Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Tolerating Inconsistencies: A Study of Logic of Moral Conflicts.Meha Mishra & A. V. Ravishankar Sarma - 2022 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 51 (2):177-195.
    Moral conflicts are the situations which emerge as a response to deal with conflicting obligations or duties. An interesting case arises when an agent thinks that two obligations A and B are equally important, but yet fails to choose one obligation over the other. Despite the fact that the systematic study and the resolution of moral conflicts finds prominence in our linguistic discourse, standard deontic logic when used to represent moral conflicts, implies the impossibility of moral conflicts. This presents a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Many Moral Particularisms.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83-106.
    What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question f or moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rieh counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • On essentially conflicting desires.Patricia Marino - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):274-291.
    It is sometimes argued that having inconsistent desires is irrational or otherwise bad for an agent. If so, if agents seem to want a and not-a, then either their attitudes are being misdescribed – what they really want is some aspect x of a and some aspect y of not-a – or those desires are somehow 'inconsistent' and thus inappropriate. I argue first that the proper characterization of inconsistency here does not involve logical form, that is, whether the desires involved (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Moral dilemmas, collective responsibility, and moral progress.Patricia Marino - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):203 - 225.
    Ruth Marcus has offered an account of moral dilemmas in which the presence of dilemmas acts as a motivating force, pushing us to try to minimize predicaments of moral conflict. In this paper, I defend a Marcus-style account of dilemmas against two objections: first, that if dilemmas are real, we are forced to blame those who have done their best, and second, that in some cases, even a stripped down version of blame seems inappropriate. My account highlights the importance of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Moral Coherence and Principle Pluralism.Patricia Marino - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):727-749.
    This paper develops and defends a conception of moral coherence that is suitable for use in contexts of principle pluralism. I argue that, as they are traditionally understood, coherence methods stack the deck against pluralist theories, by incorporating norms such as systematicity—that the principles of a theory should be as few and as simple as possible. I develop and defend an alternative, minimal, conception of coherence that focuses instead on consistency. It has been suggested that consistency in this context should (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas.Patricia Marino - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):517-533.
    On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Moral dilemmas and moral principles: When emotion and cognition unite.Andrea Manfrinati, Lorella Lotto, Michela Sarlo, Daniela Palomba & Rino Rumiati - 2013 - Cognition and Emotion 27 (7):1276-1291.
  • Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.
    This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic dilemmas (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Moral Dilemmas that Matter.Kevin Kimble - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):29.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral pickles, moral dilemmas, and the obligation preface paradox.Daniel Immerman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2087-2101.
    This paper introduces and defends a new position regarding the question of whether it is possible to have conflicting moral obligations. In doing so, it focuses on what I call a moral pickle. By “moral pickle” I mean a set of actions such that you ought to perform each and cannot perform all. Typically, when people discuss conflicting moral obligations, they focus on the notion of a moral dilemma, which is a type of moral pickle involving two conflicting actions. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
    Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Rationality is not coherence.Nora Heinzelmann - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 999.
    According to a popular account, rationality is a kind of coherence of an agent’s mental states and, more specifically, a matter of fulfilling norms of coherence. For example, in order to be rational, an agent is required to intend to do what they judge they ought to and can do. This norm has been called ‘Enkrasia’. Another norm requires that, ceteris paribus, an agent retain their intention over time. This has been called ‘Persistence of Intention’. This paper argues that thus (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will.Nora Heinzelmann - 2020 - Philosophia 1 (1):255-269.
    This paper shows that our popular account of weakness of will is inconsistent with dilemmas. In dilemmas, agents judge that they ought to do one thing, that they ought to do something else, and that they cannot do both. They must act against either of their two judgments. But such action is commonly understood as weakness of will. An agent is weak-willed in doing something if she judges that she ought to and could do something else instead. Thus, it seems (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Deontic logics for prioritized imperatives.Jörg Hansen - 2006 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 14 (1-2):1-34.
    When a conflict of duties arises, a resolution is often sought by use of an ordering of priority or importance. This paper examines how such a conflict resolution works, compares mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and gives preference to one developed by Brewka and Nebel. I distinguish between two cases – that some conflicts may remain unresolved, and that a priority ordering can be determined that resolves all – and provide semantics and axiomatic systems for accordingly defined (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Moral Dilemmas in Chinese Philosophy: A Case Study of the Lienü Zhuan.César Guarde-Paz - 2016 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 15 (1):81-101.
