Argues that the path to the good life does not consist in working toward some abstract concept of the good, but rather by ameliorating the problems of the practices and institutions that make up our practical life.

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

The paper deals with the problem of Peirce’s theory of signs, placing it within the context of modern semiotics , and considers Peirce’s semiotics from the point of view of his theory of categories and in the terms of his classification of signs. The article emphasizes the complicated system of Peirce’s late, “mature”, semeiotic and his theory of Interpretant.

Kevelson remains an important figure in legal semiotics, a co-founder, along with Bernard Jackson, of the International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law, and of course a valuable and seminal commentator on Peirce in the legal domain. This paper will examine her claim, that through his collaboration with and influence on Oliver Holmes, Peirce should be regarded as a foundational figure in a history of legal realism and modern jurisprudence, and that a legal semiotic can be identified in and not (...) only extrapolated from his seminal writings. This paper will contend that the relationship between Peirce and Holmes should be seen as perplexed and disputatious, rather than close and directly influential, as Kevelson argues. However, regardless of its limitations, Kevelson’s historical inquiry helps provide the ground for a contemporary and historical account of the full picture of a Peircean based legal semiotic and jurisprudence. (shrink)

The later works of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1913) offer an extended metaphor of mind and a rich conception of the dynamics of knowledge and learning. After a ‘rhetorical turn’ Peirce develops his early ‘semiotics’ into a more general theory of sign and sign use, while integrating his pragmatism, phenomenology, and semiotics. Therefore, in this article I bring Peirce's notion of semiosis—the sign's action—to the forefront. In doing so, I hope to disclose how Peirce's rhetorical turn not only opens up towards (...) a richer conception of the dynamics of knowledge and learning, but also invites a shift of perspective from the psychological processes of learning to the semeiotic processes that characterizes the very dynamics of knowledge production. (shrink)

This article contends that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) may enhance our understanding of educational beliefs and that Peirce’s logic may be a tool to distinguish between a dogmatic and a pragmatic justification of such beliefs. The first part of the article elaborates on Peirce’s comprehension of beliefs as mediated, socially situated and future-oriented. The second part points to how Peirce promotes his “method of inquiry” as an ethos of science. The method is not judged by the conclusions it lead to (...) or by the knowledge it may produce. Contrary, as the results are unavoidably provisional and rectifiable, Peirce holds the method productive due to the norms guiding the inquiry: (1) the pragmatic principle, (2) the social principle, (3) fallibilism and (4) abduction. In sum, when adopting a peircean conception, educational research, theory building and practice should be characterized as a mutual commitment towards shared processes of joint learning. In that, Peirce’s method of inquiry may be fruitful in sorting dogmatism from pragmatism. (shrink)

Wim Wenders' film Wings of Desire tells the story of an angel who wishes to become mortal in order to know the simple joy of human life. Told from the angel's point of view, the film is shot in black and white. But at the very instant the angel perceives the realities of human experience, the film blossoms into colour. In this article, I use this film to illustrate and explore Peirce's notion of experience and his claim that ‘experience is (...) our great and only teacher’. In his 1903 Harvard lectures, Peirce placed phenomenology at the heart of his philosophy, while outlining a notion of ‘experience’ that clearly integrates his semiotics, phenomenology and pragmatism. To Peirce, experience is a ‘brutally produced conscious effect’ that comes ‘out of practice’ and is a ‘forcible modification of our ways of thinking’. But as this modification is generated by the actions and flows of signs, it is pertinent to read Peirce's notion of experience in relation to his notion of semiosis. Consequently, a Peircean reading of Wings of Desire not only helps to explore how experience teaches, but also the ways in which the rudeness of experience cannot be fully understood without considering the sign's action. (shrink)

This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls "Secondness", in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the issues Peirce raises go deep, in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst (...) in others that criticism can be resisted by the Hegelian. (shrink)

This paper considers the relation between the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and the German idealist G. W. F. Hegel . While Peirce engaged with Hegel’s thought quite extensively, his often critical comments on the latter have made it hard to see any genuine common ground between the two; recent ways of reading Hegel, however, suggest how this might be possible, where the connections between their respective metaphysical positions and views of the categories are explored here. Issues relating to their (...) epistemology and philosophies of languages are considered in a companion article. (shrink)

