A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".

A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and (...) false. (shrink)

A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or whatever one takes as her favourite truth-bearer: this would make little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.

En ocasiones, las paradojas involucran principios constitutivos del significado. Priest sostiene que en todos los casos deberíamos retener los principios y aceptar las contradicciones resultantes, mientras que Eklund sugiere modificar los principios en todos los casos. En este artículo, afirmo que las diferentes respuestas son adecuadas para las distintas paradojas. En particular, para paradojas del tipo del mentiroso, es mejor quedarse con el esquema T, que caracteriza el significado de “verdadero”, y aceptar las conclusiones contradictorias; mientras que para la paradoja (...) sorites, uno debería modificar la premisa problemática de Tolerancia. Finalmente, elaboro una solución para la paradoja sorites, que contiene elementos del supervaluacionismo y de la teoría de la revisión. (shrink)