    From classical antiquity to contemporary times, challenging situations of dilemmatic or paradoxical nature continue to fascinate both scholars and the casual reader. Although Western literature provides a fruitful source of philosophical discussion on the circumstances under which a morally competent agent faces incompatible moral requirements, Sinology has rarely accepted the idea of moral dilemmas in Chinese philosophy in general and Confucianism in particular. The present paper explores moral and morally motivated dilemmas in Liu Xiang’s 劉向 Lienü Zhuan 列女傳 and the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Interlocking content and attitude: a reply to the anti-normativist.Javier González de Prado & Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1051-1072.
    ABSTRACT Anti-normativists have advanced the view that the involvement of content in norms is not an essential feature of content, but a contingent feature or side effect of the normativity governing attitudes. In this paper, we argue that, in its original formulation, this view puts too much weight on the idea that belief is the fundamental, and perhaps the only, source of content-involving normativity. In its more refined formulation, however, the view does not make justice to a neutral and encompassing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Normative conflicts and the logic of 'ought'.Lou Goble - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):450-489.
    On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Pro-tanto Obligations and Ceteris-paribus Rules.Danny Frederick - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):255-266.
    I summarize a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Content and Logic of Imperatives.Nicolas Fillion & Matthew Lynn - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):419-436.
    This paper articulates an account of imperatives that sensibly supports the idea of a logic of imperative inferences. We rebuke common objections to the very possibility of such a logic, from a perspective based on recent linguistic work on the morphosyntax of imperatives. Specifically, we develop the notion that the content of an imperative sentence includes both a force operator alongside an imperational content to which the force applies. We further argue that this account of the content of imperatives constitutes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • O intuicicionismo moral e os dilemas morais.Ricardo Bins Di Napoli - 2012 - Dissertatio 35:79-98.
    Na história da filosofia moral, por um lado, de Platão, passando por Aristoteles, I. Kant, J. S. Mill, e mais recentemente incluindo racionalistas como J. Habermas, J. Rawls, R. M. Hare e C. Korsgaard, várias tentativas foram feitas para mostrar que a razão é o melhor guia para nossas ações e julgamentos. Por outro lado, outros filósofos como D. Hume, A. Smith, A. J. Ayer, P. F. Strawson and S. Blackburn ensinaram que a moralidade deve ser uma tarefa para nossos (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity.Alexander Dietz - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (1):57-69.
    Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are ‘Dirty Hands’ Possible?Stephen de Wijze - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-28.
    This paper argues that ‘dirty hands’ (DH) scenarios, where an agent is forced to do wrong in order to do right, are conceptually coherent. The charge of incoherence is a widespread and common criticism made by deontologists and consequentialists alike. They argue that DH theorists erroneously assume the existence of real moral dilemmas and then compound this error by claiming that it is possible to engage in justified moral wrongdoing. However, such critics argue that there are only _prima facie_ moral (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is There a Moral Duty to Die?J. Angelo Corlett - 2001 - Health Care Analysis 9 (1):41-63.
    In recent years, there has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about the alleged moral right to die. If there is such a moral right, then it would seem to imply a moral duty on others to not interfere with the exercise of the right. And this might have important implications for public policy insofar as public policy ought to track what is morally right.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Impartiality and Associative Duties: David O. Brink.David O. Brink - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (2):152-172.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    I introduce a new version of Moral Error Theory, which I call Type-B Moral Error Theory. According to a Type-B theorist there are no facts of the kind required for there to be morality in stricto sensu, but there can be irreducible ‘normative’ properties which she deems, strictly speaking, to be morally irrelevant. She accepts that there are instrumental all things considered oughts, and categorical pro tanto oughts, but denies that there are categorical all things considered oughts on pain of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Type-B Moral Error Theory.Anthony Robert Booth - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2181-2199.
    I introduce a new version of Moral Error Theory, which I call Type-B Moral Error Theory. According to a Type-B theorist there are no facts of the kind required for there to be morality in stricto sensu, but there can be irreducible ‘normative’ properties which she deems, strictly speaking, to be morally irrelevant. She accepts that there are instrumental all things considered oughts, and categorical pro tanto oughts (both of which she deems morally irrelevant), but denies that there are categorical (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Paraconsistent Solution to the Problem of Moral Dilemmas.Helen Bohse - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):77-86.
    Moral dilemmas – situations in which an agent has a moral requirement to do each of two acts but cannot do both – seem to suggest some kind of inconsistency. I argue that the inconsistency felt intuitively is actually a logical inconsistency, and then go on to show that we can neither deny the existence of moral dilemmas nor give up the deontic principles involved in the deduction of a contradiction, as both our moral judgements and the deontic principles depend (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Obligation, free choice, and the logic of weakest permissions.Albert J. J. Anglberger, Nobert Gratzl & Olivier Roy - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):807-827.
