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  1. What Is “Law,” if “the Law” Is not Something that “Is”? A Modest Contribution to a Major Question.Dan Jerker B. Svantesson - 2013 - Ratio Juris 26 (3):456-485.
    After proposing an alternative definition of what “law” (jurisprudential concept) is, this article demonstrates the impossibility of identifying “the law” (what law-makers announce, relative to a particular jurisdiction) as something that is in a particular way. Rather, the law is a more or less abstract range of options. Drawing upon this conclusion, the article calls for a reassessment of how we view the role of law-makers. We need to remove the mystery that surrounds the law so as to provide for (...)
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  • On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?Giovanni Tuzet Damiano Canale - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (1):32-44.
    In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate (...)
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  • On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (1):32-44.
    In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate (...)
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