Different people have different perceptions about artificial intelligence (AI). It is extremely important to bring together all the alternative frames of thinking—from the various communities of developers, researchers, business leaders, policymakers, and citizens—to properly start acknowledging AI. This article highlights the ‘fruitful collaboration’ that sociology and AI could develop in both social and technical terms. We discuss how biases and unfairness are among the major challenges to be addressed in such a sociotechnical perspective. First, as intelligent machines reveal their nature (...) of ‘magnifying glasses’ in the automation of existing inequalities, we show how the AI technical community is calling for transparency and explainability, accountability and contestability. Not to be considered as panaceas, they all contribute to ensuring human control in novel practices that include requirement, design and development methodologies for a fairer AI. Second, we elaborate on the mounting attention for technological narratives as technology is recognized as a social practice within a specific institutional context. Not only do narratives reflect organizing visions for society, but they also are a tangible sign of the traditional lines of social, economic, and political inequalities. We conclude with a call for a diverse approach within the AI community and a richer knowledge about narratives as they help in better addressing future technical developments, public debate, and policy. AI practice is interdisciplinary by nature and it will benefit from a socio-technical perspective. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to understand the intellectual origins of Albert Ellis' Rational Psychotherapy (now known as Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy). In his therapeutic practice Ellis used a 'lumper' argument to replace the focus of change in psychoanalysis: not the lengthy uncovering and reworking of the individual's personal history, but the demands in self-talk through which the client is currently dis turbed. In constructing around this the persuasive (rhetorical) package that became his therapy, Ellis drew on a number of (...) popular intellectual movements, operationalism, General Semantics, the holistic theory of emotion, cognitive psychology, and psychoanalysis itself. (shrink)

What happens to professional and technical work when it is computerized? Exploratory analysis of case studies indicates that when expert systems are used to enhance the work of professionals, some tasks of medium- and low-skilled support personnel are integrated into the work of highly skilled experts. Technical workers are thus at risk of having their jobs automated as part of the computer enhancement of professionals. When computerization replaces expertise, job opportunities for medium-skilled personnel shrink and barriers to upward mobility through (...) on-the-job experience are reduced Entry-level professionals or even technicians with computers can perform tasks formerly done by experienced professionals. But working conditions do not promote the development of expertise and professional judgment among these workers. Thus it appears that routinization, deskilling, and automation are not only the problems of manual laborers in the information age; professional workers are also at risk, in complex ways. (shrink)

This paper is about - cognitive science's claim to obtain an empirically theory of human intelligence by experiments with intelligent machines; - the question, whether simulation yields/is explanation , i.e. whether the theory explaining the behaviour of a thing A, appropriately abstracted, as well explains the behaviour of a thing B, different in type from A, when A's and B's behaviours are indistinguishable; - the question, whether the Aristotelian ontic distinction between the natural and the artificial was in fact extinguished (...) by Descartes' materialistic intensional ontology; this question is denied by evidence of the existence of different theories of artificial and natural magnetism in current physics; - and about the comparison of the current theories of magnetism, of artificial or electromagnetism and of natural or ferromagnetism with the result that there is no uniform theory explaining all kinds of magnetism to be gained out of Maxwell's theory. Thus by counterexample is demonstrated that cognitive science's claim to obtain a theory of natural intelligence by the S:E-strategy is to be refused. Descartes' premise of the ontic indifference of the size of physical magnitudes is introduced as basis of the S:E-claim and its refutation as cause of the partial continuation of the ontic distinction between natural and artificial things in physics. (shrink)

Steady technological and economic progress gives science and the scientific method a distinguished position in today's culture. Therefore, there may be an impression that areas not belonging to science may hamper this progress of humanity. The views of Dean E. Wooldridge exemplify this position. The only hope is seen in the rational dimension of man in which there is no room for ethical considerations. This rational dimension is also the sole representation of man in the image created by artificial intelligence. (...) Before, AI was at least interested in philosophical issues concerning a model of man, now, AI has no interest in them; it has become an applied science trying to produce workable systems for military and industrial application. However, the model of rational man remained, and because of the prestige of computer science, the model is the most widely recognized as an official model of our epoch.There are three possible ways of improving the situation with regard to the moral dimension of man: saturating knowledge bases with moral values, carefully choosing the sponsor of each project, and saturating education with ethics by making it a part of each major on the undergraduate, and, in particular, the graduate levels. (shrink)

This essay provides a gender critique of the Eliza effect. It delineates the way in which the Eliza effect is operationalised in AI research even as it is ostensibly demystified, for example, in th...

Artificial intelligence, conceived either as an attempt to provide models of human cognition or as the development of programs able to perform intelligent tasks, is primarily interested in theuses of language. It should be concerned, therefore, withpragmatics. But its concern with pragmatics should not be restricted to the narrow, traditional conception of pragmatics as the theory of communication (or of the social uses of language). In addition to that, AI should take into account also the mental uses of language (in (...) reasoning, for example) and the existential dimensions of language as a determiner of the world we (and our computers) live in. In this paper, the relevance of these three branches of pragmatics-sociopragmatics, psychopragmatics, and ontopragmatics-for AI are explored. (shrink)

Situational aspects of action are discussed. The presented approach emphasizes the role of situational contexts in which actions are performed. These contexts influence the course of an action; they are determined not only by the current state of the system but also shaped by other factors as time, the previously undertaken actions and their succession, the agents of actions and so on. The distinction between states and situations is explored from the perspective of action systems. The notion of a situational (...) action system is introduced and its theory is expounded. Numerous examples illustrate the reach of the theory. (shrink)

L'informatique se définissant comme le traitement rationnel de l'information par machine automatique et l'intelligence se caractérisant par une même capacité de traitement rationnel, il était inévitable que l'on songe à associer l'intelligence au traitement automatique de l'information. C'est ce qu'a fait John McCarthy en forgeant le terme d'intelligence artificielle. Par «intelligence artificielle» on peut vouloir exprimer l'ambition de1. Recréer, transformer ou développer l'intelligence artificiellement2. Simuler l'intelligence en la reconstituant dans des modéles imitant certains aspects de notre intelligence dite naturelle.

