Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction.Byeong D. Lee - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):95-115.
    ABSTRACT: Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle and the constructivist view of the concept of epistemic justification, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   169 citations  
  • VIII—Beyond Eros: Friendship in the "Phaedrus".Frisbee C. C. Sheffield - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):251-273.
    It is often held that Plato did not have a viable account of interpersonal love. The account of eros—roughly, desire—in the Symposium appears to fail, and, though the Lysis contains much suggestive material for an account of philia—roughly, friendship—this is an aporetic dialogue, which fails, ultimately, to provide an account of friendship. This paper argues that Plato's account of friendship is in the Phaedrus. This dialogue outlines three kinds of philia relationship, the highest of which compares favourably to the Aristotelian (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Justification: Ethical and Epistemic.James A. Montmarquet - 1987 - Metaphilosophy 18 (3-4):186-199.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Determinism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation.Laurence A. BonJour - 1976 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-56.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1225-1240.
    It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Consequentialism or Deontology?Georg Spielthenner - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):217-235.
  • The Myth of Source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
    If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Epistemology and Social Work: Integrating Theory, Research and Practice Through Philosophical Pragmatism.Steve J. Hothersall - unknown
    Debates regarding theory and practice in social work have often avoided detailed discussion regarding the nature of knowledge itself and the various ways this can be created. As a result, positivistic conceptions of knowledge are still assumed by many to be axiomatic, such that context-dependent and practitioner-oriented approaches to knowledge creation and use are assumed to lack epistemological rigor and credibility. By drawing on epistemology, this theoretical paper outlines the case for a renewed approach to knowledge definition, creation and use (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events.Geert Keil - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Relational Doctrines of Space and Time.Clifford A. Hooker - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):97-130.
  • Consequentialism and Free Will.Maria Svedberg & Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2017 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 24:23-41.
    Many moral theories incorporate the idea that when an action is wrong, it is wrong because that there was something else that the agent could and should have done instead. Most notable among these are consequentialist theories. According to consequentialism an action A is wrong if and only if there was another action B that the agent could have performed such that, if the agent had performed B instead of A, the consequences would have been better. Relatively little attention has (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Butler’s Argument Against Psychological Hedonism.Robert M. Stewart - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):211-221.
    It is widely thought among philosophers that Joseph Butler's criticism of psychological egoism in his Sermons is, in the words of A.E. Duncan-Jones, 'the classic refutation of it.' Indeed, no less a philosopher than David Hume restated and put forth Butler's central argument against hedonistic egoism - without due credit - as part of his own critique. Yet recent commentators have begun to question Butler's arguments, albeit usually with sympathy and in the hope of saving what they take to be (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.
    To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Moral Emotions.Georg Spielthenner - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (17):1 - 13.
    Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they are moral emotions. In I will deal with the views (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Prudential Reasons.D. Clayton Hubin - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):63 - 81.
    Several authors, including Thomas Nagel and David Gauthier, have defended the view that reasons of self-interest (prudential reasons) are rationally binding. That is, there is always a reason, bearing on the rational advisability, based on one's self-interest and, as a result, a person may act irrationally by knowingly acting against such reasons regardless of the person's desires or values. Both Nagel and Gauthier argue from the rationally mandatory nature of prudential reasons to the conclusion that moral reasons can be rationally (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Expertise, Ethics Expertise, and Clinical Ethics Consultation: Achieving Terminological Clarity.Ana S. Iltis & Mark Sheehan - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (4):416-433.
    The language of ethics expertise has become particularly important in bioethics in light of efforts to establish the value of the clinical ethics consultation, to specify who is qualified to function as a clinical ethics consultant, and to characterize how one should evaluate whether or not a person is so qualified. Supporters and skeptics about the possibility of ethics expertise use the language of ethics expertise in ways that reflect competing views about what ethics expertise entails. We argue for clarity (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • How to Think About the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.
    In this essay I present what is, I contend, the free-will problem properly thought through, or at least presented in a form in which it is possible to think about it without being constantly led astray by bad terminology and confused ideas. Bad terminology and confused ideas are not uncommon in current discussions of the problem. The worst such pieces of terminology are "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will." The essay consists partly of a defense of the thesis that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Is Ultimate Moral Responsibility Metaphysically Impossible? A Bergsonian Critique of Galen Strawson's Argument.Mark Ian Thomas Robson - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):519-538.
    What I want to do in this essay is examine a notorious argument put forward by Galen Strawson. He advocates what he describes as an a priori argument against the possibility of ultimate (moral) responsibility. There have been many attempts at answering Strawson, but whether they have been successful is debatable. I attempt to employ Henri Bergson's approach to the free will debate and assess whether what he says has any purchase in terms of criticism of Strawson's position. I conclude (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Compromise.J. P. Day - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (250):471 - 485.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations