Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 06 september 2010.

A crucial question for a process view of life is how to identify a process and how to follow it through time. The genidentity view can contribute decisively to this project. It says that the identity through time of an entity X is given by a well-identified series of continuous states of affairs. Genidentity helps address the problem of diachronic identity in the living world. This chapter describes the centrality of the concept of genidentity for David Hull and proposes an (...) extension of Hull’s view to the ubiquitous phenomenon of symbiosis. Finally, using immunology as a key example, it shows that the genidentity view suggests that the main interest of a process approach is epistemological rather than ontological and that its principal claim is one of priority, namely that processes precede and define things, and not vice versa. (shrink)

У статті здійснена спроба осмислення феномена події у релігійному вимірі. Подія розглядається як явище, яке характеризується сингулярністю, тобто індивідуальним характером вираження, належить до сфери неповсякденного, не збігається зі звичними рамками розуміння навколишнього світу та не відповідає емпіричній фактичності. Необхідність більш активного філософсько-релігієзнавчого дискурсу кореляції повсякденного і неповсякденного у сфері релігії зумовила потребу звернення до означеної проблеми. Отже, метою статті є з’ясування онтологічного статусу події, релігійний контекст вияву якої постає протиставленням повсякденності та призводить до трансформації усталеного способу життя віруючого. Повсякденне буття (...) характеризується рисами сакральності, демонструє потяг до трансцендентного. З цієї причини очевидним і обґрунтованим убачається поєднання явищ буденного емпіричного світу з цінностями іншого виміру буття. Наявність неповсякденного у повсякденному житті засвідчують, зокрема, елементи культової практики, оскільки вони є вираженням сакрального часу і простору, а також способом утіленням вічних цінностей. До сфери неповсякденного належать описані в Євангеліях стосунки людини з Богом, пророцтва, об’явлення, видіння як неповсякденні вияви релігійного досвіду. Подія є протиставленням світу явищ позадосвідному світу буття, перетворенням, яке зумовлює появу нових порядків і структур. Здійснення події суперечить попереднім уявленням, тому зустріч події зі стандартною дійсністю супроводжується трансформацією повсякденності. Встановлення вкоріненості події в буття або її трансцендентного походження дає змогу визначити причини події. В умовах секуляризованого світу людина здебільшого демонструє готовність визнати значущими події, в тому числі у всесвіті, які відповідають науковим знанням. Це відбувається навіть тоді, коли факт події ставить під сумнів фундаментальні постулати науки. З огляду на це відкриття в науці, ситуації в політиці, мистецтві, особистому житті сприймаються як масштабні події. Причому момент зустрічі з подією можна описати, наприклад, за допомогою поетичної мови, яка висловлює певні символи людського буття і постає засобом об’єктивації події як неочікуваної новації. Натомість віруюча особа сприймає події надприродного характеру як втручання потойбічної реальності у звичний спосіб життя. Так, отримання релігійного досвіду супроводжується трансформацією повсякденності індивіда. Основою містичного досвіду релігійної традиції є досвід зустрічі з Божественним, наслідком чого постає зміна самосвідомості віруючої особи, трансформація її цінностей, смислів та значень. Тобто усвідомлення події, яка не належить до усталеного порядку, передбачає перспективу появи нової дійсності, котра суперечить попереднім уявленням. Однією з форм набуття релігійного досвіду є процес навернення, внаслідок чого зазнають трансформації світоглядні орієнтації людини, що дає змогу пізнання власних прихованих глибин свідомості. Навернення, набуття благодаті та віри виражають раптовий або поступовий процес, за допомогою якого індивід досягає внутрішньої гармонії, усвідомлення своєї праведності, відчуття щастя, знаходить опору у вірі в реальність того, що відкрили йому релігійні переживання. (shrink)

ArgumentOne of the first high-altitude observatories was a hotel. Established in 1823, the chalet on Mount Faulhorn became a highpoint of nineteenth-century science. In this paper, I take this mountain as my entry point into the examination of the special attraction that mountains exerted on scientists. I argue that Mount Faulhorn stood for three different conceptions of the usefulness of the mountain in science: (1) in observation networks, stations were usually chosen for pragmatic rather than scientific reasons, but mountains representedsingularspots (...) in such networks, which deserved special attention; (2) the mountain also was amicrocosmwhere altitude differences were thought to capture essential features of latitude differences; (3) the mountain was sometimes no more than amacro-toolfor the pursuit of science, just a middle ground between the heaven and the earth. (shrink)

