I would like to introduce the problematic to be addressed in this short article simply as follows. According to the majority of the modern interpreters of the Nyāya philosophy, the Naiyāyika-s are ontologically committed to an uncompromising direct realist theory of perception and to externalism both in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Computationalists, on the other hand, in their ontology, are frank or secret supporters of the view that what we cognize, even what we perceive, is representational. These two claims (...) appear to be opposed to each other. Naturally, the question arises: Is a computational account of intentional mental state, as proposed by Matilal, in his magnum opus Perception, admissible in the Navya-Nyāya framework? Though Matilal has not restricted the conundrum to Navya-Nyāya, the way he has analyzed the cognitive states are available only in the Navya-Nyāya literature. The main objective of this article is to strengthen Matilal’s position further with the help of some additional arguments from the Navya-Nyāya treatises. (shrink)