Epistemologists have shown increased interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement, and in particular, in whether there is a rational requirement concerning belief revision in the face of peer disagreement. This article examines some of the general issues discussed by epistemologists, and then considers how they may or may not apply to the case of religious disagreement, both within religious traditions and between religious (and non-religious) views.

My aim in this article is to widen the scope of the current debate on peer disagreement by applying it to a kind of case it has hitherto remained silent about – namely, to cases of disagreement in which one of the disagreeing parties bases her opinion on a private religious experience to which the other party has no access. In order to do this, I will introduce a modified version of the notion of peerhood – a version that, in (...) contrast to the one employed in the current debate, can be fruitfully applied to the troublesome kind of case in question. I will then employ this new notion in order to specify the degree of conciliation rationally required from the disagreeing parties in the kind of case in question. (shrink)

Religious disagreements are widespread. Some philosophers have argued that religious disagreements call for religious skepticism, or a revision of one’s religious beliefs. In order to figure out the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, two questions need to be answered. First, what kind of disagreements are religious disagreements? Second, how should one respond to such disagreements? In this paper, I argue that many religious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, where parties have good reason to think they are not epistemic (...) peers, yet they lack good reason to determine who is superior. Such disagreements have been left relatively unexplored. I then argue that in cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, disputants can remain relatively steadfast in holding to their beliefs. Hence, we can remain relatively steadfast in our beliefs in such cases of religious disagreements. (shrink)

Controversial view agnosticism is the thesis that we are rationally obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in controversial subject areas, such as philosophy, religion, morality and politics. Given that one’s social identity is in no small part a function of one’s positive commitments in controversial areas, CVA has unsurprisingly been regarded as objectionably ‘spineless.’ That said, CVA seems like an unavoidable consequence of a prominent view in the epistemology of disagreement—conformism—according to which the rational response (...) to discovering that someone you identify as an epistemic peer or expert about p disagrees with you vis-à-vis p is to withhold judgment. This paper proposes a novel way to maintain the core conciliatory insight without devolving into an agnosticism that is objectionably spineless. The approach offered takes as a starting point the observation that–for reasons that will be made clear—the contemporary debate has bypassed the issue of the reasonableness of maintaining, rather than giving up, representational states weaker than belief in controversial areas. The new position developed and defended here explores this overlooked space; what results is a kind of controversial view. (shrink)

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one’s own opinion; and yet one should be able to maintain one’s opinion on important matters. I show that contrary to initial appearances, we can accept all three of these claims. Disagreement significantly shifts the balance of the evidence; but with respect to certain kinds of claims, one should nonetheless retain one’s beliefs. (...) And one should retain them even though these beliefs would not be supported by the new total evidence if one didn’t already hold them. (shrink)

My main claim is that, contrary to the assumptions of mainstream literature, epistemic religious diversity is not a matter of an abstract comparison among the belief systems of different religions or denominations; rather, it is a relation arising from the epistemic encounter among individuals who adhere to different doxastic groups. Particularly, while epistemic symmetry inclines to treat our doxastic opponents as peers, epistemic peerhood is not the starting point of doctrinal comparisons, but the potential outcome of the epistemic process of (...) the construal of shared evidence. A key point in my approach is that such a process is anecdotally constituted. My working plan is the following. In the first section I will introduce the challenge of religious diversity. In the next section, I will distinguish between two characterisations of the relation among seminal claims of doxastic groups, namely, beliefs which stand in a competing relation and beliefs which are merely alternative. I will provide a degree view of this distinction. The subsequent section consists in a overview of the outcomes from the epistemology of disagreement. In the fourth section, I will provide two basic motivations in support of TE. Finally, I will conclude by sketching how TE motivates the assumption of a schema for handling religious disagreements which I name anecdotal pluralism. (shrink)

Anecdotal pluralism (AP) is the claim that, when two individuals disagree on the truth of a religious belief, the right move to make is to engage in a communal epistemic process of evidence sharing and evaluation, motivated by the willingness to learn from each other, understand the adversary's views and how these challenge their own, and re-evaluate their own epistemic position in regards to external criticisms. What I will do in my paper is to provide a presentation of AP and (...) give a few reasons in support. I will begin with showing how pluralism can be promoted by religious experiences inhering in any (historical) tradition. To this regard, my purpose is to analyse such experiences as conducive to the assumption of the two main principles defining any pluralist view. Subsequently, I will construe AP by seven claims, and I will focus my efforts on justifying its superiority both to exclusivism/inclusivism and other varieties of pluralism. My next and final move is to list a few reasons which support my view. (shrink)

Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...) ("Should Have Known," Synthese, forthcoming; and "On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had," Episteme 2016, this issue); but the discussion will interest anyone working on epistemic defeat. (shrink)

This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.

This chapter covers contemporary work on disagreement, detailing both the conceptual and normative issues in play in the debates in mainstream analytic epistemology, and how these relate to religious diversity and disagreement. §1 examines several sorts of disagreement, and considers several epistemological issues: in particular, what range of attitudes a body of evidence can support, how to understand higher-order evidence, and who counts as an epistemic “peer”. §2 considers how these questions surface when considering disagreements over religion, including debates over (...) the nature of evidence and truth in religion, epistemic humility, concerns about irrelevant influences and about divine hiddenness, and arguments over exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Finally, §3 summarizes the contributors’ essays in this volume. (shrink)

التزام دینی و ربط و نسبت آن با عقلانیت از مباحث مهم فلسفۀ دین است. راجر تریگ از اندیشمندان معاصری است که این مسئله را محور توجه خود قرار داده است. در این مقاله ما دیدگاه او در خصوص سرشت التزام و ربط و نسبت آن با باور، معنا، توجیه و عقلانیت را از نظر گذرانده‌ایم. او با تعریف خاصی که از التزام ارائه می‌دهد، آن را مبتنی بر دو مؤلفه می‌داند: یکی باور گزاره‌ای و دیگری تعهد شخصی بدان. از (...) آنجا که تریگ مؤلفه اول التزام را اساسی و بنیادین می‌داند، تمرکز مقاله نیز بر همین مؤلفه است. تریگ بر اساس مؤلفۀ اول، واقع‌گرایی و نقد نسبی‌انگاری را از لوازم حقیقی التزام می‌داند و در همین راستا به نقد ناواقع‌گرایی و نسبی‌انگاری در این حوزه می‌پردازد. او از جمله علل گرایش به نسبی‌انگاری در حوزۀ دین را تلاش ویتگنشتاین متأخر در واکنش به پوزیتیویسم منطقی می‌داند که منجر به جدایی و تمایز دین از علم شد. تریگ ضمن نقد این جریان فلسفی، می‌کوشد تا پیامدهای آن را نیز نشان دهد. او با تأکید بر زبان به عنوان امری که تبلور حقیقت است و ارتباط را امکان‌پذیر می‌کند و نیز تأکید بر سرشت مشترک بشر به مقابله با نسبی‌انگاری مفهومی می‌پردازد و راه را برای عقلانیت التزام می‌گشاید. مقاله در پایان نشان می‌دهد که اگرچه تریگ در نقدهایش به موفقیت‌هایی دست یافته است، به نظر می‌رسد جنبۀ ایجابی بحث او فاقد استحکام و دقت کافی است. (shrink)