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  1. Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, and the Third-Person.Joe Saunders - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):164-182.
    Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he (...)
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  • The Question of System: How to Read the Development from Kant to Hegel.Pirmin Stekeler‐Weithofer - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):80-102.
    In order to understand Hegel's approach to philosophy, we need to ask why, and how, he reacts to the well-known criticism of German Romantics, like Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, against philosophical system building in general, and against Kant's system in particular. Hegel's encyclopedic system is a topical ordering of categorically different ontological realms, corresponding to different conceptual forms of representation and knowledge. All in all it turns into a systematic defense of Fichte's doctrine concerning the primacy of us as actors (...)
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  • Traps and gaps in action explanation: Theoretical problems of a psychology of human action.Werner Greve - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (2):435-451.
  • Kant y Hegel sobre la naturaleza de la acción intencional. ¿Continuidad o ruptura?Luis Placencia García - 2017 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 54:171-200.
    Este texto busca mostrar algunos aspectos de continuidad entre las concepciones de la acción intencional de Kant y Hegel. Esos aspectos son la base de otros conocidos elementos de ruptura que hay entre ellos. Como en las últimas décadas el problema de la concepción de ambos autores en torno a este punto ha sido investigado por múltiples estudiosos, me concentraré fundamentalmente en un punto que no ha sido suficientemente tratado: el modo en que ambos autores conciben la naturaleza de la (...)
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