- The Stopping Rule Principle and Confirmational Reliability.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (1):1-28.details
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Simple methods for evaluating and comparing binary experiments.Thomas A. Weber - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):257-288.details
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A Verisimilitude Framework for Inductive Inference, with an Application to Phylogenetics.Olav B. Vassend - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1359-1383.details
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Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):53-77.details
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A bayesian way to make stopping rules matter.Daniel Steel - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):213--227.details
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The role of Bayesian philosophy within Bayesian model selection.Jan Sprenger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.details
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Evidence and experimental design in sequential trials.Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):637-649.details
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Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.details
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Inductivism and probabilism.Roger Rosenkrantz - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):167 - 205.details
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Error and inference: an outsider stand on a frequentist philosophy.Christian P. Robert - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (3):447-461.details
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Decisions as statistical evidence and Birnbaum's 'confidence concept'.John W. Pratt - 1977 - Synthese 36 (1):59 - 69.details
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Revisiting the two predominant statistical problems: the stopping-rule problem and the catch-all hypothesis problem.Yusaku Ohkubo - 2021 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 30:23-41.details
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Conditional as-if analyses in randomized experiments.Luke W. Miratrix, Guillaume W. Basse & Nicole E. Pashley - 2021 - Journal of Causal Inference 9 (1):264-284.details
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Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics?Deborah G. Mayo - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):233 - 262.details
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Counting experiments.Jonathan Livengood - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):175-195.details
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On the necessity for random sampling.D. J. Johnstone - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (4):443-457.details
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On the Neyman–Pearson Theory of Testing.Spencer Graves - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):1-23.details
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A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle.Greg Gandenberger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):475-503.details
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Counterexamples to a likelihood theory of evidence.Malcolm R. Forster - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (3):319-338.details
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Stopping rules as experimental design.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-20.details
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Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results.Zoltan Dienes - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for bayesian theory.Allan Birnbaum - 1977 - Synthese 36 (1):19 - 49.details
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Seeing the wood for the trees: philosophical aspects of classical, Bayesian and likelihood approaches in statistical inference and some implications for phylogenetic analysis.Daniel Barker - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (4):505-525.details
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Empiricism and/or Instrumentalism?Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Ken A. Aho - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S5):1019-1041.details
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Significance testing, p-values and the principle of total evidence.Bengt Autzen - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):281-295.details
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Connecting dempster–shafer belief functions with likelihood-based inference.Mikel Aickin - 2000 - Synthese 123 (3):347-364.details
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Type I error rates are not usually inflated.Mark Rubin - manuscriptdetails
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An error in the argument from conditionality and sufficiency to the likelihood principle.Deborah G. Mayo - 2009 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 305.details
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Full Bayesian Significance Test Applied to Multivariate Normal Structure Models.Marcelo de Souza Lauretto, Carlos Alberto de Braganca Pereira, Julio Michael Stern & Shelemiahu Zacks - 2003 - Brazilian Journal of Probability and Statistics 17:147-168.details
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Can a Significance Test Be Genuinely Bayesian?Julio Michael Stern, Carlos Alberto de Braganca Pereira & Sergio Wechsler - 2008 - Bayesian Analysis 3 (1):79-100.details
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A Tool-Based View of Theories of Evidence.Chien-Yang Huang - 2020 - Dissertation, Durham Universitydetails
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A Verisimilitude Framework for Inductive Inference, with an Application to Phylogenetics.Vassend Olav Benjamin - unknowndetails
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Model Verification and the Likelihood Principle.Samuel C. Fletcher - unknowndetails
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