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  1. Semantic games with chance moves revisited: from IF logic to partial logic.Xuefeng Wen & Shier Ju - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1605-1620.
    We associate the semantic game with chance moves conceived by Blinov with Blamey’s partial logic. We give some equivalent alternatives to the semantic game, some of which are with a third player, borrowing the idea of introducing the pseudo-player called Nature in game theory. We observe that IF propositional logic proposed by Sandu and Pietarinen can be equivalently translated to partial logic, which implies that imperfect information may not be necessary for IF propositional logic. We also indicate that some independent (...)
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  • Belief system foundations of backward induction.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403.
    Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.
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  • Revising predictions.Giacomo Bonanno - 2001 - In Johan van Benthem (ed.), Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge.
    Making a prediction is essentially expressing a belief about the future. It is therefore natural to interpret later predictions as revisions of earlier ones and to investigate the notion of belief revision in this context. We study, both semantically and syntactically, the following principle of minimum revision of prediction: “as long as there are no surprises, that is, as long as what actually occurs had been predicted to occur, then everything which was predicted in the past, if still possible, should (...)
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  • Wiebe van der Hoek Michael Wooldridge.Michael Wooldridge - 2003 - Studia Logica 75:125-157.
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