Celem artykułu jest częściowe uzasadnienie negacji tezy, którą nazywam tezą o genezie realizmu strukturalnego. Dotyczy ona postulowanych w obrębie pewnej metafilozoficznej narracji związków między współczesnymi stanowiskami zwanymi epistemicznym realizmem strukturalnym i ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym a poglądami filozofów z początku XX wieku. W artykule rekonstruuję wymienione dwa stanowiska, postulowane związki, jakie mają one mieć z dwoma filozofami, Henri Poincarém oraz Ernstem Cassirerem, a następnie przedstawiam, dlaczego te postulowane związki są nietrafnie rozpoznane. Niesie to za sobą wnioski dotyczące swoistości wymienionych stanowisk oraz (...) pojęć obiektywności i rzeczywistości w ich kontekście. (shrink)

This paper examines the implications of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies for contemporary philosophy and psychology. Part I analyzed Johannes Peter Muller’s canonical formulation of the Doctrine, arguing that it follows from empirical results combined with methodological principles. Here, I argue that these methodological principles remain valid in psychology today, consequently, any naturalistic philosophy of perception must accept the Doctrine’s skeptical conclusion, that the qualities of our perceptual experience are not determined by, and thus do not reveal the nature (...) of, their causes in the world. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we must be global skeptics; rather, I argue that contemporary epistemology of perception should embrace Muller’s own response to the Doctrine: epistemic structural realism. As articulated by Muller’s student, Helmholtz, structural realism follows from the Doctrine once we recognize that active exploration constitutes part of the mechanism that determines perceptual experience, a view congenial to contemporary theories of embodied perception in cognitive science. Structural realists in philosophy of science should likewise heed the lessons of the Doctrine, as it played a critical part in the early history of their view, and may still serve a constructive role as exemplar today. (shrink)

Philosophy of science in the twentieth century tends to emphasize either the logic of science (e.g., Popper and Hempel on explanation, confirmation, etc.) or its history/sociology (e.g., Kuhn on revolutions, holism, etc.). This dichotomy, however, is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Questions regarding scientific understanding and mathematical explanation do not fit neatly inside either category, and addressing them has drawn from both logic and history. Additionally, interest in scientific and mathematical practice has led to work that falls between the two sides (...) of the dichotomy. We might call these less narrow approaches ‘holistic’. Prior to 1918, work in the philosophy of science was also somewhat more holistic and interdisciplinary in nature. An exemplar of this type of approach is found in the work of Henri Poincaré. In this paper I will consider one particularly flexible tool Poincaré uses throughout his philosophical writings about science and mathematics: the tool of the unifying concept. More specifically, I will focus on one unifying concept: that of structure. I aim to show first, that structure is a unifying scientific concept for Poincaré; second, a focus on structure helps explain his scientific and mathematical success; lastly, this case study may provide a model for how unifying concepts can facilitate progress in mathematics and science. (shrink)