- Neurology, psychology, and the meaning of life: On Thagard's The Brain and the Meaning of Life.Iddo Landau - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):604-618.details
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Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.details
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Reasons in Action.Michael Pendlebury - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):341 - 368.details
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The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.details
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Do reasons drain away?Aaron Wolf - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6785-6802.details
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The compulsory curriculum and beyond: A reply to Peter Gardner.John White - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 19 (1):129–136.details
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The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.details
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The consequences of taking consequentialism seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.details
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Actions, inactions and the temporal dimension.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):30-31.details
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Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.details
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Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.details
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The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable.Andrew Stewart - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.details
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What goals are to count?Mark D. Spranca - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-30.details
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On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1211-1223.details
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Who is the Scientist-Subject? A Critique of the Neo-Kantian Scientist-Subject in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s Objectivity.Esha Shah - 2017 - Minerva 55 (1):117-138.details
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Free will and the structure of motivation.David Shatz - 1985 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-82.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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Goals, values and benefits.Frederic Schick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-29.details
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Can goals be uniquely defined?Ilana Ritov - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):28-29.details
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Broadening the base for bringing cognitive psychology to bear on ethics.Peter Railton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):27-28.details
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A defense of two optimistic claims in ethical theory.Stuart Rachels - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):1-30.details
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A “should” too many.Paul M. Pietroski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):26-27.details
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Some examples of nonconsequentialist decisions.Gerald M. Phillips - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):25-26.details
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Objective Reasons.Michael Pendlebury - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):533-563.details
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Mill’s proof and the guise of the good.Francesco Orsi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):93-105.details
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Charity and moral imperatives.Douglas Odegard - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):81-94.details
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Side effects: Limitations of human rationality.Keith Oatley - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):24-25.details
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Does consequentialism pay?Adam Morton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):24-24.details
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Is Life’s Meaning Ultimately Unthinkable?: Guy Bennett-Hunter on the Ineffable.Thaddeus Metz - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1247-1256.details
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God, the meaning of life, and a new argument for atheism.Jason Megill & Daniel Linford - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (1):31-47.details
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Consequentialism in haste.Roger A. McCain - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):23-24.details
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Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.details
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Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.details
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Jonathan Baron, consequentialism and error theory.Sanford S. Levy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):22-23.details
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On begging the question when naturalizing norms.Leonard D. Katz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-22.details
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Max Stirner’s Ontology.John Jenkins - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):3-26.details
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Departing from consequentialism versus departing from decision theory.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-21.details
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Elicitation rules and incompatible goals.Julie R. Irwin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):20-21.details
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Values as constraints on affordances: Perceiving and acting properly.Bert H. Hodges & Reuben M. Baron - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (3):263–294.details
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Truth or consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.details
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Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity.Noam Gur - 2019 - In Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (eds.), The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought. Springer Verlag. pp. 151-170.details
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Consequences of consequentialism.Rick Grush - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):18-19.details
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Moral errors.Clark Glymour - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):17-18.details
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Is consequentialism better regarded as a form of reasoning or as a pattern of behavior?Steve Fuller - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-17.details
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Consequentialism and utility theory.Deborah Frisch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-16.details
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Belief and Motivation.Daniel Friedrich - 2013 - Theoria 80 (3):255-268.details
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Normative and descriptive consequentialism.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):15-16.details
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How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
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