This paper provides a phenomenological analysis of postphenomenological philosophy of technology. While acknowledging that the results of its analyses are to be recognized as original, insightful, and valuable, we will argue that in its execution of the empirical turn, postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological dimension of questioning. By contrasting the postphenomenological method with Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as developed in his early Freiburg lectures and in Being and Time, we will show how the postphenomenological method must be understood as mediation theory, (...) which adheres to what Heidegger calls the theoretical attitude. This leaves undiscussed how mediation theory about ontic beings involves a specific ontological mode of relating to beings, whereas consideration of this mode is precisely the concern of phenomenology. This ontological dimension is important to consider, since we will argue that postphenomenology is unwittingly technically mediated in an ontological way. The upshot of this is that in its dismissal of Heidegger’s questioning of technology as belonging to “classical philosophy of technology,” postphenomenology implicitly adheres to what Heidegger calls technology as Enframing. We argue that postphenomenology overlooks its own adherence to the theoretical attitude and ultimately to Enframing, and we will conclude with calling for a phenomenological questioning of the dimension that postphenomenology presently leaves unthought, meaning that we will develop a plea for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

The paper deals with the notion of guilt according to Heidegger’s philosophy and its repercussions for the understanding of guilt according to criminal law doctrine and theory. Heidegger’s notion on guilt is tantamount to Dasein’s incapacity to exhaust all its existential possibilities, whereas legal guilt has to do only with man’s legal indebtedness, which is an aspect of inauthenticity, a deficient mode of ontological responsibility. This does not mean, though, sheer amoralism or apologetics to violence. In late Heidegger one may (...) discern traces of an ontological ethics, which refers to Dasein’s attunement to Being and especially to the sparing and healing of the Fourfold as these are coming to presence through poetic dwelling; through, that is, an authentic contact with the Uncanny, meaning a radical exposure to Being’s enigmatic hiddenness, the endurance in front of the abyss of Nothingness. In this framework there remains no space for assuming any moral-juridical responsibility, because Dasein is predestined to err constantly due to the ruptures and turnings of Being’s history. Legal blameworthiness is thus obsolete because, injustice being according to Heidegger the dis-jointure of Being’s order, there is ontologically no imputable ‘legal’ crime; there is only Dasein’s eventful projecting-opening within errancy. Whether though this notion of ‘Being’ is a new ‘arche’ to be superseded emerges then as the crucial question. To regain any non-metaphysical notion of guilt is after Heidegger only possible through a theoretical move which cannot ignore his legacy but also has to go beyond the Master. (shrink)

Machines are often employed in Heidegger’s philosophy as instances to illustrate specific features of modern technology. But what is it about machines that allows them to fulfill this role? This essay argues there is a unique ontological force to the machine that can be understood when looking at distinctions between techne and mechane in ancient Greek sources and applying these distinctions to a reading of Heidegger’s early thought on equipment and later thought on poiesis. Especially with respect to Heidegger’s appropriation (...) of Aristotle’s conception of dunamis, it becomes apparent from a Heideggerian perspective that machines provide an increase in capacity to its human users, but only so at a cost. This cost involves a problem of knowledge where the set of operations required in machine use results in the loss of understanding our dependency on being. The essay then concludes with a discussion of how this relation to machinic capacity is not merely pessimistic and deterministic, but indicates what might constitute a free relation to machines. (shrink)

In this article, we evaluate Meillassoux’s criticism of correlationism in general and of Heidegger’s correlationism in particular. Contrary to earlier contributions, we argue that Meillassoux’s reflections on uncorrelated being not only serve an epistemological but also an ontological interest; both Meillassoux and Heidegger are interested in the way we have access to uncorrelated being as well as in the nature of uncorrelated being itself. After introducing Meillassoux’s criticism of the correlationism of Heidegger, we reflect on three arguments of his account (...) of planet earth as un-correlated being; the emergence of planet earth, the presupposed accessibility of un-correlated being and his criticism of Heidegger’s fideism. Although it becomes clear that Meillassoux’s criticism of correlationism is not applicable in the case of Heidegger, it also helps us to articulate the relevance of Heidegger’s “realist” approach of uncorrelated being in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)