How does the mind attribute external causes to internal sensory experiences? Adam Smith addresses this question in his little known essay ‘Of the External Senses.’ I closely examine Smith's various formulations of this problem and then argue for an interpretation of his solution: that inborn perceptual mechanisms automatically generate external attributions of internal experiences. I conclude by speculating that these mechanisms are best understood to operate by simulating tactile environments.

This paper situates Hume's views on animals in the context of the Scottish Enlightenment by contrasting them with the views of Adam Smith. While Smith is more central to the philosophical establishment of the Scottish Enlightenment, their views on morals resemble each other greatly and both think that the analogies between humans and non-human animals are useful for thinking about morals. Their estimation of the nature and extent of those analogies, however, differ widely from one another. This has been historically (...) obscured by the fact that in no single work does Smith precisely detail what he thinks non-human animals are capable of. I argue that Smith thinks non-human animal minds are different in kind from human minds. This is evident from Smith's view of how language facilitates and co-creates certain aspects of human cognition. Hume, by contrast, seems to hold that non-human animal minds differ merely by degree from human minds. After reconstructing Smith's view, I contrast it with Hume's, providing historical context to show how Hume falls outside the mainstream on this issue and Smith within it. Their views on animals reflect, broadly, their standing with respect to the wider Scottish philosophical community. (shrink)

The paper is aiming to present and analyse the notions used by Adam Smith: ‘instinct’ and ‘ appetites’. They appear in two of the Scottish philosopher’s works: in ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ and in an essay ‘ Of the External Senses’. Smith noticed that there are certain inborn mechanisms that suggest the existence of crucial needs and means leading to satisfy those needs. That concerns, mostly, hunger and thirst, but also sex drive. He regarded the need of self-preservation and (...) of caring for one’s own well-being as crucial for a man’s behaviour. The essay ‘ Of the External Senses’ mentions instinctive correlation of the objects of sight with the objects of touch as crucial for the human survival, basing on George Berkeley’s theory of vision. Smith’s remarks on appetites give a new perspective on how the mechanisms given us by Nature influence moral and social individuals, at the same time completing the philosopher’s theory. The need to care for self ’s prosperity and survival can be regarded not only as an instinct, but also as actions leading to realisation of the virtue of prudence. Moreover, we learn how to fulfil our instinctive needs and appetites within the society, searching for acceptable means. In the paper Smith’s view of instincts and appetites is also being briefly confronted with David Hume’s and Thomas Hobbes’ remarks on the subject. (shrink)

This paper traces missing links in the history of economic thought. In outlining Hume's concept of 'the reflexive mind' it shows that this opened frontiers between philosophy and psychology which Bertrand Russell denied and which logical positivism in philosophy and positive economics displaced. It relates this to Hume's influence not only on Smith, but also on Schopenhauer and the later Wittgenstein, with parallels in Gestalt psychology and recent findings from neural research and cognitive psychology. It critiques Kant's reaction to Hume's (...) claim that one may assume but cannot prove cause and effect and how Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis has been Kantian but wrong in claims for axioms that are universal truths. It illustrates how Samuelson's presumption that language and mathematics are 'identical' was as mistaken as the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein, relates this to Kleinian splitting, denial and projective identification and suggests that recovery of greater realism in economics needs to regain links with such philosophy and psychology. (shrink)