This paper provides a detailed account of the origins of the Psycho logical Review in 1894, of the policies and practices of its editors (James Mark Baldwin and James McKeen Cattell) during its first decade, and of the public and private disagreements that led them to dissolve their collaboration in 1904. In doing so, it sheds light on the significant roles played by specialized scientific journals in the development of specific scientific specialities, and illustrates the value for historical exploration of (...) (what anthropologists call) a 'thick description' of (what historians call) 'the fine texture of the past'. It argues that personal factors such as luck and character and temperament often have a greater impact on the way in which science actually evolves than do intellectual interests and concerns, and concludes with an analysis of the overwhelming signifi cance of this episode on the later careers of both Baldwin and Cattell. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce believed that his pragmatic philosophy could reconcile religion and science and that this reconciliation involves a religious ethics creating a real community with the cosmos and God. After some rival pragmatic approaches to God and religious belief inconsistent with Peirce's philosophy are set aside, his metaphysical plan for a reconciliation of religion and science is outlined. A panentheistic God makes the best match with his desired conclusions from the Neglected Argument for the reality of God, and this (...) God is also capable of fulfilling the pragmatic role demanded by Peirce's ethical expectations for the intelligent functioning of religion. The discussion proceeds to an elaboration of the aesthetic, metaphysical, and ethical elements of Peirce's philosophical system, which indicate why Peirce's religious ethics is best categorized as akin to Stoicism, with some Christian elements. For Peirce, religious ethics proceeds from the (potentially universal) agapic community's cooperation with God's loving creativity of the universe. (shrink)

The starting point for this article is the question of the relationship between Darwinism and Christian theology. I suggest that evolutionary theory presents three broad issues of relevance to theology: the phenomena ofcontinuity, naturalism, andcontingency. In order to formulate a theological response to these issues I draw on the semiotics (theory of signs) and cosmology of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce developed a triadic theory of signs, underpinned by a threefold system of metaphysical categories. I propose a semiotic (...) model of the Trinity based on Peirce's semiotics and categories. According to this model the sign‐processes (such as the genetic “code”) that are fundamental to life may be understood as vestiges of the Trinity in creation. I use the semiotic model to develop a theology of nature that addresses the issues raised by evolutionary theory. The semiotic model amounts to a proposal for a new metaphysical framework within which to understand the relationship between God and creation and between theology and science. (shrink)

Edgar Allan Poe’s standing as a literary figure, who drew on (and sometimes dabbled in) the scientific debates of his time, makes him an intriguing character for any exploration of the historical interrelationship between science, literature and philosophy. His sprawling ‘prose-poem’ Eureka (1848), in particular, has sometimes been scrutinized for anticipations of later scientific developments. By contrast, the present paper argues that it should be understood as a contribution to the raging debates about scientific methodology at the time. This methodological (...) interest, which is echoed in Poe’s ‘tales of ratiocination’, gives rise to a proposed new mode of—broadly abductive—inference, which Poe attributes to the hybrid figure of the ‘poet-mathematician’. Without creative imagination and intuition, Science would necessarily remain incomplete, evenby its own standards. This concern with imaginative (abductive) inference ties in nicely with his coherentism, which grants pride of place to the twin virtues of Simplicity and Consistency, which must constrain imagination lest it degenerate into mere fancy. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore Peirce's work for insights into a theory of learning and cognition for education. Our focus for this exploration is Peirce's paper The Fixation of Belief (FOB), originally published in 1877 in Popular Science Monthly. We begin by examining Peirce's assertion that the study of logic is essential for understanding thought and reasoning. We explicate Peirce's view of the nature of reasoning itself—the characteristic guiding principles or ‘habits of mind’ that underlie acts of inference, the dimensions (...) of and interaction between doubt and belief, and his four methods of resolving or ‘fixing’ belief (i.e., tenacity, authority, a priori, and experimentation). The four methods are then juxtaposed against current models of teaching and learning such as constructivism, schema theory, situated cognition, and inquiry learning. Finally, we discuss Peirce's modes of inference as they relate educationally to the resolution of doubt and beliefs and offer an example of belief resolution from an experienced teacher in a professional development environment. (shrink)