In 1922, Albert Einstein rejected Bergson’s concept of time. He even declared that Bergson’s duration did not exist, something that Bergson never quite came to terms with. On the other hand, some of Bergson’s reflections indicated that in a certain respect he was close to the spirit of modern physics, especially quantum theory. The author, therefore, asks whether it is possible to equate Bergson’s duration with the quantum space-time continuum and thus rehabilitate Bergson’s concept. The first part of the article, (...) in addition to the definition of duration, focuses on the connection of the subject, time, and matter in Bergson, which represents one of the points of contact with quantum theory. The second part describes the role of the subject in quantum theory. The third part presents the definition of the mentioned space-time continuum. The final section compares the two concepts and answers the research question. (shrink)

At the heart of this essay lies the problem of Christian universals.Sin-talk is arguably Christian theology’s primary contribution to any account of the human condition. Fashionable or unfashionabl...

A central claim of Deleuze's reading of Bergson is that Bergson's distinction between space as an extensive multiplicity and duration as an intensive multiplicity is inspired by the distinction between discrete and continuous manifolds found in Bernhard Riemann's 1854 thesis on the foundations of geometry. Yet there is no evidence from Bergson that Riemann influences his division, and the distinction between the discrete and continuous is hardly a Riemannian invention. Claiming Riemann's influence, however, allows Deleuze to argue that quantity, in (...) the form of ‘virtual number’, still pertains to continuous multiplicities. This not only supports Deleuze's attempt to redeem Bergson's argument against Einstein in Duration and Simultaneity, but also allows Deleuze to position Bergson against Hegelian dialectics. The use of Riemann is thereby an important element of the incorporation of Bergson into Deleuze's larger early project of developing an anti-Hegelian philosophy of difference. This article first reviews the role of discrete and continuous multiplicities or manifolds in Riemann's Habilitationsschrift, and how Riemann uses them to establish the foundations of an intrinsic geometry. It then outlines how Deleuze reinterprets Riemann's thesis to make it a credible resource for Deleuze's Bergsonism. Finally, it explores the limits of this move, and how Deleuze's later move away from Bergson turns on the rejection of an assumption of Riemann's thesis, that of ‘flatness in smallest parts’, which Deleuze challenges with the idea, taken from Riemann's contemporary, Richard Dedekind, of the irrational cut. (shrink)

I will discuss some of the implications of the ongoing Darwinian revolution for theology as a constructor and interpreter of human meaning. Focus will be directed toward the following issues: How should we best understand ourselves in the new, evolutionary cosmos? What are the problems with the kind of genetic reductionism espoused by neo‐Darwinism? How are those problems resolved by the “relational” understanding of life made available by thermodynamics and ecology? How do we generate meaning‐structures in this relationally‐constituted cosmos? Finally, (...) how do these developments enrich our understandings of responsibility—to each other and to our private conceptions of God? (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of causal explanation in classical and statistical thermodynamics. It is argued that the irreversibility of macroscopic processes is explained in both formulations of thermodynamics in a teleological way that appeals to entropic or probabilistic consequences rather than to efficient-causal, antecedental conditions. This explanatory structure of thermodynamics is not taken to imply a teleological orientation to macroscopic processes themselves, but to reflect simply the epistemological limitations of this science, wherein consequences of heat-work asymmetries are either macroscopically (...) measurable (entropy) or calculable (probabilities), while efficient-causal relationships are obscure or indeterminable. (shrink)

