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  1. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?Kirk A. Ludwig - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 259-274.
    The paper rejects the claim that phenomena such as change and inattentional blindness show that perceptual representations are inaccurate or that a radical overhaul of our traditional picture of perception is required. The paper rejects in particular the sensorimotor theory of perception, which denies that there are any perceptual representations. It further argues that the degree of resolution of perceptual experience relevant to assessing its accuracy is determined by our use of it in standard conditions, and that the integration of (...)
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  • Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    A tese central do fiabilismo é que uma crença verdadeira é conhecimento apenas se foi produzida por um mecanismo que tende a gerar crenças verdadeiras. Como tanto o processo que gera uma dada crença quanto sua propensão a produzir crenças verdadeiras podem não ser apreendidos pelo sujeito a quem se atribui o conhecimento, o fiabilismo é uma teoria externista. A principal fonte de críticas ao fiabilismo reside precisamente na desvinculação entre o que torna crenças meramente verdadeiras conhecimento e a perspectiva (...)
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  • Vyžaduje si videnie presné reprezentácie?Ondrej Močkor - 2018 - Ostium 14 (4).
    Some philosophers claim that our visual world is just an illusion. They support this point of view with a body of empirical research which shows the fragility of our capacity to precisely represent our visual world. My aim is to show that this question is even more complicated. I will introduce a double notion of visual representation. I argue that what we called vision is a result of two distinct processing of visual information.
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  • First-person experiments.Carl Ginsburg - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.
    The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are experiencing. The (...)
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