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Kant: An Introduction

Cambridge University Press (1978)

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  1. Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):529-578.
    Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...)
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  • Heidegger on Kant on the Alternative to the Scientism of the Enlightenment.Richard Mcdonough - 1997 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 28 (3):236-254.
    The paper argues that a philosopher who describes his main works as "critiques" of reason cannot be the simple defender of rational science that he is sometimes taken to be. Rather, as Heidegger argues, Kant's program is much deeper and more problematic.
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  • The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason.José Luis Bermúdez - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
  • The Incoherence of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic: Specifying the Minimal Conditions for Dialectical Error.David J. Herman - 1991 - Dialectica 45 (1):3-29.
    SummarySubjecting to a detailed analysis Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, the author posits that Kant's understanding of such error is, to the extent that it conflates the subjective‐objective, phenomenal‐noumenal, and regulative‐constitutive distinctions, fundamentally incoherent. The author argues not only that these three distinctions cannot on Kant's own terms be conflated, but also that Kant's treatment of dialectical error is further vitiated by circularity of argument: Kant proposes to explain the three distinctions by (...)
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  • The Mereology of Representation.Jessica Leech - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):205-228.
    Mental representations—like many other things—seem to have parts. However, it isn’t clear how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation. In this paper I shed new light on how representations can have a mereology. In particular, it has been recognized that there is a mereological element to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representations: intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its parts. The paper thus focuses on an (...)
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  • Synthetic Apriority.Yakir Levin - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (2):137 - 150.
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  • Reasoning Takes Time: On Allison and the Timelessness of the Intelligible Self.Fabian Freyenhagen - 2008 - Kantian Review 13 (2):67-84.
    Consider the following objection of Bennett to Kant: The least swallowable part of Kant's whole theory of freedom is the claim that the causality of freedom is not in time. This follows from Kant's doctrine that time is an appearance, and anyway the theory of freedom needs it: it is because the noumenal cause of an event is not in time, and thus is not itself an event, that it escapes the causality of nature. Kant is unembarrassed: ‘Inasmuch as it (...)
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  • Kantian Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism.Colin McLear - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Overview of the (non)conceptualism debate in Kant studies.
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  • Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2013 - Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300.
    We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
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  • The Structure of Knowing : Existential Trust as an Epistemological Category.Hildur Kalman - 1999 - Acta Universitatis Umensis 145.
    This thesis investigates the structure of knowing, and it argues that existential trust is an epistemological category. The aim of the dissertation is to develop a view according to which all human activity is seen as an activity of a lived body, and in which the understanding of the structure of such activity is regarded as central for the solution even of epistemological problems. This view is not rooted in any one philosophical tradition, but circles around activity of the lived (...)
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  • Kant on Analogy.John J. Callanan - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (4):747 – 772.
    The role of analogy appears in surprisingly different areas of the first Critique. On the one hand, Kant considered the concept to have a specific enough meaning to entitle the principle concerned with causation an analogy; on the other hand we can find Kant referring to analogy in various parts of the Transcendental Dialectic in a seemingly different manner. Whereas in the Transcendental Analytic, Kant takes some time to provide a detailed (if not clear) account of the meaning of the (...)
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  • Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty.Robert Stern - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):143-161.
    A modest transcendental argument is one that sets out merely to establish how things need to appear to us or how we need to believe them to be, rather than how things are. Stroud's claim to have established that all transcendental arguments must be modest in this way is criticised and rejected. However, a different case for why we should abandon ambitious transcendental arguments is presented: namely, that when it comes to establishing claims about how things are, there is no (...)
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  • A Problem for Causal Theories of Action.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):84–108.
    Philosophical accounts of "action" standardly take an action to be a doing which _satisfies some description that is semantically related to the content of a propositional attitude of the subject's which _explains why that doing occurred. Causal theories of action require that the explanation in question must involve the causation of action-doings by propositional attitudes (typically intentions, volitions, or combinations of belief and desire). I argue that there are actions whose status, as such, cannot be acknowledged by any causal theory, (...)
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  • Transcendental Arguments and Idealism.Ross Harrison - 1982 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:211-224.
    ‘Metaphysics’, said Bradley, ‘is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.’ This idea that reasoning is both instinctive and feeble is reminiscent of Hume; except that reasons in Hume tend to serve as the solvent rather than the support of instinctive beliefs. Instinct leads us to play backgammon with other individuals whom we assume inhabit a world which exists independently of our own perception and which will (...)
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