Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Epistemology of Testimony: Locke and His Critics.Kenneth L. Pearce - forthcoming - In Stephen Howard & Jack Stetter (eds.), The Edinburgh Critical History of Early Modern and Enlightenment Philosophy. Edinburgh University Press.
    Contemporary discussions of the epistemology of testimony are often framed in terms of the disagreement on this topic between Hume and Reid. However, it is widely assumed that, prior to Hume, philosophers in the grip of Enlightenment individualism neglected philosophical questions about testimony, simply treating testimony as ordinary empirical evidence. In fact, although the evidential model of testimony was popular in early modern philosophy, it was also the subject of vigorous debate. This chapter examines Locke's defence of the evidential model (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Role of Trust in Argumentation.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (2):205-236.
    Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Only Light and Evidence: Locke on the Will to Believe.Mark Boespflug - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (1):1-21.
    John Locke has been widely understood to hold that belief is under one's direct control. This doxastic voluntarism appears to be implicit in his evidentialism, his doxastic moralism, and his postulation of an ability to suspend assent. I argue, first, that interpreting Locke as a doxastic voluntarist is untenable—at odds with his conception of knowledge, probable assent, and religious belief. I also claim that interpreting Locke as a voluntarist fails to cohere with his understanding of the intellect's relation to the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation