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  1. ¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?Jorge Mittelmann - 2014 - Quaderns de Filosofia 1 (2).
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  • Peut-on avoir la vie en puissance? Sur la cohérence du κοινότατος λόγος de l’'me.Jorge Mittelmann - 2019 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 40 (2):297-331.
    Aristotle’s broad characterization of the soul has been challenged on account of its reliance on the notion of a “potentially alive body”. J. L. Ackrill famously claimed that no body can meet this description without being already actually alive. By a close inspection of both metaphysical and embryological texts, this paper argues that (1) it is embryos (and not fully-formed organic bodies) who provide the right kind of potentially alive subjects and that (2) the schematic character of the soul’s common (...)
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  • Philoponus, in De Anima III: Quest for an Author.Peter Lautner - 1992 - Classical Quarterly 42 (2):510-522.
    It has been strongly disputed that Philoponus is the author of the commentary on the third book of De Anima printed in vol. xv of CAG under his name, and Stephanus of Alexandria has been taken to be its real author. The evidence for the authorship of Stephanus is as follows: Codex Parisinus gr. 1914, written in the twelfth century, has an adscript by a later hand saying βιβλ⋯ον τρ⋯τον ⋯π⋯ ϕωνης στεϕ⋯νου, and the same appears in the fifteenth-century Codex (...)
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  • Philoponus, in De Anima III: Quest for an Author.Peter Lautner - 1992 - Classical Quarterly 42 (2):510-522.
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  • Γνωστικῶς and / or ὑλικῶς: Philoponus’ Account of the Material Aspects of Sense-Perception.Péter Lautner - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (4):378-400.
    The paper aims to show that Philoponus’ theory of sense-perception does not fit in with the spiritualist claim that the sensory process does not involve an extra material change in the sense-organ. Both the specific sense-organs and the primary sense-organ contract or expand in the perceptual process. On the other hand, the literalist claim needs to be modified as well since only the tactile sense-organ takes on the relevant qualities. Contraction or expansion in the sense-organ is triggered, not by physical (...)
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