    We introduce a new understanding of deontic modals that we callobligations as weakest permissions. We argue for its philosophical plausibility, study its expressive power in neighborhood models, provide a complete Hilbert-style axiom system for it and show that it can be extended and applied to practical norms in decision and game theory.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Can Every Option Be Rationally Impermissible?Chrisoula Andreou - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1309-1317.
    Moving from simple to increasingly sophisticated candidate cases, I argue against the idea that there can be cases in which, due to no fault of the agent or to any ambiguity regarding how things will go depending on which option is selected, all the options available to an agent are rationally impermissible. Whether there are cases that fit this bill—qualifying as what I will label no-fault-or-ambiguity rational dilemmas—depends on the characteristics of conclusive reasons. My reasoning leads me to the view (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.
    Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions des (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Applied Ethics Series (Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy).Jacob Blair - 2011
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Emoções e sentimentos: considerações sobre sua apropriação na abordagem dos dilemas morais.Ricardo Bins Napoli & Lauren Lacerda Nunes - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (1):129-147.
    This work aims at elucidate the reasons for appropriating the sentiments and emotions in the approach of moral dilemmas. Therefore, first it will start with an analysis of Williams in his article Ethical Consistency where the author approaches de role of the emotions such as remorse and regret, and also introduces the idea of “moral remainder” in moral dilemmas. In a second moment, this work will be concentrated in the analysis of Statman in his article The debate over the so-called (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.Michael Ridge & Sean McKeever - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • “Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):487-514.
    The claim that (OIC) “ought” implies “can” (i.e., you have an obligation only at times at which you can obey it) entails that (1) obligations that become infeasible are lost (i.e., you stop having an obligation when you become unable to obey it). Moreover, the claim that (2) obligations that become overridden are not always lost (i.e., sometimes you keep having an obligation when you acquire a stronger incompatible obligation) entails that (ONIM) “ought” does not imply “must” (i.e., some obligations (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Moral rights without balancing.Ariel Zylberman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):549-569.
    How should we think about apparent conflicts of moral rights? I defend a non-balancing and holistic specification model: non-balancing because moral rights have absolute deontic stringency regardless of any balance of independent values; holistic because the content of moral rights is limited only by that of other moral rights. Holistic Specification, as I call the model, offers a principled, non-consequentialist explanation of exceptions to moral rights. Moreover, Holistic Specification explains why moral rights matter to practical thought while rendering remedial duties (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • I ought, therefore I can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
    I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.
    There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Norms for pure desire.Victor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
    According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principlesfor coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Sollen und Können.Jens Timmermann - 2003 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 6 (1):113-122.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A New Conventionalist Theory of Promising.Erin Taylor - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):667-682.
    Conventionalists about promising believe that it is wrong to break a promise because the promisor takes advantage of a useful social convention only to fail to do his part in maintaining it. Anti-conventionalists claim that the wrong of breaking a promise has nothing essentially to do with a social convention. Anti-conventionalists are right that the social convention is not necessary to explain the wrong of breaking most promises. But conventionalists are right that the convention plays an essential role in any (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.
    Whereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what we’re morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral requirements are directly grounded by non-normative facts. This isn’t, however, to say that there is no place in the picture for moral reasons. Moral reasons exist, and they’re grounded by moral requirements. Arguing for this picture of the moral sphere requires playing both offense (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.
    Whereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what we’re morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral requirements are directly grounded by non-normative facts. This isn’t, however, to say that there is no place in the picture for moral reasons. Moral reasons exist, and they’re grounded by moral requirements. Arguing for this picture of the moral sphere requires playing both offense (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Moral holism, moral generalism, and moral dispositionalism.Luke Robinson - 2006 - Mind 115 (458):331-360.
    Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation.Luke Robinson - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):560-579.
    A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Problem of the Second Best: Conceptual Issues: Juha Räikkä.Juha Räikkä - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (2):204-218.
    In this article I shall undertake a preliminary exploration of the notion of second best. I shall follow a three-step strategy. First, I shall introduce some applications of the theorem of the second best in different fields of philosophy and social sciences. Secondly, I shall make several conceptual distinctions related to the theorem. I aim to show that there are certain theoretical results that are similar but not identical to the theorem of the second best, and that the notion of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The many moral particularisms.Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83 - 106.
    What place, if any, moral principles should or do have in moral life has been a longstanding question for moral philosophy. For some, the proposition that moral philosophy should strive to articulate moral principles has been an article of faith. At least since Aristotle, however, there has been a rich counter-tradition that questions the possibility or value of trying to capture morality in principled terms. In recent years, philosophers who question principled approaches to morality have argued under the banner of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations