In this paper I approach the hermeneutic of living nature as suggested by Martin Heidegger in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. On the basis of complex hermeneutic procedures, Heidegger held the well-known thesis about the animal’s poverty of world. My hypothesis is that the relevance of this thesis should be minimized for the sake of the acknowledgment of a poverty in the world proper to human beings. Poverty in the world refers to the main result of a comparison between the (...) structure of the intentionality of animals and the transcendental-formative structure of human existence. Such a comparison does not only point out the lack of the “something as something-structure” in the intentionality of animals, but also the necessary fragmentation in the human sharing of life’s intentionality. From here results a very important semantic limitation, for every meaningful speech about animal life should take into account the incompleteness in the sharing of the intentional spheres of living beings and humans. I conclude suggesting a set of questions that should be focused in a constructive hermeneutic of living nature. Key words: Heidegger, hermeneutic of nature, lfe, intentionality. (shrink)

Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions (...) of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness. (shrink)

To address the question posed in the title, I focus on Heidegger's conception of linguistic communication developed in the sections on Rede and Gerede of Being and Time. On the basis of a detailed analysis of these sections I argue that Heidegger was a social externalist but semantic internalist. To make this claim, however, I first need to clarify some key points that have led critics to assume Heidegger's commitment to social externalism automatically commits him to semantic externalism regarding concept (...) use. I begin by explaining the independence of those positions, arguing that social externalism answers the question of whose concepts in a linguistic community are properly individuated, whereas semantic externalism makes a claim about what it takes for concepts to be properly individuated. Once these issues are distinguished, it is possible to see that Heidegger's intersubjectivist conception of language commits him to social externalism, while his conception of the ontological difference commits him to semantic internalism. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present-at-hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further (...) claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present-at-hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative. (shrink)

Hubert Dreyfus has recently invoked the work of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty in criticizing the ‘Myth of the Mental’. In criticizing that supposed myth, Dreyfus argues for a kind of foundationalism that takes embodied coping to be a self‐sufficient layer of human experience that supports our ‘higher’ mental activities. In turn, Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology is found, in Dreyfus’s recent writings, to corroborate this foundationalism. While Merleau‐Ponty would agree with many of Dreyfus’s points, this paper argues that he would not, in fact, agree with (...) the foundationalism. Furthermore, when understood in the right way, Merleau‐Ponty’s early phenomenology supports the idea, opposed to Dreyfus’s foundationalism, that conceptual activities are tied up with our coping activities. The paper ends by considering the upshot of this reading of Merleau‐Ponty’s work for Dreyfus’s phenomenology. (shrink)

Kajian ini mengangkat pemikiran dua filsuf besar yaitu Martin Heidegger dan Mullā Şadrā dalam suatu kajian Filsafat Manusia dengan topik pembahasan ‘Struktur Fundamental Manusia’. Problem yang diangkat adalah bagaimana kesejalanan atau paralelisme gagasan keduanya mengenai struktur fundamental manusia. Penelitian ini berusaha mencari hakikat manusia menurut pandangan Martin Heidegger dan Mullā Şadrā kemudian mensintesiskannya dengan metode paralelisme. Penelitian ini penulis rasa penting, di samping untuk memperkaya dialog pemikiran antar peradaban, juga karena kedua filsuf ini memiliki kesamaan prinsip ontologis dalam fondasi filsafatnya (...) yaitu, Ada. Pandangan ini kemudian disebut dengan ‘reduksi ontologis’. Keduanya yakin bahwa tidak ada problem filsafat yang dapat terselesaikan kecuali pertanyaan tentang Ada terjawab secara memadai. Pandangan reduksi ontologis ini termanifes dalam bangunan pemikiran dan kritik keduanya, terutama dalam studi ini adalah gagasan mengenai manusia yang bersandar pada prinsip ke swa-buktian Ada. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini ialah metode komparatif khusus yaitu Paralelisme. Paralelisme adalah teori interpretasi atau metode komparasi khusus yang berupaya mencari paralelitas atau kesejalanan formulasi pemikiran antara dua filsuf yang memiliki perbedaan konteks, penekanan, pendekatan arah pemikiran dan solusi, namun memiliki karakteristik gagasan yang sejalan, sebangun atau paralel. Dari penelitian ini penulis menyimpulakan bahwa, Paralelisme Struktur Fundamental Manusia menurut Heidegger dan Mullā Şadrā menunjukan suatu kritik pada pandangan yang telah mengakar dalam diskursus filsafat Barat modern yang dipelopori oleh Rene Descartes. Heidegger secara terang menunjukan ketidakterimaannya pada pandangan tentang diri dalam filsafat Cartesian dan mendobraknya dengan gagasan manusia Dasein sebagai eksisten yang memahami dirinya sendiri dalam pra-struktur memahami, secara eksistensial dan mendahului suatu refleksi atau aktifitas kognitif apapun tentang diri Aku. Demikian pula Mullā Şadrā, walaupun hidup seabad dengan Rene Descartes, secara tidak langung mengkritik tradisi filsafat rasionalisme semacam itu dengan mengembangkan gagasan ilmu ḥudhūrī-nya, bahwa pengetahuan akan Aku atau diri ini bersifat imanen dalam dirinya sendiri dan mendahului segala bentuk konsepsi atau refleksi mengenai diri serta menjadi dasar bagi pengetahuan empiris. (shrink)