past one could only handle one-to-one relationships within a univariate framework. Today we have tools to capture complexity closer to real world situations. (...) Thus, the second perspective is rooted in multivariate thinking and modeling tools. Relying mainly on soft modeling-exploratory methods, such as partial least squares regression, we claim that quantification in sensory biology in the future should be met with a dialectic view that simultaneously exploits the two perspectives. (shrink)

Davey has failed to clarify the critical evidence that could corroborate the expectancy bias hypothesis and refute preparedness theory. Such a clarification is necessary because each theory could potentially allow for multiple distal and proximal influences on selective associations. Expectancies are not the only proximal mediators. Our recent findings indicate that affective response matching may be an additional factor promoting such associations.

Each of us is uniquely subject to certain kinds of stimulation from a small part of the universe within our skins. Mentalistic psychologies insist that other kinds of events, lacking the physical dimensions of stimuli, are accessible to the owner of the skin within which they occur. One solution often regarded as behavioristic, granting the distinction between public and private events and ruling the latter out of consideration, has not been successful. A science of behavior must face the problem of (...) privacy by dealing with events within the skin in their relation to behavior, without assuming they have a special nature or must be known in a special way. (shrink)

Both the fast and frugal heuristics and the naturalistic decision making research programmes have identified important areas of inquiry previously neglected in the traditional study of human judgment and decision making, and have greatly contributed to the understanding of people's real-world decision making under environmental constraints. The two programmes share similar theoretical arguments regarding the rationality, optimality, and role of experience in decision making. Their commonalities have made them appealing to each other, and efforts have been made, by their leading (...) academics, to promote synergy and integration. However, there has been little progress towards this during the last decade. This paper seeks to address this gap by seeking to better understand their commonalities and differences. To do so, literature relating to the two programmes is reviewed. The findings of the review indicated that an integration of the two could enhance FFHs' field research in applied settings, facilitate its investigation on boundary conditions of people's decision strategy selection, enable NDM to embrace emerging research opportunities in the age of big data, as well as permit each programme to enlighten the research topics and to validate the research findings of the other. (shrink)

Davey suggests that increased resistance to extinction of CRs conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli may be due to more persistent expectancies of the UCS following these stimuli. However, this viewpoint is contradicted by existing empirical evidence that fear-relevant CRs survive an extinction trials series producing extinction of expectancies whereas CRs conditioned to non-fear-relevant CSs do not.

The replication crisis has caused researchers to distinguish between exact replications, which duplicate all aspects of a study that could potentially affect the results, and direct replications, which duplicate only those aspects of the study that are thought to be theoretically essential to reproduce the original effect. The replication crisis has also prompted researchers to think more carefully about the possibility of making Type I errors when rejecting null hypotheses. In this context, the present article considers the utility of two (...) types of Type I error probability: the Neyman–Pearson long run Type I error rate and the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability. It is argued that the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate is inapplicable in social science because it refers to a long run of exact replications, and social science deals with irreversible units that make exact replications impossible. Instead, the Fisherian sample-specific Type I error probability is recommended as a more meaningful way to conceptualize false positive results in social science because it can be applied to each sample-specific decision about rejecting the same substantive null hypothesis in a series of direct replications. It is concluded that the replication crisis may be partly due to researchers’ unrealistic expectations about replicability based on their consideration of the Neyman–Pearson Type I error rate across a long run of exact replications. (shrink)

In terms of physics, mass is the fixed attribute of an object while weight varies with the accelerative force. Neither weight nor mass are simple sensory stimuli as both involve the integration of sensory and motor information with higher cognitive processes. Studies of apparent heaviness yield only vague information about sensorimotor mechanisms.

Charles E. Osgood's theory of affective meaning defines affect as interplay of three meaning dimensions – evaluation, potency, and activity – that represent the central constituents of our affective ecology. Based on a rigorous Brunswikian sampling procedure, we selected a representative set of stimuli that mirror this ecology. A germane informative analysis explicates and corroborates the sampling approach. We then report two experiments testing whether these dimensions of affective meaning can be learnt by means of stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure. (...) Our findings yield evidence for (1) stimulus pairing effects on evaluation and activity, and (2) stimulus exposure effects on potency and activity. Overall, the findings reveal that stimulus pairing and stimulus exposure differentially influence the learning of dimensions of affective meaning. We discuss implications of this research for current emotion theories as well as its contribution to research in the cognition–emotion interface. Finally, we argue that the implementation of representative design by virtue of Brunswikian sampling promotes theory development and opens new research avenues for an original and creative science of cognition and emotion. (shrink)

