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  1. Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.) - 2014 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
    This book illustrates the program of Logical-Informational Dynamics. Rational agents exploit the information available in the world in delicate ways, adopt a wide range of epistemic attitudes, and in that process, constantly change the world itself. Logical-Informational Dynamics is about logical systems putting such activities at center stage, focusing on the events by which we acquire information and change attitudes. Its contributions show many current logics of information and change at work, often in multi-agent settings where social behavior is essential, (...)
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  • A Note on the Epistemological Value of Pretense Imagination.Tom Schoonen - 2021 - Episteme:1-20.
    Pretense imagination is imagination understood as the ability to recreate rational belief revision. This kind of imagination is used in pretend-play, risk-assessment, etc. Some even claim that this kind of hypothetical belief revision can be grounds to justify new beliefs in conditionals, in particular conditionals that play a foundational role in the epistemology of modality. In this paper, I will argue that it cannot. I will first provide a very general theory of pretense imagination, which I formalise using tools from (...)
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  • The Logical Development of Pretense Imagination.Aybüke Özgün & Tom Schoonen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-27.
    We propose a logic of imagination, based on simulated belief revision, that intends to uncover the logical patterns governing the development of imagination in pretense. Our system complements the currently prominent logics of imagination in that ours in particular formalises the algorithm that specifies what goes on in between receiving a certain input for an imaginative episode and what is imagined in the resulting imagination, as well as the goal-orientedness of imagination, by allowing the context to determine, what we call, (...)
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  • Probability and time.Marco Zaffalon & Enrique Miranda - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence 198 (C):1-51.
  • Modeling Reasoning in a Social Setting.Johan van Benthem - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (2):235-265.
    In this survey and position paper, we discuss some issues in logical modeling of interactive behavior. We draw together a number of lines in current logics for social action, emphasizing uses of ‘small models’ rather than complex spaces.
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  • An axiomatic characterization of temporalised belief revision in the law.Luciano H. Tamargo, Diego C. Martinez, Antonino Rotolo & Guido Governatori - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (4):347-367.
    This paper presents a belief revision operator that considers time intervals for modelling norm change in the law. This approach relates techniques from belief revision formalisms and time intervals with temporalised rules for legal systems. Our goal is to formalise a temporalised belief base and corresponding timed derivation, together with a proper revision operator. This operator may remove rules when needed or adapt intervals of time when contradictory norms are added in the system. For the operator, both constructive definition and (...)
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  • Merging DEL and ETL.Tomohiro Hoshi - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (4):413-430.
    This paper surveys the interface between the two major logical trends that describe agents’ intelligent interaction over time: dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) and epistemic temporal logic (ETL). The initial attempt to “merge” DEL and ETL was made in van Benthem et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) and followed up by van Benthem et al. (J Phil Logic 38(5):491–526, 2009) and Hoshi (Epistemic dynamics and protocol information. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University Stanford, 2009a). The merged framework provides a (...)
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  • Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models.Sujata Ghosh & Rineke Verbrugge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4265-4307.
    How do people reason about their opponent in turn-taking games? Often, people do not make the decisions that game theory would prescribe. We present a logic that can play a key role in understanding how people make their decisions, by delineating all plausible reasoning strategies in a systematic manner. This in turn makes it possible to construct a corresponding set of computational models in a cognitive architecture. These models can be run and fitted to the participants’ data in terms of (...)
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  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions" was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twentyfive years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in (...)
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  • AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original (...)
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  • Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic.Sebastian Enqvist - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527-548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
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  • Rational choice and agm belief revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (12-13):1194-1203.
    We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on..
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  • Guest Editors' Introduction.Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
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  • Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW]Giacomo Bonanno - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we (...)
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  • A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.
    This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...)
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