O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a concepção enciclopédica de revolução científica posta em prática pelo químico francês L.-B. Guyton de Morveau (1737-1816). Deslocando a análise do conhecimento químico das Luzes do programa traçado por Lavoisier (1743-1794), sugerimos uma concepção revolucionária republicana, proclamada como resultado do esforço de uma coletividade. Daremos destaque a três abordagens revolucionárias de Guyton de Morveau no âmbito da química. A primeira foi sua atuação no ensino dessa ciência, cuja pedagogia e métodos de ensino foram fundamentais (...) para sua imersão social. Além disso, entre 1770 e 1790, Guyton de Morveau teve desempenhos decisivos no seio da empresa enciclopédica e no seio da escola química francesa. (shrink)

French abstract: L’article étudie la relation de Peirce à Comte, en partant des critiques formulées dans ses écrits de jeunesse. Son enjeu est double : il relève d’abord d’une question d’histoire de la philosophie étonnamment peu traitée, alors même que Peirce lit, commente et critique Comte. Le second enjeu est épistémologique et métaphysique : Peirce voit dans la théorie comtienne des hypothèses une position proche du pragmatisme qu’il développe, mais grevée de présupposés nominalistes qui la rendent finalement intenable, à moins (...) que l’on n’en adopte une lecture « charitable ». La confrontation avec Comte semble alors être l’occasion privilégiée d’une explicitation de son propre pragmatisme. -/- English version (see link below on Cairn international) This article discusses Peirce’s relationship to Comte, based on criticisms made by Peirce in his early writings. It has a twofold purpose : firstly, addressing an important question in the history of philosophy that is surprisingly overlooked, even if Peirce reads, comments and criticizes Comte. The second issue is epistemological and metaphysical : Peirce sees in Comte’s theory of hypotheses a position close to the pragmatism he develops, but burdened with nominalist presuppositions that ultimately make it untenable, unless one adopts a “charitable” reading of it. The confrontation with Comte then seems to be a privileged opportunity, for Peirce, to clarify his own pragmatism. (shrink)

In the present article, we discuss the specificity of the object of the history of science as an autonomous and interdisciplinary field of studies by nature and origin, placed at the interface of history, epistemology and science, and focus on some key historiographical views. Within this context, Georges Canguilhem stands out for contributions such as calling the attention to the relevance of epistemology in science history research and the discontinuity-continuity antithesis, among many others. An accurate understanding of Canguilhem’s ideas demands (...) an unbiased review of Auguste Comte’s work, particularly his views on science in general, the various sciences in particular and the methods to present them, to wit, the historical and the dogmatic. We finish with a short description of our theoretical-methodological work and its implications for studies in the history of science. (shrink)