- By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity.Maarten Van Doorn - 2022 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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Theories of welfare, theories of good reasons for action, and ontological naturalism.Brad Hooker - 1991 - Philosophical Papers 20 (1):25-36.details
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Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem.Charles R. Pigden - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):441-456.details
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Quasi-realist explanation.Nick Zangwill - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):287 - 296.details
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Moral mind-independence.Nick Zangwill - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):205-219.details
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V—Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?Catherine Wilson - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):97-114.details
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Who Is Afraid of the Logical Problem in Meta-Ethics?Ruth Weintraub - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (67):411-426.details
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Logic For Expressivists.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):601 - 616.details
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“Response-dependence, rigidification, and objectivity”, erkenntnis 44 (1995): 101-112.Peter Vallentyne - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (1):101 - 112.details
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On the epistemic value of moral experience.William Tolhurst - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):67-87.details
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Knowing right from wrong.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):62 – 80.details
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Morality, Teleology, Objectivity, Authority.Steven Ross - 2013 - Philosophical Forum 44 (4):373-393.details
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Debunking debunking: a regress challenge for psychological threats to moral judgment.Regina A. Rini - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):675-697.details
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Meta-Ética como conifrmação: A anatomia moral de Hume.Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro - 2012 - Dissertatio 35:47-78.details
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Further problems with projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.details
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Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity.George Pavlakos, Niko Kolodny, Ulrike Heuer & Douglas Lavin - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378.details
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Moral fictionalism versus the rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.details
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After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.details
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Legal reality: A naturalist approach to legal ontology. [REVIEW]Michael S. Moore - 2002 - Law and Philosophy 21 (6):619 - 705.details
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Does epistemology reduce to cognitive psychology?Richard Montgomery - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (2-3):245-263.details
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On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese:1-25.details
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On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111.details
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Mixed up about mixed worlds? Understanding Blackburn’s supervenience argument.Cole Mitchell - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2903-2925.details
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The Argument from Moral Experience.Don Loeb - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.details
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Uggles and Muggles: Wedgwood on normative thought and justification. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):469 - 477.details
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Ethics Without Errors.James Lenman - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):391-409.details
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Deliberation, schmeliberation: Enoch’s indispensability argument. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):835-842.details
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Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence.Mark Lebar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175-211.details
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If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.details
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Critical notice.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):475 – 488.details
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Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.details
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After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.details
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Moral Experience: Perception or Emotion?James Hutton - 2022 - Ethics 132 (3):570-597.details
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Immoral realism.Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):897-914.details
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Some Scepticism about Moral Realism.Jeffrey Goldsworthy - 1995 - Law and Philosophy 14 (3/4):357 - 374.details
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Does Direct Moral Judgment Have a Phenomenal Essence?Joshua Glasgow - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):52-69.details
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Sentimentalist pluralism: Moral psychology and philosophical ethics.Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.details
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Ethics and Science: Is Plausibility in the Eye of the Beholder?Allan Gibbard - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):737-749.details
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Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1689-1699.details
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Die Natur der Farben.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - De Gruyter.details
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):399-443.details
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Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology.Gregg D. Caruso - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.details
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Error theories and values.John A. Burgess - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):534 – 552.details
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Primitivism and the Analogy between Colors and Values.Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):621-639.details
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A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?Matthew S. Bedke - 1027–1042 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042.details
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Norm-expressivism and regress.Tanyi Attila - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):362-376.details
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Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.details
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Moral motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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