Holistic perception is an antidote to the subject–object divide, a divide that leads to a mechanistic understanding of the world and can see human beings only in terms of parts, without a robust articulation of wholeness. In this piece, I argue that philosopher of science Henri Bortoft offers an empirically grounded theory, based on consciousness studies, which recasts the problem of the many and the one, offering insight into just such a holistic perception. I further argue that Samuel Taylor Coleridge's (...) philosophy of unity and multiplicity agrees in many respects with that of Bortoft. However, Coleridge draws further implications of his philosophy for Trinitarian theology. I will argue, in line with Bortoft and Coleridge, that perception is a hinge point in this discussion, allowing the move between the discussion of wholeness, subjectivity, and identity. I conclude that a holistic perceptual shift reconstitutes the human person in a way that is theologically significant, especially with respect to Christian Trinitarian doctrine. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw on postphenomenology and material engagement theory to consider the material and emergent character of sociality in Homo faber. I approach this through the context of the bow and arrow, which is a technology that has received recent attention in cognitive archeology as a proxy for assessing criteria that made early human cognition distinct from that of other hominins. Through an ethnographic case study, I scrutinize the forms of knowledge that are required to use the technology (...) in the dynamic field of environmental practices that constitute the hunt. I demonstrate that the learning of the skill is a transformational process where beginners develop self and intentionality by attuning subjective capacities for sensory awareness and creative responsiveness. Through mutual participation, the bow and arrow aligns disposition and rapport among those whose life processes are shaped by the skill. As a mechanism of shared experience, the bow and arrow generates a community can together perceive and act creatively in an impermanent world. Through these observations, I argue that early human sociality was built not on a pre-evolved capacity for symbolic representation but on technical experience, and I consider important questions this raises about the nature of evolutionary processes at work in the development of communities through time. (shrink)

In “Reconstructing Bergson’s Critique of Intensive Magnitude” John Bagby defends Bergson against the criticism that I develop in “Bergson and Intensive Magnitude: Dismantling...

ABSTRACT This article examines Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will. I demonstrate how his rejection of a different kind of quantity that is ordinal and does not allow measurement, and the underlying strict dualism of quantity and quality, is inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of his later philosophy. I dismantle two main strategies for explaining these inconsistencies. Furthermore, I argue that Bergson’s simplistic conception of quantity in terms of homogeneous multiplicity, which is operative (...) in his rejection of an alternative conception of quantity, lacks justification in the face of the transformations that the concept of quantity underwent in the history of mathematics and physics. (shrink)

Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will mainly targets Kant’s “Anticipations of Perception”, in which the Kantian distinction between matter and form is lowered. Bergson pra...

According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, (...) and only sustained empirical research in cognitive science will determine the extent to which that is true. (shrink)

У статті зроблена спроба показати новий ракурс проблем доцільності людської діяльності та процесів, що відбуваються у сущому взагалі, визначити їх раціональний і ірраціональний компоненти, а також розкрити їх глибинний сенс. Автор обстоює думку, що послідовний розвиток доцільності йде у напрямку набуття все більшого ступеню складності. Людську цивілізацію можна розглядати закономірною ланкою цього процесу. Сьогоднішній етап розвитку цивілізації показує, що вона стоїть на роздоріжжі, маючи перед собою різні альтернативи, але всі вони пов’язані з переходом до нового рівня складності. Або йти шляхом (...) послідовного впровадження нових технологій і створення штучного інтелекту з безмежними можливостями, який стане наступником людського етапу еволюції; або, за допомогою генної інженерії, знайти шляхи вдосконалення людини як біологічній істоті, яка буде мати надзвичайні фізичні та інтелектуальні здібності, що будуть набагато перевершувати якості сучасної людини. У будь якому випадку, перехід на новий рівень складності є нагальною потребою, але чи здійсниться цей перехід доцільно і розумно, чи хаос буде наростати і станеться обвал до більш сталого рівня простоти – питання, на яке поки що немає переконливої відповіді. (shrink)

In this paper, death and immortality ideas of Russian cosmists are in syncretic way put together with key ideas in postmodern philosophy. The problem considered in world philosophy on creating co-evolutionary conditions for the emergence of «immortal» man is illustrated by a wide variety of ideas and concepts. This paper contains innovative ideas of the Russian cosmists as the starting point of the research. Special attention is paid to the extraordinary teachings of N. F. Fedorov, who is the founder of (...) Russian Cosmic philosophy. Using the system-diachronic method and technologies of ascending from the abstract to the concrete, the author compares the ideas of Russian cosmism with manifest concepts of modern philosophy (synergetics, phenomenology, transhumanism). The author also gives the most striking facts of discoveries of modern natural science and draws conclusions about ideas of Russian cosmists that have been put forward ahead of their time and retained their relevance and ontological potential until now. The paper presents the prospects for further studying the heritage of Russian cosmism to search for philosophical tools that could, without going beyond the limits of ethical universals, successfully combine the controversial theoretical directions of modern philosophy for the future positive practical development of society. (shrink)

This article provides an affirmative feminist reading of the philosophy of Henri Bergson by reading it through the work of Karen Barad. Adopting such a diffractive reading strategy enables feminist philosophy to move beyond discarding Bergson for his apparent phallocentrism. Feminist philosophy finds itself double bound when it critiques a philosophy for being phallocentric, because the setup of a master narrative comes into being with the critique. By negating a gender-blind or sexist philosophy, feminist philosophy only reaffirms its parameters, and (...) setting up a master narrative costs feminist philosophy its feminism. I thus propose and practice a different methodological starting point, one that capitalizes on "diffraction." This article experiments with the affirmative phase in feminist philosophy prophesied by Elizabeth Grosz, among others. Working along the lines of the diffractive method, the article at the same time proposes a new reading of Bergson (as well as of Barad), a new, different metaphysics indeed, which can be specified as onto-epistemological or "new materialist.". (shrink)

Richard Koch1 became known in the 1920s with works on basic medical theory. Among these publications, the character of medical action and its status within the theory of science was presented as the most important theme. While science is inherently driven by the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, medicine pursues the practical purpose of helping the sick. Therefore, medicine must be seen as an active relationship between a helping and a suffering person. While elucidating this relationship, Koch discusses (...) the fundamental elements of medicine found in natural philosophy and the relationship of medicine to its own history. One of his aims is to unite natural history and the history of ideas without reducing intellectual processes to biological ones. Koch considers free will as something intuitively certain. It must serve as an axiom which will capture human as well as non-human reality. Based on the fact that human free will, considered a psychic quality, evolved out of inanimate matter, Koch grants matter (proto-) psychic qualities. They are evoked through specific constellations of matter. – With regard to history, Koch rejects the notion of constant progress. The history of medicine has provided insights that cannot be surpassed but can be obscured. Historical self-contemplation serves as a means for avoiding any deviations which may prevent medicine from fulfiling its ultimate purpose. Koch connects nature and history through the concept of a unity between natural history and the historical development of medicine. Medicine is considered an especially complex development of a purposive reaction to harmful stimuli, a reaction which can already be encountered in unicellular organisms. Without intending to reduce historical and mental processes to biological ones, Koch sets for himself the aim of gathering different phenomena and presenting them in one encapsulating unity. (shrink)

The Nanoessence project aims to examine life at a sub-cellular level, re-examining space and scale within the human context. A single HaCat skin cell is analysed with an Atomic Force Microscope (AFM) to explore comparisons between, life and death at a nano level. The humanistic discourse concerning life is now being challenged by nanotechnological research that brings into question the concepts of what constitutes living. The Nanoessence project research is based on data gathered as part of a residency at SymbioticA, (...) Centre of Excellence in Biological Arts, University of Western Australia and the Nanochemistry Research Institute, (NRI) Curtin University of Technology. The space of the body can be seen at an atomic level as having no defining boundaries. More generally, molecular self-assembly seeks to use concepts of supramolecular chemistry, and molecular recognition in particular, to cause single-molecule components to automatically arrange themselves into some useful conformation (reference Wikipedia). Nano assembly, or bottom-up approach, is the construction of a supramolecular chemistry by the assembly of nanoscopic particles, or even atoms and molecules. The proposal for nanotechnology to reshape nature atom by atom develops an interesting debate as to the constitution of life. The Nanoessence project aims to construct a physical experience to examine this scientific and metaphysical world. Nanoessence is an interactive audio-visual installation. In the Nanoessence installation the viewer will interface with the visual and sonic presentation through his or her own breath. In the context of the project breath has a strong conceptual and metaphorical link to a Biblical inception of life. The project attempts to maintain a high quality of authentic data to engage the viewer in a sensorial qualitative experience of quantitative data. (shrink)

The last few years have seen increasing research interest in moods and atmospheres. While this trend has been accompanied by growing interest in the history of the wordStimmungin other disciplines, this has not yet been the case within philosophy. Against this background, this paper offers a conceptual history of the wordStimmung, focusing on the period from Kant to Heidegger, as this period is, presumably, less known to researchers working with notions like mood, attunement or atmosphere today. Thus, considering this period (...) might provide conceptual resources not yet considered in current debate.Stimmunghas the remarkable feature of encompassing the entire semantic field of mood and atmosphere, insofar as both subjects and objects can literally be inStimmung.Stimmungmight refer to the state or condition of being attuned, which is understood as a dispositional state, as well as the process or act of attuning, which includes self-activating and foreign-determined forms of attuning. The word was first used for the tuning of musical instruments, but was quickly transferred to the fields of aesthetics, psychology, and physiology. This paper will focus on the contrast between the psychological canonization ofStimmungas a type of mental state, and the use ofStimmungas an untranslatable, irreducible metaphor with unique semantic force allowing for original theorizing. (shrink)

It has been shown that quantum mechanics in its orthodox interpretation violates four different formulations of causality principle endowed with empirical meaning. The present work aims to highlight how even a realistic non-standard interpretation of the theory conflicts with causality in its Cartesian formulation of the principle of the non-inferiority of causes over effects. Such an interpretation, which attributes some form of weak physical reality to the wave function (called empty wave, regarded as a zero-energy wave-like phenomenon), is a sort (...) of precursor of the more recent so-called wavefunction realism. We also discuss a more radical realistic interpretation according to which physical properties can also be assigned to non-metaphysical relative nothing, seen as the simple absence of a particle such as a photon, but not of its corresponding state (no-photon), which is considered real. By interpreting the wave function collapse as a consequence of an interaction with empty waves or of a detection of the no-photon, we will highlight how more real physical effects can derive from lower causes, including relative nothing. Finally, we will show how these interpretations, while violating Cartesian causality in its two variants, do not seem to affect the validity of the principle of a rational explanation that nothing can derive from (absolute) nothing, which does not seem satisfied by the orthodox interpretation. (shrink)

This dialogue was produced by an email exchange, with each email limited to 200 words. The exchange took place between 21 January and 9 June, 2021. No edits were allowed once ‘send’ had been pressed and there was to be no other correspondence between the participants for the duration of the dialogue. The Call for Papers for this special issue of Human Affairs was the starting point and there was no other pre-planning.

What is artificial life? Much has been said about this interesting collection of efforts to artificially simulate and synthesize lifelike behavior and processes, yet we are far from having a robust philosophical understanding of just what Alifers are doing and why it ought to interest philosophers of science, and philosophers of biology in particular. In this paper, I first provide three introductory examples from the particular subset of artificial life I focus on, known as ‘soft Alife’ (s-Alife), and follow up (...) with a more in-depth review of the Avida program, which serves as my case study of s-Alife. Next, I review three well-known accounts of thought experiments, and then offer my own synthesized account, to make the argument that s-Alife functions as thought experimentation in biology. I draw a comparison between the methodology of the thought-experimental world that yields real-world results, and the s-Alife research that informs our understanding of natural life. I conclude that the insights provided by s-Alife research have the potential to fundamentally alter our understanding of the nature of organic life and thus deserve the attention of both philosophers and natural scientists. (shrink)

This article argues that we can understand Jean Epstein's theory of photogénie as an instance of technics. Starting from a reading of Epstein's final fictional film Le Tempestaire, we can see that Epstein collapses the distinction between human and technological. This insight leads to a discussion of Epstein's theory of photogénie more generally, and one that highlights the term's relationship to temporality. This temporal dimension recalls Bernard Stiegler's discussion of technics in Technics and Time. As the series evolves, Stiegler increasingly (...) foregrounds cinema as technics, and the essay ends with a discussion of the ways that Epstein's understanding of photogénie can press on Stiegler's claims. (shrink)

There seems to be no connection between philosophy of humor and the philosophy of technology. In this paper, I want to make the case that there is. I will pursue a twofold goal in this paper: First, I will take an account from one of the seminal figures in the philosophy of humor, Henri Bergson, and bring out its merits for a philosophy of technology. Bergson has never been fully appreciated as a philosopher of technology. I will fill this gap (...) and show that Bergson’s account of the comic contains some interesting insights about our relation to technology. Second, I will show that humor and the comic open up a new perspective on technology that may facilitate new ways of thinking about our technological culture. (shrink)

The utopia we are dealing with here could have been called ‘the mother of all utopias’ since it is in fact humanity's greatest, most primal dream, indeed the one that defines us as human. This great utopia, from which are woven our representations of paradise, for example, is immortality, the theme of René Barjavel's novel entitled The Immortals (1973).

The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation for Sartre’s account of the unity of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego. I will argue that it is only once The Transcendence of the Ego is read alongside other texts written around the same time, such as The Imaginary, that we can understand how Sartre believes it is possible for consciousness to be unified without an I. I begin by setting out the Kantian context that Sartre develops for (...) his views, before looking at Sartre’s arguments themselves. I then turn to some of the difficulties other readers have encountered with making sense of the arguments of the Transcendence of the Ego. I argue that it is only in relation to Sartre’s account of what he calls the illusion of immanence in The Imaginary, that we can make sense of Sartre’s account of consciousness, before reconstructing what I take to be Sartre’s position drawing on Sartre’s references to Bergson and Spinoza. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore why Deleuze takes up Hamlet's claim that ‘time is out of joint’. In the first part of this paper, I explore this claim by looking at how Deleuze relates it to Plato's Timaeus and its conception of the relationship between movement and time. Once we have seen how time functions when it is ‘in joint’, I explore what it would mean for time to no longer be understood in terms of an underlying (...) rational structure. The claim can be understood as about a relationship between time and action. In the second part of this paper, I want to relate this new understanding of time to Hamlet itself, in order to see how temporality operates within the play. I will conclude by relating these two different conceptions of time out of joint to one another through Nietzsche's eternal return. (shrink)

Deleuze’s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze’s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this article how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze’s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the content of art can be (...) represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze’s philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze’s wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz’s critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz’s criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze’s philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz’s phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of petitio principii, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a close reading of Deleuze's complex account of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle in Difference and Repetition. The first part provides a reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle itself, showing why Freud feels the need to develop a transcendental account of repetition. In the second, I show the limitations of Freud's account, drawing on the work of Weismann to argue that Freud's transcendental model mischaracterises repetition. In the third part, I show how (...) Freud's account of the death drive is shadowed by Deleuze's own non-representational transcendental account. (shrink)

There are two classical and opposite positions about scientific discovery: the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully rational and the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully irrational. In the first case, machines are regarded as able to perform the scientific discovery process whereas, in the second case, machines are considered unable to perform any part of the scientific discovery process.We adopt a third intermediate approach that envisages a new role for machines, which are conceived as descriptions (...) of the results of scientific discovery activity. More precisely, the purpose of the paper is to illustrate the multilevel structure of a machine, called creative dynamic agency, that represents the articulated and incremental description of the product of scientific discovery process. The multilevel architecture reflects the composition relation that holds among phenomena described by creative agents that compose creative dynamic agency. (shrink)

Difference and Repetition might be said to have brought about a Deleuzian Revolution in philosophy comparable to Kant’s Copernican Revolution. Kant had denounced the three great terminal points of traditional metaphysics – self, world and God – as transcendent illusions, and Deleuze pushes Kant’s revolution to its limit by positing a transcendental field that excludes the coherence of the self, world and God in favour of an immanent and differential plane of impersonal individuations and pre-individual singularities. In the process, he (...) introduces numerous conceptual innovations into philosophy: the becoming of concepts; a transformation of the form of the question; an insistence that philosophy must start in the middle; an attempt to think in terms of multiplicities; the development of a new logic and a new metaphysics based on a concept of difference; a new conception of space as intensive rather than extensive; a conception of time as a pure and empty form; and an understanding of philosophy as a system in heterogenesis – that is, a system that entails a perpetual genesis of the heterogeneous, an incessant production of the new. -/- Keywords: concepts, becoming, multiplicity, singularity, the middle [au milieu], difference, intensity, time, system, the new. (shrink)

This paper examines the intersecting of the themes of temporality and truth in Deleuze's philosophy. For the ancients, truth was something eternal: what was true was true in all times and in all places. Temporality (coming to be and passing away) was the realm of the mutable, not the eternal. In the seventeenth century, change began to be seen in a positive light (progress, evolution, and so on), but this change was seen to be possible only because of the immutable (...) laws of nature that govern change. It was not until philosophers such as Bergson, James, Whitehead – and then Deleuze – that time began to be taken seriously on its own account. On the one hand, in Deleuze, time, freed from its subordination to movement, now becomes autonomous: it is the pure form of change (continuous variation) that lies at the basis of Deleuze's metaphysics in Difference and Repetition (and is explored more thematically in The Time-Image). As a result, on the other hand, the false, freed from its subordination to the form of the true, assumes a power of its own (the power of the false), which in turn implies a new ‘analytic of the concept’ that Deleuze develops in What Is Philosophy? (shrink)

This article offers a synthesis of certain essential contributions from three revolutionary thinkers of our age, C. West Churchman, Pir Vilayat Khan, and Ilya Prigogine, each of whom recently departed this life. In the course of this article, common threads in the work of these pioneers related to problem solving and creativity will be explored.

