Switch to: References

Citations of:

Ethics

Kluwer Academic Publishers (1985)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):91-117.
    §13 of Principia Ethica contains G. E. Moore’s most famous open question arguments. Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended various forms of metaethical nonnaturalism—a doctrine Moore himself endorsed—by appeal to OQAs. Some contemporary cognitivists embrace the force of Moore’s OQAs against metaethical naturalism. And those who posit noncognitivist meaning components of ethical terms have traditionally used OQAs to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs. Despite this influence, Moore’s OQAs have been ridiculed in recent decades. Their deployment has been (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Wittgenstein, Consciousness, and the Mind.Pär Sundström - 2005 - Sorites 16 (December):6-22.
    Contrary to philosophical tradition, modern theorists of the mind have often downplayed the importance of consciousness. Instead, they have accounted for the mind in terms of phenomena like mechanisms, dispositions, abilities and even environmental features. One of many inspirations for this trend is a series of passages of the later Wittgenstein. These passages discuss a variety of specific mental phenomena, like searching, comparing, understanding and reading. The passages have often been taken them to show that one may exemplify any of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Moral Virtues.Georg Spielthenner - 2004 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 3 (1):27-35.
    Although much has been published on virtues in recent years, there is still considerable uncertainty in philosophy about the concept of a virtue and especially about moral virtues. In this article, I will try to clarify these notions. In particular, I want to answer the question: When are virtues moral virtues? Clearly, not every practical virtue is a moral virtue. Why was the courage of the Nazi soldiers in the second world war not a moral virtue, but yet is presumably (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Exceptions in Nonderivative Value.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):26-49.
    According to most substantive axiological theories – theories telling us which things are good and bad – pleasure is nonderivatively good. This seems to imply that it is always good, even when directed towards a bad object, such as another person’s suffering. This implication is accepted by the Mainstream View about misdirected pleasures: it holds that when someone takes pleasure in another person’s suffering, his being pleased is good, although his being pleased by suffering is bad. This view gains some (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Emotions.Georg Spielthenner - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (17):1 - 13.
    Moral emotions have been badly neglected by philosophical ethics. In my view to the detriment of this discipline because they are not only important for the moral evaluation of persons but also for value theory and thus also for a theory of morally right actions. This paper outlines my account of moral emotions. Emotions such as regret or shame are sometimes but not always moral emotions. I will determine when they are moral emotions. In I will deal with the views (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Against Internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.
    Argues that practical irrationality is akin to moral culpability: it is defective practical thought which one could legitimately have been expected to avoid. It is thus a mistake to draw too tight a connection between failure to be moved by reasons and practical irrationality (as in a certain kind of "internalism"): one's failure may be genuine, but not culpable, and therefore not irrational.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Moore’s Open Question Phenomenon Explained—Naturalistically.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):241-256.
    G.E. Moore’s open question arguments have been targeted by unsympathetic philosophers for close to a century. Perhaps the most serious criticism directed towards Moore’s OQAs is that they be...
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Species of Goodness.William Benjamin Bradley - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. I contend that the distinction has never been properly drawn. My main task is to formulate the distinction in a way that avoids the problems of the traditional formulations. ;After defending the traditional Moorean conception of intrinsic value against John Mackie's arguments from relativity and "queerness," and against recent attacks by Elizabeth Anderson and Shelly Kagan, I attempt to define two important types of extrinsic value (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577-597.
    This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, from which he inferred what is here called the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Subjective Rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.
    Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of (i) what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and (ii) what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations