- Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
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Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope: An Introduction (The Moral Psychology of the Emotions). Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 135-151.details
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Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
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Know How and Acts of Faith.Paulina Sliwa - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 246-263.details
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Speech Acts: The Contemporary Theoretical Landscape.Daniel W. Harris, Daniel Fogal & Matt Moss - 2018 - In Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press.details
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Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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On proper presupposition.Julia Zakkou - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):328-352.details
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Assertion and Its Many Norms.John N. Williams - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):39-76.details
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Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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Understanding and the Norm of Explanation.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1171-1175.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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Knowledge Guaranteed.John Turri - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):602-612.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.details
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Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
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Assertibility and Sensitivity.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):99-117.details
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Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.details
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Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.details
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A Note on Existentially Known Assertions.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):813-821.details
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Irksome assertions.Rachel McKinnon & John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.details
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Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):782-798.details
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The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details
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'Belief' and Belief.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Moral Assertion.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):639-649.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Christoph Kelp Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Questioning and addressee knowledge.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-23.details
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Assertion, Implicature, and Iterated Knowledge.Eliran Haziza - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Assertion and the “How do you know?” challenge.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-17.details
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Anonymous assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.details
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Doubting Assertion.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):1-13.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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Can the Knowledge Norm Co‐Opt the Opt Out?Kevin Dorst - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):273-282.details
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Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Telling, showing and knowing: A unified theory of pedagogical norms.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):16-20.details
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Knowledge from Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):283 - 297.details
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How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):133-140.details
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E=K and The Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin.Rodrigo Borges - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1031-1041.details
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Reinforcing the knowledge account of assertion.Martijn Blaauw - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):105-108.details
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A non‐normative account of assertion.Dylan Black - 2018 - Ratio 32:53-62.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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