Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 329-344, October 2011.

This paper explores the usefulness of the 'ethical matrix', proposed by Ben Mepham, as a tool in technology assessment, specifically in food ethics. We consider what the matrix is, how it might be useful as a tool in ethical decision-making, and what drawbacks might be associated with it. We suggest that it is helpful for fact-finding in ethical debates relating to food ethics; but that it is much less helpful in terms of weighing the different ethical problems that it uncovers. (...) Despite this drawback, we maintain that, with some modifications, the ethical matrix can be a useful tool in debates in food ethics. We argue that useful modifications might be to include future generations amongst the stakeholders in the matrix, and to substitute the principle of solidarity for the principle of justice. (shrink)

The concept of Homo economicus, one of the major foundations of neoclassical economics and a subset of the ideology of laisser-faire capitalism. was recently charged and tried in the island high court. Using the island’s virtual jury system for the first time, the accused was tried before a jury of three — Plato, Schopenhauer and feminist economists — chosen by him while under a veil of ignorance of the charge. All three returned guilty verdicts. Plato’s was prescriptive: ‘One ought not (...) to be like Homo economicus’. Schopenhauer’s verdict was descriptive: ‘Human nature is not Homo economicus’. The feminist verdict was both. Following the trial — described as a thought experiment — the island’s resident philosopher put forward two claims: (a) Neoclassical economists base their theories on a deficient depiction of humankind (descriptive misconception) a claim supported by a witness expert in experimental economics; (b) The depiction holds a dominant but unjustified position in various discourses such as welfare state debates because it is promoted by a small but highly influential group of economically privileged, universityeducated whites, namely graduates of economics, a claim supported by the sociology expert witness. (shrink)

This essay reviews a number of issues regarding self-regulation and professional ethics which journalists across Europe might face in the scaling down of national borders. The dilemma of whether a pan-European ideal standards code of ethics can help journalists when working across borders and encountering other traditions is explored by referring to Slovenia, one of the new European Union (EU) members. Presenting a critique of the traditional professionalization concept, cogent arguments are found for rejecting a universal code of ethics. By (...) acknowledging the limitations and even deficiencies of such codified morality, a journalist's responsibility is emphasized and a different concept of ethics is indicated. Ethical journalists in this international context must focus on responsibility, positive tolerance, and empathy that transcends mere obedience to a code. The EU citizen's ethics rather than EU professional ethics should be advanced, based on universal principles and grounded in personal responsibility. (shrink)

Despite claims that STS science education promotes ethical responsibility, this approach is not supported by a clear philosophy of ethics. This paper argues that the work of Emmanuel Levinas provides an ethics suitable for an STS science education. His concept of the face of the Other redefines education as learning from the other, rather than about the other. Extrapolating the face of the Other to the non‐human world suggests an ethics for science education where the goal of pedagogy is peace (...) with each other and the world through the rupture, eros and justice that arises from openness to the demands of the world. Understanding the infinite responsibility of the invocation presented by the face of the Other radically reconceptualizes science education from STS towards an E‐STS curriculum of responsiveness that critically employs the said of modern science and opportunities of experience to enable the next generation of citizens to act in peace to what the world is saying. (shrink)

Despite claims that STS(E) science education promotes ethical responsibility, this approach is not supported by a clear philosophy of ethics. This paper argues that the work of Emmanuel Levinas provides an ethics suitable for an STS(E) science education. His concept of the face of the Other redefines education as learning from the other, rather than about the other. Extrapolating the face of the Other to the non‐human world suggests an ethics for science education where the goal of pedagogy is peace (...) with each other and the world through the rupture, eros and justice that arises from openness to the demands of the world. Understanding the infinite responsibility of the invocation presented by the face of the Other radically reconceptualizes science education from STS(E) towards an E‐STS curriculum of responsiveness that critically employs the said of modern science and opportunities of experience to enable the next generation of citizens to act in peace to what the world is saying. (shrink)

A virtue centred approach to ethics has been criticized for being vague owing to the nature of its central concept, the paradigm person. From the perspective of the practitioner the most damaging charge is that virtue ethics fails to be action guiding and, in addition to this, it does not offer any means of act appraisal. These criticisms leave virtue ethics in a weak position vis-à-vis traditional approaches to ethics. The criticism is, however, challenged by Hursthouse in her analysis of (...) the accounts of right action offered by deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. It is possible to defend the action guiding nature of virtue ethics: there are virtue rules and exemplars to guide action. Insights from Aristotle’s practical approach to ethics are considered alongside Hursthouse’s analysis and it is suggested that virtue ethics is also capable of facilitating action appraisal. It is at the same time acknowledged that approaches to virtue ethics vary widely and that the challenges offered here would be rejected by those who embrace a radical replacement virtue approach. (shrink)

Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including anxiety, fear, powerlessness, and vulnerability. There is much debate on the ‘therapeutic’ or ‘helping’ nurse–patient relationship. However, despite the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, the literature concerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I critically examine these theories (...) and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. I examine the work of Hursthouse on virtue ethics’ action guidance and the v-rules. I argue that the moral virtues and a strong (action-guiding) version of virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; (2) using judgement; and (3) using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral perception, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. Merits and problems of the virtue-based approach are examined. I relate the work of MacIntyre to nursing and I conceive nursing as a practice: nurses who exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong practice-based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist, and relational. Several areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to develop this account yet further. (shrink)