Austrian economics starts out from the thesis that the objects of economic science differ from those of the natural sciences because of the centrality of the economic agent. This allows a certain a priori or essentialistic aspect to economic science of a sort which parallels the a priori dimension of psychology defended by Brentano and his student Edmund Husserl. We outline these parallels, and show how the theory of a priori dependence relations outlined in Husserl’s Logical Investigations can throw light (...) on the Austrian account of entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there (...) is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions, which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano’s borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cette étude est de montrer l'influence que la philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte a exercée sur la pensée du jeune Brentano durant la période de Würzburg (1866-1874). J'examine d'abord quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont amené Brentano à s'intéresser à la philosophie de Comte et je résume, dans un deuxième temps, les grandes lignes de l'article de Brentano sur Comte dont la version française est reproduite dans ce numéro. Dans la troisième partie de cette étude, je commente brièvement quelques (...) passages de la Psychologie d'un point de vue empirique où Brentano discute de thèmes comtiens. Je conclue cette étude par quelques remarques sur les traces laissées par le positivisme de Comte dans l'œuvre de Brentano. (shrink)

The article is trying to present reception not as such, but as a problem which reception is for historian of philosophy. It is clearly visible in the process of formation on neo-Kantianism, which programme distance themselves from any orthodoxy. As a consequence there is a need of treating a neo-philosophy as original and one-off phenomenon and not a renewal of old philosophy. As an example can serve a dead dog motif present at Hegel and Jacobi related to Spinoza.

Die Abhandlung entwickelt und vertritt folgende Thesen: (1) Brentanos Vier-Phasen-Theorie wurde unabhängig von Comtes Drei-Stadien-Gesetz entworfen . (2) Aber Brentano legte großen Wert darauf, die Übereinstim- mung beider Theorien zu unterstreichen . (3) Beide Theorien gehen von verschiedenen Geschichtsauffassungen aus: Comtes Theorie schließt die Geschichte der fundamentalen positiven Wissenschaften ein, die geradli- nig verläuft, stets aufwärts führt und durch keine gesetzmäßig auftretenden Verfallsphasen belastet wird, aber dennoch Stagnationen kennt . Dagegen bezieht sich Brentanos Theorie vorwiegend auf die Geschichte der Philo- (...) sophie, allerdings indirekt auch auf die schönen Künste . Dabei verlaufen die historischen Entwicklungen zyklisch und kennen Perioden des wissen- schaftlichen Auf- und Niederganges, die sich wiederholen . (4) Beide The- orien enthalten verschiedene Strategien, die auf eine grundlegende Erneu- erung der Philosophie abzielen . Für Comte gilt, dass die neue Philosophie positiv und unabhängig von der philosophischen Tradition arbeiten müsse . Dagegen vertritt Brentano die Auffassung, nach der die Philosophie von ihrer Methode her der Naturwissenschaft analog empirisch forscht und da- bei der philosophischen Tradition prinzipiell verpflichtet bleibt. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis addresses a group of conceptual instruments that are central to Aristotle's philosophy, namely, the concepts of pros hen, homonymy, synonymy and multivocity. These instruments are crucial to many of Aristotle's works as he devotes himself to analysing the key notions in each of his investigations using these instruments. Despite the undisputable importance of these instruments, they display severe interpretative problems, which this thesis critically evaluates. The currently established view on the relationship between homonymy and multivocity is discussed (...) and then reassessed in order to approach the definition of the so-called pros hen structure. This approach takes into account a so-far undescribed distinction of types of examples Aristotle uses and sheds new light on the assessments of the role of the pros hen structure in Aristotle’s philosophy and the theories on development in Aristotle’s thought. Niels Tolkiehn studied Philosophy and Systematic Musicology at the University of Hamburg. He continued his studies as a doctoral student at the Munich School of Ancient Philosophy, a graduate school of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Supervised by Prof. Dr. Christof Rapp, he was awarded his doctoral degree in 2019 with this dissertation. (shrink)