Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Utility of Knowledge

Erkenntnis 77 (2):155-165 (2012)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA.
    Section 2.1 identifies three notions of intrinsic value: the finality sense understands it as value for its own sake, the supervenience sense identifies it with value that depends exclusively on the bearer’s internal properties, and the nonderivative sense describes intrinsic value as value that provides justification for other values and is not justified by any other value. A distinction between final intrinsic and final extrinsic value in terms of supervenience is subsequently introduced. Section 2.2 contains a discussion of the debate (...)
    $38.81 new   $40.93 used   $42.26 from Amazon    (collection)    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism.Erik J. Olsson, Trond A. Tjøstheim, Andreas Stephens, Arthur Schwaninger & Maximilian Roszko - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):417-438.
    The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that their solution works given (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • The Utility of Knowledge.Campbell Brown - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):155-65.
    Recent epistemology has introduced a new criterion of adequacy for analyses of knowledge: such an analysis, to be adequate, must be compatible with the common view that knowledge is better than true belief. One account which is widely thought to fail this test is reliabilism, according to which, roughly, knowledge is true belief formed by reliable process. Reliabilism fails, so the argument goes, because of the "swamping problem". In brief, provided a belief is true, we do not care whether or (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The value of knowledge.Duncan Pritchard, J. Adam Carter & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The value of knowledge.Carter J. Adam, Pritchard Duncan & Turri John - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations