Esta comunicación toma como punto de partida un conflicto paradigmático entre las concepciones de Isócrates y de Platón sobre la educación y el ideal de hombre que las guiaba, para delinear los trazos de otro conflicto entre el humanismo inspirado por la tradición griega, asumido y transformado en el interior de la tradición cristiana, y un “humanismo” que, en el marco del pensamiento liberal, intenta recrear el ideal de hombre en términos de individuo aislado, con desdoblamientos consecuentes en la concepción (...) de la sociedad y de las tareas del Estado. Las tres figuras del conflicto aquí expuestas indican que los desafíos actuales del humanismo de inspiración cristiana son ciertamente más graves de los que se le presentaron al humanismo griego del siglo IV a.c. El individualismo asumido como ideología, el liberalismo transformado en tradición y el neoliberalismo como doctrina econó- mica hegemónica conforman una comprensión de hombre y de los bienes de la vida humana, en sus dimensiones individuales y sociales, en contraste radical con la que se reporta a la tradición cristiana. Palabras clave:humanismo, individualismo, liberalismo, bien común, justicia. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 159 - 176 The purpose of this paper is the analysis of the Plotinian and Iamblichean reading of the Aristotelian theory of abstraction, and its relationship with the status of mathematical entities, as they were conceived within a Platonic model, according to which mathematical objects are ontological autonomous and separate.

Desperately difficult texts inevitably elicit desperate hermeneutical measures. Aristotle's De Anima, book three, chapter five, is evidently one such text. At least since the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias, scholars have felt compelled to draw some remarkable conclusions regarding Aristotle's brief remarks in this passage regarding intellect. One such claim is that in chapter five, Aristotle introduces a second intellect, the so-called 'agent intellect', an intellect distinct from the 'passive intellect', the supposed focus of discussion up until this passage.1 This (...) view is a direct descendent of the view of Alexander himself, who identified the agent intellect with the divine intellect.2 Even the staunchest defender of such a view is typically at a loss to give a plausible explanation of why the divine intellect pops into and then out of the picture in the intense and closely argued discussion of the human intellect that goes from chapter four through to the end of chapter seven.3 Revolting against an extravagant postulation of entities, Michael Wedin, for example, has argued with considerable subtlety and ingenuity that there is in fact only one intellect discussed in De Anima.4 This unified intellect is fully capable of being integrated into Aristotle's hylomorphic psychology. In order to make his case, though, Wedin is himself forced (1) to discount the importance of some texts and (2) to interpret others in a way that strains credulity. (shrink)

In this article I will show that the problem of embodiment goes back to the question of the mind-body split, as this has been established and discussed by the philosophical tradition. With the digital turn and the advent of ubiquitous computing the problem of embodiment has taken new forms that have led scholars to introduce the notion of a “new digital Cartesianism.” Subjectivation processes within digital culture have mostly been explained by resorting to what I will call the “E-D-R scheme,” (...) which assumes that a real detachment between the body and the mind really occurs in digital processes. Since—as I will show—this is not actually the case, I will suggest replacing this epistemological scheme with a new one, which I will call the “double-embodiment scheme,” in order to acquire a more fitting epistemological account of the underlying digital ontology. Finally, I will discuss the distinction between bodily extension and the incorporation of non-bodily objects introduced by Helena De Preester in order to show that, in the digital realm, this distinction is much more blurred and complex than she acknowledges: digital interaction requires both bodily extension and the incorporation of objects as complementary processes. (shrink)