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  1. A reply to Gillham on the impairment principle.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (1):31-35.
    The impairment argument claims that abortion is immoral, because it results in a greater impairment to a fetus than other actions that are clearly immoral, such as inflicting fetal alcohol syndrome. Alex Gillham argues that the argument requires clarification of the meaning of greater impairment. He proposes two definitions, and points out the difficulties with each. In response, I argue that while the impairment argument’s definition of greater impairment is narrow in scope, it is sufficient for its intended purpose. Broadening (...)
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  • Killing and Impairing Fetuses.Prabhpal Singh - 2022 - The New Bioethics 28 (2):127-138.
    Could it be that if a fetus is not a person abortion is still immoral? One affirmative answer comes in the form of ‘The Impairment Argument’, which utilizes ‘The Impairment Principle’ to argue that abortion is immoral even if fetuses lack personhood. I argue ‘The Impairment Argument’ fails. It is not adequately defended from objections, and abortion is, in fact, a counterexample to the impairment principle. Furthermore, it explains neither what the wrong-making features of abortion are nor what features of (...)
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  • Fetuses, Newborns, and Parental Responsibility.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):188-193.
    I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the (...)
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  • Three Problems with the Impairment Argument.William Simkulet - 2022 - Asian Bioethics Review 15 (2):169-179.
    In his recent article “Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The Impairment Argument,” Perry Hendricks sets out to sidestep thorny metaphysical questions regarding human fetuses and present a new argument against abortion – if impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, then killing the fetus is immoral. Hendricks takes inspiration from Judith Jarvis Thomson’s defense of abortion – that even if fetuses are persons with a right to life, the right to life is (...)
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  • Abortion, Rights, and Cabin Cases.William Simkulet - 2022 - The New Bioethics 28 (4):315-326.
    Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus, with abortion opponents arguing fetuses are persons with a right to life. Judith Jarvis Thomson bypasses this debate, arguing that even if we assume fetuses have a right to life, this is not a right to use other people’s bodies. Recently Perry Hendricks attempts to bypass discussion of rights, assuming that if he can show that some people have a right to use other’s (...)
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  • The impairment argument, ethics of abortion, and nature of impairing to the n + 1 degree.Alex R. Gillham - 2023 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26 (2):215-224.
    I argue here that the impairment principle requires clarification. It needs to explain what makes one impairment greater than another, otherwise we will be unable to make the comparisons it requires, the ones that enable us to determine whether b really is a greater impairment than a, and as a result, whether causing b is immoral because causing a is. I then develop two of what I think are the most natural accounts of what might make one impairment greater than (...)
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  • Abortion, Impairment, and Well-Being.Alex R. Gillham - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (6):541-550.
    Hendricks’ The Impairment Argument (TIA) claims that it is immoral to impair a fetus by causing it to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Since aborting a fetus impairs it to a greater degree than causing it to have FAS, then abortion is also immoral. In this article, I argue that TIA ought to be rejected. This is because TIA can only succeed if it explains why causing an organism to have FAS impairs it to a morally objectionable degree, entails that (...)
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  • Violinists, demandingness, and the impairment argument against abortion.Dustin Crummett - 2019 - Bioethics 34 (2):214-220.
    The ‘impairment argument’ against abortion developed by Perry Hendricks aims to derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foetal alcohol syndrome. Hendricks endorses an ‘impairment principle’, which states that, if it is wrong to inflict an impairment of a certain degree on an organism, then, ceteris paribus, it is also wrong to inflict a more severe impairment on that organism. Causing FAS is wrong in virtue of the impairment it inflicts. But abortion inflicts an even more severe (...)
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  • The Impairment Argument and Future-Like-Ours: A Problematic Dependence.Christopher Bobier - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 20 (3):353-357.
    In response to criticism of the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion, Bruce Blackshaw and Perry Hendricks appeal to Don Marquis’s future-like-ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing to explain why knowingly causing fetal impairments is wrong. I argue that wedding the success of the impairment argument to FLO undermines all claims that the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is novel. Moreover, I argue that relying on FLO when there are alternative explanations for the wrongness of (...)
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  • Strengthening the impairment argument against abortion.Bruce Blackshaw & Perry Hendricks - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (7):515-518.
    Perry Hendricks’ impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is based on two premises: first, impairing a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and second, if impairing an organism to some degree is immoral, then ceteris paribus, impairing it to a higher degree is also immoral. He calls this the impairment principle. Since abortion impairs a fetus to a higher degree than FAS, it follows from these two premises that abortion is immoral. Critics have focussed on the ceteris paribus (...)
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  • The Impairment Argument Against Abortion.Perry Hendricks - 2022 - In Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce P. Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger (eds.), Agency, Pregnancy, and Persons: Essays in Defense of Human Life.
    I provide an updated version of The Impairment Argument against abortion and respond to numerous objections that can be (and have been) raised to it.
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