Wonder is a root of the religious experience, and the desire to understand drives science. If wonder and understanding are fundamentally opposed, religion and science will be also. But only if wonder is limited to the contemplation of magic or mysteries is religion in principle opposed to science. The aim of science is to explain how something is possible. Understanding how something is possible need not destroy our wonder at it. Recent scientific theories of the human mind—albeit based in computer (...) technology—increase our wonder at its richness and power. (shrink)

We can readily identify goal-directed systems and distinguish them from non-goal-directed systems. A woodpecker hunting for grubs is the first, a pendulum returning to rest is the second. But what is it to be a goal-directed system? Perhaps the dominant answer to this question, inspired by systems theories such as cybernetics, is that goal-directed systems are distinguished by their tendency to seek, aim at, or maintain some more-or-less easily identifiable goal. Cybernetics and the like would hold that physical systems subject (...) only to physical laws can exhibit such behavior. If sound, this systems approach to teleology would unify a diverse range of goal-directed phenomena and neatly side-step many traditional bogey-men of teleology, such as anthropomorphism and future causation. Goal-directed phenomena would be a normal feature of the natural causal world that could be described in purely descriptive and quantitative terms, and receive ordinary causal explanations. Thus, the systems approach promises to provide a naturalistic-cum-descriptive account of teleology suitable for use in naturalistic accounts of other phenomena, including the intentionality of mental states and even self-consciousness. (shrink)

As we live in a culture where “everything can be commodified, measured and calculated and can be put in the competitive market for sale, detached from its roots and purpose,” there is need to redefine our humanness in terms of the changing nature of science, technology, and their deeper impact on human life. More than anything else, it is Information Technology that now has tremendous influence on all spheres of our life, and in a sense, IT has become the destiny (...) of our life. And this is where the real trauma lies. On the one hand, our being in the cyberspace opens up new and exciting horizons before us; on the other hand, we ourselves are changed and transformed in the process. The virtual world transforms human users to a problem-solver technocrat. The speed at which Information Technology is changing the way that youth around the world are socializing, playing, and researching, it is the common practice now for a 15-year old to go home and update their MySpace page, followed by playing online games, or looking up the new trendy YouTube video. These forms of technology are often the topic of adolescent conversations as YouTube, blogs, e-magazines, Face book, MySpace, iPhones, and iPods dominate the commercial and social networking market. Some researchers refer to this phenomenon as ubiquitous technology drawing attention to the fact that ubiquitous technology acknowledges the speedy adoption of day-to-day use of technology as a global phenomenon. In this background, this article aims at revisiting the question, “What is to be human in the era of Ubiquitous Technology?” From a feminist perspective, one can still redefine the boundaries between femininity and masculinity in the context of IT and its impact on our lifestyle and thought style. While examining the ways in which our definitions of “woman” and “man” are shifting in this new communication environment, Elizabeth Lane Lawley observes that we cannot fix a single center from which the experiences of women with computer and communication systems can be viewed and that such fixity would only serve to deepen inequities rather than exposing and removing them. She finally submits, “It is possible to use new theoretical perspectives on the shifting boundaries of gender definitions to rethink a previously deterministic view of the effect of new technologies on society, and particularly the effect of those technologies on women. While the gradual absence of the subject from the field of Artificial Intelligence leads to the invisibility of feminine care along with social and relational nature of man, some feminists dismiss the biological sex distinction on such issues and encourage females to ‘imitate man’ and to become more aggressive, assertive and dominating” (Lawley 1993 ). What are the possible impacts of this new technology on the so-called feminine traits of our human nature? How far our definitions of “woman” and “man” are shifting in this new communication environment? This is what this article seeks to explore. (shrink)

As a step towards comprehensive computer models of communication, and effective human machine dialogue, some of the relationships between communication and affect are explored. An outline theory is presented of the architecture that makes various kinds of affective states possible, or even inevitable, in intelligent agents, along with some of the implications of this theory for various communicative processes. The model implies that human beings typically have many different, hierarchically organized, dispositions capable of interacting with new information to produce affective (...) states, distract attention, interrupt ongoing actions, and so on. High "insistence" of motives is defined in relation to a tendency to penetrate an attention filter mechanism, which seems to account for the partial loss of control involved in emotions. One conclusion is that emulating human communicative abilities will not be achieved easily. Another is that it will be even more difficult to design and build computing systems that reliably achieve interesting communicative goals. (shrink)

I want to suggest that the major influence of classical arguments for embodiment like "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991) has been a changing of positions rather than a refutation: Cognitivism has found ways to retreat and regroup at positions that have better fortification, especially when it concerns theses about artificial intelligence or artificial cognitive systems. For example: a) Agent-based cognitivism' that understands humans as taking in representations of the world, doing rule-based processing and then acting on (...) them (sense-plan-act) is often limited to conscious decision processes; and b) Purely syntactic cognition is compatible with embodiment, or supplemented by embodiment (e.g. for 'grounding'). While the empirical thesis of embodied cognition ('embodied cognitive science') is true and the practical engineering thesis ('morphological computation', 'cheap design') is often true, the conceptual thesis ('embodiment is necessary for cognition') is likely false - syntax is often enough for cognition, unless grounding is really necessary. I conclude that it has become more sensible to integrate embodiment with traditional approaches rather than "fight for embodiment" or "against cognitivism". (shrink)

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/62-80.html#1967-01.