Among his other contributions to advancing our understanding of classical American pragmatism and, in particular, Charles S. Peirce, none is more worthy of our attention than Richard S. Robin's characteristically painstaking attempt to address the puzzle of Peirce's "Proof" of pragmaticism.1 In this as in so many other respects,2 he shows himself to be, in effect, the student of Max H. Fisch (see especially 1986, chapter 19).3 There are hermeneutical traditions as well as philosophical ones and often the former are (...) integral parts of the latter. This is certainly the case regarding pragmatism. A deeper or better understanding of the inaugural figures in this philosophical movement is taken, by the interpreters of.. (shrink)

Peirce was a thinker who claimed that his mind had been thoroughly formed by his rigorous training in the natural sciences. But he was also the author who proclaimed that nothing is truer than true poetry. In making the case for Peirce’s relevance to issues of education, then, it is necessary to do justice to the multifaceted character of his philosophical genius, in particular, to the experimentalist cast of his mind and his profound appreciation for the aesthetic, the imaginative, and (...) (more narrowly) the metaphorical in their myriad guises. My aim in this paper is to go some distance, however small, toward doing such justice to Peirce. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : Alfred Fouillee's doctrine of ideas-forces approximates historically and intellectually William James’s theory of will. But Fouillee's criticism of pragmatism also has connections with Pierce's emphasis on the real and the analysis of concepts, and shows an influence of tychism approaching mysticism. -/- .

This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed (...) by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce frequently mentioned reading Richard Whately's Elements of Logic when he was 12 years old. Throughout his life, Peirce emphasized the importance of that experience. This valorization of Whately is puzzling at first. Early in his career Peirce rejected Whately's central logical doctrines. What valuable insight concerning logic was robust enough to survive these specific rejections? Peirce recommended a biographical approach to understanding his philosophy. This essay follows that suggestion by considering Peirce's reading of Whately in a larger (...) life context. Surprisingly many factors in Charles Peirce's personal and intellectual development were at play when he read Whately. His father, Benjamin Peirce, oversaw rigorous home schooling intended to train young Charley for a brilliant intellectual career. Laboratory experience with qualitative chemical analysis exposed the boy to the logic of scientific investigation, specifically to the hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry. However, tensions between father and son developed over Charles' wish to devote his life to studying the logic of science. The two also disagreed upon the value of formal science. Against this background we will review relevant logical doctrines of Whately's book, as well as his innovative formalizing practice of logical inquiry. Then we will see that it was Whately's lessons about formal science that were of such importance to Peirce. (shrink)

In this paper I synthesize a unified system out of Peirce's life work, and name it Peirce's Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism. Peirce developed this philosophy in four stages: His 1868–69 theory that cognition is a continuous and infinite social semiotic process, in which Man is a sign. His Popular Science Monthly pragmatism and frequency theory of probabilistic induction. His 1891–93 cosmic evolutionism of Tychism, Synechism, and Agapism. Pragmaticism: The doctrine of real potentialities, and Peirce's pragmatic program for developing concrete reasonableness. Peirce's (...) evolutionary conception of the cosmos is pantheistic, and he constructed it to reconcile religion with Darwinian evolution. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce, polymath, philosopher, logician, lived a life of often wild extremes and, when he died in 1914, had earned a vile reputation as a debauched genius. Yet he created a unified, profound and brilliant work, both published and unpublished, a fact difficult to explain. In my 1993 biography, I proposed three hypotheses to account for his Jekyll-Hyde character: his obsession with the puzzle of meaning, two neurological pathologies, trigeminal neuralgia and left-handedness, and the powerful influence of his father. (...) After publication, further research has led me to propose two additional hypotheses to explain his extraordinary life: manic-depressive illness and mystical experience, the last greatly influencing the development of his doctrine of semeiotic, of which his logic of science is a part. (shrink)

The process of ‘logical differentiation’ was introduced by Peirce in 1870. Directly analogous to mathematical differentiation, it uses logical terms instead of mathematical variables. Here, this mysterious process receives new interpretations which serve to clarify Peirce’s use of logical terms. I introduce the logical terms, the operation of multiplication, the logical analogy to the binomial theorem, infinitesimal relatives, the concepts of numerical coefficients and the number associated with each term. I also analyse the algebraic development of ‘logical differentiation’ and consider (...) in depth one application of the process. (shrink)

Kelly’s work was formed and developed in the context of the American philosophical movement known as pragmatism. The major figures to which this tradition is attributed are Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. In Personal Construct Psychology, Dewey was acknowledged by Kelly and by subsequent writers as perhaps his most important influence. It has recently become increasingly apparent, however that Peirce was a much more pervasive and crucial influence on James and Dewey than has previously been recognized. Kelly (...) did not mention Peirce but a close reading of the two writers reveals a remarkable correspondence and relationship between their two bodies of work. To set these two thinkers side by side proves to be an interesting and productive exercise. In this paper, after introducing Peirce and examining the relationship between him and Dewey, Kelly’s basic philosophical assumptions, as outlined at the beginning of Volume 1 of the Psychology of Personal Constructs, are used as a framework for exploring their similarities and differences. The result is an enrichment of our understanding of Kelly’s philosophy which allows us to make links with many different subsequent thinkers’ ideas and provides a basis for exploring the psychological aspects of the two men’s work. The latter forms the subject of Part II of this series which is in preparation. (shrink)

Kelly suggested that it was useful to consider anyone as functioning as a scientist, in the business of applying theories, making hypotheses and predictions and testing them out in the practice of everyday life. One of Charles Peirce’s major contributions was to develop the disciplines of logic and the philosophy of science. We can deepen and enrich our understanding of Kelly’s vision by looking at what Peirce has to say about the process of science. For Peirce, the essence of science (...) was the application of the laws of inference. He developed a much broader concept of logic, elaborating the processes of deduction and induction and adding to these the logic of hypothetical inference, or ‘abduction’, even as Kelly broadened it further in his “departure from classical logic”. Examining the implications of these three forms of inference allows us to elaborate the dynamics involved in the process of construing, ordinacy and the cycles of experience, creativity and decision making. This is the second of a three part series examining the relationship between the work of Peirce and Kelly. The third will include a look at phenomenology, bipolarity, the self, dialogical process and sociological considerations. (shrink)

A pesquisa tem como objeto de estudo as comunidades digitais. O que garante relações efetivas entre os integrantes ou entre os integrantes e as ideias que circulam na comunidade, ou entre tais ideias a ponto de garantir a permanência da comunidade, bem como para o delineamento de tendências para o crescimento dessas ideias na comunidade?, é a pergunta norteadora. A partir dos conceitos de Charles S. Peirce de comunidade, lançamos a hipótese de que a comunidade permanece, pois pode construir uma (...) ambiência movida pelo amor evolutivo ou agapismo, e tende a contribuir para o aumento da razoabilidade concreta. Sendo assim, a pesquisa objetiva contribuir para a compreensão de como o amor evolutivo (ágape) se atualiza em uma comunidade e como a razoabilidade concreta nela se move. Nesse caso, consideramos que os Otaku se constituem como uma réplica para o conceito de comunidade, no sentido peirceano. Da mesma forma, nossos objetivos específicos são: argumentar sobre os vínculos entre amor evolutivo, comunidade e pragmaticismo no interior da arquitetura filosófica peirceana, além da noção de réplica em Peirce; identificar os produtos postos em circulação pela comunidade Otaku; inventariar o potencial de significados de um produto selecionado, ou atentar para o interpretante imediato do produto enquanto signo; identificar interpretantes dinâmicos vinculados ao produto selecionado; desenhar uma tendência para os interpretantes dinâmicos e argumentar sobre pistas que permitam aproximar o grupo dos Otaku com a ideia de comunidade em Peirce. Para tanto, tomamos como corpus seis capítulos publicados do manga One Piece pelo grupo de fãs OPEX, e as mensagens deixadas pelos leitores no mesmo site. As análises seguem um percurso metodológico orientado pelo conceito de interpretante e suas modalidades, proposto por Johanssen e Santaella, a partir da teoria peirceana. Assim, analisamos primeiro o potencial de significados latente no manga; depois os comentários, como efeitos atualizados do manga; e então uma nuvem de pontos formada pelos comentários classificados, para detectar tendências, a presença da ação de uma lei. A partir das análises, concluiuse que os efeitos do manga nos fãs (que dominam o manga) se apresentam nos comentários que sinalizam para interpretantes emocionais, energéticos e lógicos. Além disso, a nuvem de pontos sugere o estabelecimento de um hábito na comunidade, indicando o crescimento da razoabilidade concreta. Isso permite que aproximemos a o grupo de fãs da comunidade de Peirce, como uma réplica do primeiro nível da comunidade, a do amor, confirmando nossa hipótese. A exploração do conceito de comunidade, na perspectiva peirceana, e a proposta e aplicação do método de análise do movimento de ideias na comunidade digital, a partir da teoria dos interpretantes, constituem a relevância da pesquisa para a área. (shrink)