For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things.

Although time was a predominate theme in Continental philosophy for the first half of the twentieth century, philosophical attention has increasingly shifted to space. This paper contributes to the phenomenology of space through Hans Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology. Blumenberg elucidates the significance of phenomenological distance for the contingent existence of humans. Spanning from the experience of early human ancestors to history and epistemology, Blumenberg’s work reveals how contingency pervades human existence. Blumenberg understands names, myths, rhetoric, and metaphors as cultural techniques that (...) function as means of self-preservation by distancing an overwhelming and disorienting reality and managing the felt contingency of human existence. Developing upon Blumenberg’s insights into human contingency and distance, the paper argues that detours offer a way to address the contemporary, existential issues posed by the increasing rate of technological change and environmental problems. (shrink)

Although the ethics of humor is a relatively new field, it already seems to have achieved a consensus about ethics in general. In this paper, I implicitly (1) question the view of ethics that stands behind many discussions in the ethics of humor; I do this by explicitly (2) focusing on what has been a chief preoccupation in the ethics of humor: the evaluation of humor. Does the immoral content of a joke make it more or less humorous? Specifically, I (...) analyze whether a sexist joke is more humorous because of its sexism. Contra recent trends in the ethics of humor, I answer this question affirmatively. To this end, the paper presents a detailed and novel reading of Bergson's philosophy of humor, which I argue connects most easily and significantly to the alternate view of ethics I have in mind. (shrink)

This paper examines a specific appeal to philosophical anthropology—Andy Clark's—and the role it plays in shaping his account of our fundamental cyborg humanity." By focusing on the theme of embodiment, we also inquire into how phenomenology might benefit from Clark's account as well as how Clark's account might benefit from further engagement with phenomenology. Throughout, we explore inter- and intra-disciplinary questions that highlight the contribution the philosophy of technology can make to our understanding of embodiment and philosophical anthropology.

While unicellular microbes such as phytoplankton (marine algae) have long been considered immortal unless eaten by predators, recent research suggests that under specific conditions entire populations of phytoplankton actively kill themselves; their assumed atemporality is being revised as marine ecologists recognize phytoplankton’s important role in the global carbon cycle. Drawing on empirical research into programmed cell death in marine microbes, this article explores how, in their study of microbial death, scientists change not only our understanding of microbial temporality, but also (...) reconstruct the relationship between life and death, biological individuality and assumptions about a natural teleology associated with bounded biological systems and genetic programmes. Reading this research together with a Derridean deconstruction of the limit between human and other animals with respect to death, this article explores how the deconstruction of individuality from within biology may suggest alternatives to our anthropocentric notion of time and embodiment. (shrink)

This article offers a contribution to the history of scientific ideas by proposing an epistemological argument supporting the assumption made by Miller whereby Niels Bohr has been influenced by cubism when he developed his non-intuitive complementarity principle. More specifically, this essay will identify the Bergsonian durée as the conceptual bridge between Metzinger and Bohr. Beyond this conceptual link between the painter and the physicist, this paper aims to emphasize the key role played by art in the development of human knowledge.

Besieged by ongoing economic crises, global health emergencies, geopolitical instabilities, ecological devastation, and growing political resentments, the intractable nature of the problems that configure the present has never loomed larger or more darkly. But what, indeed, is a problem? Problematising the modern image that treats problems as obstacles to be overcome by the progress of technoscientific knowledge and policy, this introductory article lays the groundwork for a generative conceptualisation of problems. Reweaving intercontinental connections between traditions of French philosophy and American (...) pragmatism, it proffers a conception of the problematic as a mode of existence that is irreducible to the subjective, the methodological, or the epistemological. Problems go all the way down and up, requiring nothing less than an art of metamorphosis capable of engendering processes of creation, invention, and transformation in whose hold bodies and practices, knowledges and lives, thoughts and worlds, are done and undone, made and remade. (shrink)