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  1. Fellow Creatures, by Christine Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 0198753853. 272 Pp. $24.95. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):258-262.
  • Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Oxford University Press, 2018, 252pp., $24.95 , ISBN 9780198753858. [REVIEW]Joe Saunders - forthcoming - Philosophy:1-6.
  • The Place of Animals in Kantian Ethics. [REVIEW]Jonathan Birch - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35:8.
    Kantian ethics has struggled terribly with the challenge of incorporating non-human animals as beings to which we can owe obligations. Christine Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures is a bold, substantial attempt to meet that challenge. In this essay review, I set the scene for the book’s core argument, offer a reconstruction of that argument, and reflect on its strengths and limitations, arguing that it is ultimately unconvincing.
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  • A Reconsideration of Indirect Duties Regarding Non-Human Organisms.Toby Svoboda - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):311-323.
    According to indirect duty views, human beings lack direct moral duties to non-human organisms, but our direct duties to ourselves and other humans give rise to indirect duties regarding non-humans. On the orthodox interpretation of Kant’s account of indirect duties, one should abstain from treating organisms in ways that render one more likely to violate direct duties to humans. This indirect duty view is subject to several damaging objections, such as that it misidentifies the moral reasons we have to treat (...)
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  • Killing Traditions: Consistency in Applied Moral Philosophy.Lisa Kemmerer - 2004 - Ethics, Place and Environment 7 (3):151 – 171.
    This paper investigates consistency in applied moral philosophy with regard to the recent controversy over Makah whaling in the state of Washington. The first part presents both sides of the controversy. The second part examines the meaning of 'tradition' and distinguishes between 'new' and 'old' traditions. The third part explores what might constitute moral consistency for the Makah and what might constitute moral consistency for the larger community.
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  • The Value of Nonhuman Nature: A Constitutive View.Roman Altshuler - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):469-485.
    A central question of environmental ethics remains one of how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios; that is, it is a question of how to explain our experience of value in nature and, more importantly, whether that experience is justified. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, I turn to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman nature places on action dependent (...)
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  • When the Tail Wags the Dog: Animal Welfare and Indirect Duty in Kantian Ethics.Jens Timmermann - 2005 - Kantian Review 10:128-149.
    Even the most sympathetic readers of Kant's moral philosophy usually disagree with him about some aspect of his theory, or some particular moral judgement. His unqualified condemnation of lying in the essay ‘On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy’ is a classical case in question, as is his strong endorsement of retributive justice and the death penalty. A third prominent source of discontent are Kant's repeated verdicts on the moral status of non-human animals, or rather the lack thereof. For, (...)
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  • Non-Human Rights: An Idealist Perspective.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1984 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (1-4):439 – 461.
    The question whether an entity has rights is identified with that as to whether an intrinsic value resides in it which imposes obligations to foster it on those who can appreciate this value. There should be no difficulty in granting that animals have rights in this sense, but what of other natural objects and artifacts? It seems that various inanimate things, such as fine buildings and forests, often possess such intrinsic value, yet since they can only be fully actual in (...)
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