Many consider play a natural part of childhood, and although there is disagreement in the literature on what essentially defines “play” in childhood, philosophical theories of play tend to support this initial consideration. But is childhood play also something we owe each other within a framework of educational justice? This is a question yet to be addressed. In this paper, I answer this question affirmatively. I take off from a generic account of educational justice and argue that childhood play should (...) be considered a central entitlement of this account. I then argue in line with the capability approach that if we ought to protect childhood play, it should be children’s capability for play rather than the functioning of play that needs protection. I end by offering an account of the capability for childhood play. (shrink)

Social inclusion can refer to the ability of individuals and groups to participate in social activities and the extent to which they feel included and recognized as valuable and able to make contributions. I explore the social inclusion of children in K-12 education (ages 4 - 18), and argue it is vital for the development and exercise of attitudes and capacities such as hope and local autonomy. Since schools are tasked with developing children's skills and knowledge, the extent to which (...) they succeed will play a large role in limiting or enabling children's social inclusion both when they become adults and as children. Children's relationships are an important aspect of their school experiences, as they affect not only whether they feel connected to others but also what they deem to be the grounds of their inclusion. Schools can also equip children with the skills and experiences required for social interactions with others in better and worse ways, fostering children's attitudes towards themselves, others, and the world and affecting whether they think they have the resources to have an impact on their environment and society and can achieve both personal and shared goals. (shrink)

In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become increasingly popular amongst philosophers, and according to which children, perhaps in virtue of their biological features, have special and valuable capacities, and, more generally, privileged access to some sources of value. This article provides a conceptual map of these views and their possible (...) interpretations, and notes their bearing on issues of population ethics and on the duties that we are owed during childhood. (shrink)

Do states have a right to exclude prospective immigrants as they see fit? According to statists the answer is a qualified yes. For these authors, self-determining political communities have a prima facie right to exclude, which can be overridden by the claims of vulnerable groups such as refugees and children born in the state’s territory. However, there is a concern in the literature that statists have not yet developed a theory that can protect children born in the territory from being (...) excluded from the political community. For if the self-determining political community has the right to decide who should form the self in the first place, then that right should count against both newcomers by immigration and newcomers by birth. Or so the concern goes. In this essay, I defend statism against this line of criticism and provide a liberal justification for the inclusion of children born within the state’s borders. My account leads to some surprising implication for citizenship law, as well as immigration arrangements in the area of asylum and unauthorized immigration. (shrink)