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  1. Mathematics and Metaphilosophy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This book discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the problem of explaining the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs (‘the justificatory challenge’), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the problem of explaining their reliability (‘the reliability challenge’), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The book shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and Gödel: An Attempt to Make ‘Wittgenstein’s Objection’ Reasonable†.Timm Lampert - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (3):324-345.
    According to some scholars, such as Rodych and Steiner, Wittgenstein objects to Gödel’s undecidability proof of his formula $$G$$, arguing that given a proof of $$G$$, one could relinquish the meta-mathematical interpretation of $$G$$ instead of relinquishing the assumption that Principia Mathematica is correct. Most scholars agree that such an objection, be it Wittgenstein’s or not, rests on an inadequate understanding of Gödel’s proof. In this paper, I argue that there is a possible reading of such an objection that is, (...)
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  • Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...)
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  • Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science.-Preprint Volume- - unknown
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  • Gödel on Truth and Proof.Dan Nesher - unknown
  • On the necessary philosophical premises of the Goedelian arguments.Fano Vincenzo & Graziani Pierluigi - unknown
    Lucas-Penrose type arguments have been the focus of many papers in the literature. In the present paper we attempt to evaluate the consequences of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for the philosophy of the mind. We argue that the best answer to this question was given by Gödel already in 1951 when he realized that either our intellectual capability is not representable by a Turing Machine, or we can never know with mathematical certainty what such a machine is. But his considerations became (...)
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