The recent upsurge in “brain-training and perceptual-cognitive-training", proposing to improve isolated processes such as brain function, visual perception and decision-making, has created significant interest in elite sports practitioners, seeking to create an ‘edge’ for athletes. The claims of these related 'performance-enhancing industries' can be considered together as part of a process training approach proposing enhanced cognitive and perceptual skills and brain capacity, to support performance in everyday life activities, including sport. For example, the 'process-training industry' promotes the idea that playing (...) games not only makes you a better player, but also smarter, more alert, and a faster learner. In this position paper we critically evaluate the effectiveness of both types of process-training programmes in generalizing transfer to sport performance. These issues are addressed in three stages. First, we evaluate empirical evidence in support of perceptual-cognitive process training, and its application to enhancing sport performance. Second, we critically review putative modularised mechanisms underpinning this kind of training, addressing limitations and subsequent problems. Specifically, we consider merits of this highly specific form of training, which focuses on training of isolated processes such as cognitive processes (attention, memory, thinking) and visual perception processes, separately from performance behaviors and actions. We conclude that these approaches may, at best, may provide some 'general transfer' of underlying processes to specific sport environments, but lack 'specificity of transfer' to contextualize actual performance behaviors. A major weakness of process training methods is their focus on enhancing performance in body “modules” (e.g., eye, brain, memory, anticipatory sub-systems). What is lacking is evidence on how these isolated components are modified and subsequently interact with other process “modules”, which are considered to underlie sport performance. Finally, we propose how an ecological dynamics approach, aligned with an embodied framework of cognition undermines the rationale that modularised processes can enhance performance in competitive sport. An ecological dynamics perspective proposes that the body is a complex adaptive system, interacting with performance environments in a functionally integrated manner, emphasising that the inter-relation between motor processes, cognitive and perceptual functions and the constraints of a sport task is best understood at the performer-environment scale of analysis. (shrink)

Psychophysical scales can be constructed under suitable restrictions from appropriate data, but they still do not justify privileged internal sensations.

This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In (...) the present analysis, based on Bayes’ Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs. (shrink)

In his target article Lockhead calls attention to numerous complications that prevent a valid straightforward or Fechnerian interpretation of psychophysical data. Here I describe three additional sources of bias, all involving the influence of stimuli presented before the start of an investigation.

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 451-466, July 2022.

Gigerenzer’s ‘external validity argument’ plays a pivotal role in his critique of the heuristics and biases research program (HB). The basic idea is that (a) the experimental contexts deployed by HB are not representative of the real environment and that (b) the differences between the setting and the real environment are causally relevant, because they result in different performances by the subjects. However, by considering Gigerenzer’s work on frequencies in probability judgments, this essay attempts to show that there are fatal (...) flaws in the argument. Specifically, each of the claims is controversial: whereas (b) is not adequately empirically justified, (a) is inconsistent with the ‘debiasing’ program of Gigerenzer’s ABC group. Therefore, whatever reason we might have for believing that the experimental findings of HB lack experimental validity, this should not be based on Gigerenzer’s version of the argument. (shrink)

According to Davey, generalized expectancy biases cause fearrelevant behavior and may complement Seligman's biological preparedness model. Expectancy biases do not explain the preparedness phenomenon, because such cognitive (or covert behavioral) processes are themselves controlled by social and other environmentally based contingencies. Davey's own examination of the importance of cross-cultural factors can show the relationship between FR stimuli and behavior without needing cognitive agency to explain the behavioral phenomenon.

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

How can we study bounded rationality? We answer this question by proposing rational task analysis —a systematic approach that prevents experimental researchers from drawing premature conclusions regarding the rationality of agents. RTA is a methodology and perspective that is anchored in the notion of bounded rationality and aids in the unbiased interpretation of results and the design of more conclusive experimental paradigms. RTA focuses on concrete tasks as the primary interface between agents and environments and requires explicating essential task elements, (...) specifying rational norms, and bracketing the range of possible performance, before contrasting various benchmarks with actual performance. After describing RTA’s core components we illustrate its use in three case studies that examine human memory updating, multitasking behavior, and melioration. We discuss RTA’s characteristic elements and limitations by comparing it to related approaches. We conclude that RTA provides a useful tool to render the study of bounded rationality more transparent and less prone to theoretical confusion. (shrink)

Expectations can facilitate rapid fear conditioning and this may explain some phenomena that have been attributed to preparedness. However, preparedness remains the best explanation for some aspects of clinical phobias and the difficulty of creating fears of modern dangers. Rapid fear conditioning based on expectancy is not an alternative to an evolutionary explanation, but has, like preparedness, been shaped by natural selection.