On assiste aujourd'hui à un renouvellement et à une intensification du questionnement juridique, lesquels ne vont pas sans susciter une interpellation de la réflexion philosophique par le droit. Plusieurs motifs concourent à cette situation. Cette interpellation de la philosophie est le signe d'un besoin d'élucidation, d'éclaircissement et de nouvelles délimitations conceptuelles, au sein d'une situation historique où les schèmes traditionnels d'interprétation du droit font sentir leurs insuffisances.

There are many places that we must save from destruction. Sadly, they are mostly distant from us. If we accept Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-World, this distance means that we cannot authentically speak of their Being. Even if we 'dwell' in our own lands, we are not 'at home' in these beautiful places. However, if we cannot speak of their Being, of what 'is', how can we ask logging and mining multinationals to stop destroying them? This speechlessness may be overcome with (...) a Whiteheadian process metaphysics, and 'late' Heideggerian poetics. These may then be developed in a concrete community life. (shrink)

This paper situates moral education in the context of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy and as embedded in lived experience qualified by three dimensions, namely critical, clinical, and creative (‘3C’). The construct of ‘3C’ education will be enriched by reference to the theoretical corpus of Nel Noddings, specifically her 2006 book Critical Lessons: What our schools should teach. The paper argues that only as embodying all three ‘C's in experience can education become genuinely moral and bring the missing element of values into (...) quality teaching (cf. Lovat, 2006a). The novel concept ‘pedagogy of values’ is proposed, analysed and synthesized alongside Deleuze's unorthodox ‘pedagogy of the concept’. (shrink)

Enrique Dussel and John Dewey share commitments to philosophical theory and practice aimed at addressing human problems, democratic modes of inquiry, and progressive social reform, but also maintain productive differences in their fundamental starting point for political philosophy and their use of the social sciences. Dussel provides a corrective to Dewey’s Eurocentrism and to his tendency to underplay the challenges of incorporating marginalized populations by insisting that social and political philosophy begin from the perspective of the marginalized and excluded. Simultaneously, (...) Dewey encourages a modest experimental and fallibilist approach to social transformation that promises more feasible social reforms than Dussel’s approach rooted in phenomenology and the critical social sciences. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for the contribution that deconstruction can make towards an understanding of complex systems. We begin with a description of what we mean by complexity and how Derrida’s thought illustrates a sensitivity towards the problems we face when dealing with complex systems. This is especially clear in Derrida’s deconstruction of the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. We compare this critique with the work of Edgar Morin, one of the foremost thinkers of contemporary complexity and argue (...) for the possible contributions that both thinkers provide towards an understanding of complex phenomena in the world. We then move on to illustrate the particular economy of thinking we are forced to engage with when dealing with complex systems. This economy is inspired by Derrida’s deconstruction of Bataille’s general economy. This economy illustrates the fundamental nature of critique in the process of dealing with complex systems, the third concept we explore in this paper. The process of critique illustrates the necessity for both cutting apart and weaving together of economies in order to maintain the possibility for divergent ways of being in the world. We conclude with the ethical implications of dealing with complex systems and some first steps towards an ‘ethics of complexity’. (shrink)

This paper adopts a comparative approach to analyze the crucial issue of the dynamics between universally shared values and the essentials of different cultures. It presents the ways in which universal values are conceptualized in Western, Indian and Muslim philosophy, presenting not only a historical overview but referring to modern authors such as Daya Krishna, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Richard Rorty, Muhammad Iqbal, S.H. Nasr and Abdolkarim Soroush to show how these authors implicitly use, or do not use, cultural essential and universal (...) values in their own work. It is eventually claims that comparative philosophy is of crucial importance for the future of philosophical thought in a global world. (shrink)

This paper identifies cultural disenchantment as a crucial concept in Rorty's understanding of liberalism, and considers how Rorty's use of this term draws on but also differs from similar ideas in Nietzsche and Weber. It argues that Rorty's notion of disenchantment complements his Darwinian view of human nature and his conception of the self as a centerless web of beliefs and desires. These three principal ideas form the basis of Rorty's novel theoretical approach to liberal democracy and of his belief (...) in its ability to sustain itself without its traditional rationalist justifications. (shrink)

Rorty uses the private–public distinction as a conceptual tool to uphold the ideal of self–creation (Romanticism) simultaneously to the ideal of solidarity (Enlightenment liberalism). The difficulty of accommodating these two apparently opposing ideals has led Rorty to make inconsistent and contradictory claims about the private–public distinction. This article suggests a way of easing the tension that exists around Rorty’s formulations of the distinction. It does so by turning to the thematic of “self–enlargement” to be found in Rorty’s later writings. By (...) presenting self–enlargement as a common feature of self–creation and solidarity, this reading opens up a way of reconciling these two ideals and mitigating some of the difficulties in Rorty’s private–public distinction. (shrink)

Compassion is a sign of superficiality: broken destinies and unrelenting misery either make you scream or turn you to stone. Pity is not only inefficient; it is also insulting. And besides, how can you pity another when you yourself suffer ignominiously? Compassion is as common as it is because it does not bind you to anything! Nobody in this world has yet died from another's suffering. And the one who said that he died for us did not die; he was (...) killed. (E. M. Cioran, On the Heights of Despair). (shrink)

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that we accept rest.... Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted (...) as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult. Michel Foucault (1988b, 154). (shrink)

This text of a lecture describes the importance of Zygmunt Bauman's work for sociological theory and intellectual debate in Germany. The main points are: the tension between the German Sonderweg thesis and Bauman's analysis of the Holocaust; the relationship between Bauman's theory of modernity/postmodernity and the writings of Elias, Horkheimer/Adorno and Beck; a critique of Bauman's neglect of democratic alternatives within modernity, particularly American intellectual and political traditions; and a discussion of Bauman's emphasis on pre-societal sources of morality in his (...) postmodern ethics and the pragmatist understanding of intersubjectivity and morality. (shrink)

Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been fully articulated yet nevertheless shapes the pragmatist attitude in philosophy. Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there”. One of the consequences of transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical pro...