The article demonstrates how Charles Sanders Peirce built cosmological ideas based on the analysis of the specifics of a human being. It is proved that the possibility of a certain degree of anthropocentrism in Peirce’s cosmological conception was laid down in the categorical system, including the level of the Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It is shown why according to his scientific metaphysics, for everyone, the concept that corresponds to human nature is more true than other ones, as well as why (...) a person instinctively feels the truth. This situation is possible because the laws of thought are formulated in accordance with the laws of nature. Human nature reflects what is in the world. Thus, through self-knowledge, a person also discovers reality itself as a dynamic universe in which the physical and he mental, the real and the ideal are subject to the same laws. However, human beings do not know all of them, but only those that correspond to the level of their understanding and interests. Subsequently, science and technology are built on the basis of individuals’ own intentions. Human beings realize that the universe is boundless and not everything they are able to understand and justify. This makes fallibilism inevitable. It is analyzed how to solve the difficulties of fallibilism; Peirce proposed to use the concept of practical certainty as a basic criterion for recognizing the system of knowledge about the world as true. It is shown that the concepts of tychism, synechism, and agapism, which reveal the meaning of Peirce’s cosmological theory of evolution, are also based on the principles of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. Thus, it is argued that human being becomes the key to understanding Peirce’s metaphysical cosmology. (shrink)

One of the least explored areas of C.S. Peirce's wide range of work is his contributions to psychology and the philosophy of mind. This dissertation examines the corpus of this work, especially as it relates to the subjects of mind, habit, instinct, sentiment, emotion, perception, consciousness, cognition, and community. The argument is that Peirce's contributions to these areas of investigation were both highly original and heavily influenced by the main intellectual currents of his time. An effort has been made to (...) present Peirce's philosophy without apology, within the conceptual framework and idiom of its time, and without appeal to a comprehensive view that Peirce never articulated. Nevertheless, as several noted interpreters have argued, much of this work can be viewed through the lens of Peirce's innovative theory of signs and the notion of the semiotic triad as its central unifying feature, despite the fact that the general theory was itself under continuous refinement and remained incomplete at the time of his death. Another hermeneutical device employed is William James' better known and more accessible work which, when juxtaposed with Peirce's ideas, serves to bring them into sharper relief. While general and historical in the presentation of material, this study seeks, at the same time, to engage the criticism of contemporary Peirce scholars in an attempt to account for several of the conundrums inherent in Peirce's work. Among the problems with implications for his philosophy of mind and theory of inquiry are the limitations of his theory of continuity, his negative view of the self, his somewhat ambiguous position on the relation of psychology to logic, and the metaethical puzzle arising from application of his theory of probable inference to truly fateful decisions. These problems provide an interesting perspective and lend balance to the truly insightful contributions Peirce made to the discovery of the mind. (shrink)