This essay argues that Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, Jürgen Habermas's communication theory, and Jacques Derrida's deconstruction all fit together within one philosophical paradigm: metamodernism. Metamodernism, as defined, is opposed to both modernism and radical forms of postmodernism. Within metamodernism, a political conundrum provides the key clue for understanding the relations among Gadamer, Habermas, and Derrida as well as for elaborating the contours of the paradigm. Specifically, the political implications of the three philosophies are intransitive: they seem to shift around rather (...) than being in fixed relations to each other. So, for instance, Gadamer sometimes seems to the political right of both Habermas and Derrida, but then, at different times, he stands between them, and then again, at other times, he seems to be to the left of both. This political paradox suggests that the traditional political categories of liberalism and conservatism do not suitably reflect the critical positions within metamodernism. Gadamer, Habermas, and Derrida are far more concerned with explaining the possibility and techniques of interpretive and social critique, while remaining true to the metamodernist paradigm, rather than fitting themselves into the traditional liberal or conservative political camps. (shrink)

We build on Morgan’s deep conventionalist base by offering a pragmatic approach for achieving normative progress on sports most intractable problems (e.g. performance enhancemen...

This paper both elaborates and interrogates the transactional model of human experience at the center of Shannon W. Sullivan's Living Across and Through Skins. In particular, it highlights the need to supplement her account with a psychoanalytic reading of our gendered subjectivities. Moreover, it stresses the necessity to focus on such humanly important—and irreducibly somatic—phenomena as grief and eros.

Countering the present trend in the discourse on justice wherein human reason is perceived and marginalized as an embarrassment to justice and the trend to reject the concept of formal justice, this paper argues that there is formal justice and the essence of justice is setting things right and setting righteousness to stand straight. By this token, justice means the rule of reason, not the rule of power and desire, and the ethics of justice differs fundamentally from the ethics of (...) care/benevolence. The popular assumption that justice as the rule of reason is incompatible with the idea of justice as accommodating diversity is unjustified. The paper joins the present discourse on justice from a historical perspective. It examines the historical Confucian and neo-Confucian concept of justice in a way of its dialogues with other Western concepts of justice such as Plato's concept of justice. (shrink)

Although Spinoza's formative influence on the cultural ideals of the West is widely recognized, especially with reference to liberal democracy, secular humanism, and naturalistic ethics, little has been written about the educational implications of his philosophy. This article explores the pedagogical tenets that are implicit in Spinoza's writings. I argue (1) that Spinoza's ethics is eudaimonistic, aiming at self‐affirmation, full humanity and wellbeing; (2) that the flourishing of individuals depends on their personal resources, namely, their conatus, power, vitality or capacity (...) to act from their own inner natures; and (3) that the combination of the Spinozian conceptions of humanism, liberal democracy, eudaimonistic ethics, and the enlightened and sovereign individual constitute together the grounds for a comprehensive empowering and liberating pedagogy. (shrink)

Adapting Western self-critical discourse, the Arab Egyptian intellectual Abdelwahab Elmessiri attempted to Islamize modernity; however, he did this ironically via Western critique itself. This paper follows a comparative approach to show how Elmessiri’s construction of the duality of immanence and transcendence is based on the critiques introduced by Eric Voegelin and Zygmunt Bauman. However, while Bauman saw the role of critical theory as the modest comment on human experience, Elmessiri and Voegelin uncovered the dominance of immanence in Western modernity so (...) as to contrast it with Islamic monotheism and the Christian humanistic legacy, respectively. The critiques introduced by Elmessiri and Voegelin reach their climax when modernity is compared to a form of heretical Gnosticism. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists argue for the incorporation of all forms of oppression into their analyses, feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. Yet insofar as a reduction to animal irrationality has been central to the epistemic injustice of both humans and animals, I propose that in addition to axes of gender, race, class and (...) sex, feminist epistemology must register the animal-human dichotomy as a fundamental driving mechanism inherent in epistemic injustice. From the perspective of a truly liberatory epistemology, I thus argue for an expanded account of epistemic injustice that is both 1) sufficiently attentive to the way injustices to human knowers continue to rely on animal oppression and 2) that accommodates epistemic injustices against animal knowers. (shrink)

The article asks about the function of clinical ethics. It does so by confronting the assumption that ethics is supposed to help in the solution of concrete problems, relying upon a defined set of principles and rules. The scientific character of such an approach to clinical ethics complements the very understanding of modern medicine as being increasingly scientific and technical; that is, as oriented toward the production of effects. The paper claims that, rather tan sharing in the “suspension of meaning” (...) pursued by medicine for the sake of scientific objectivity, the main task of clinical ethics consists of a retrieval, or “anamnesis,” of the very questions medicine seems to suspend: the significance of illness and disease, of birth, suffering and death, and of the service to the ethos of generosity that sustains the healing professions. Also, the paper offers a cultural “etiology” of “the suspension of meaning” in ethics, and pleads for a moral reflection that begins with a free and open confrontation with clinical experience. Attending to the moral meaning of concrete situations, the paper argues that formal modes of logical argumentation are only derivative functions of the moral language and, thus, cannot exhaust the broad spectrum of ethical discourse in medicine. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.9. (shrink)