A taxonomy of part‐whole or meronymic relations is developed to explain the ordinary English‐speaker's use of the term “part of” and its cognates. The resulting classification yields six types of meronymic relations: 1. component‐integral object (pedal‐bike), 2. member‐collection (ship‐fleet), 3. portion‐mass (slice‐pie), 4. stuff‐object (steel‐car), 5. feature‐activity (paying‐shopping), and 6. place‐area (Everglades‐Florida). Meronymic relations ore further distinguished from other inclusion relations, such as spatial inclusion, and class inclusion, and from several other semantic relations: attribution, attachment, and ownership. This taxonomy is (...) then used to explain cases of apparent intransitivity in merological syllogisms, and standard form syllogisms whose premises express different inclusion relations. The data suggest that intransitivities arise due to equivocations between different types of semantic relations. These results are then explained by means of the relation element theory which accounts for the character and behavior of semantic relations in terms of more primitive relational elements. The inferential phenomena observed are then explained by means of a single principle of element matching. (shrink)

Cultural differences occur in the use of categories to aid accurate recall of information. This study investigated whether culture also contributed to false (erroneous) memories, and extended cross-cultural memory research to Turkish culture, which is shaped by Eastern and Western influences. Americans and Turks viewed word pairs, half of which were categorically related and half unrelated. Participants then attempted to recall the second word from the pair in response to the first word cue. Responses were coded as correct, as blanks, (...) or as different types of errors. Americans committed more categorical errors than did Turks, and Turks mistakenly recalled more non-categorically related list words than did Americans. These results support the idea that Americans use categories either to organize information in memory or to support retrieval strategies to a greater extent than Turks and suggest that culture shapes not only accurate recall but also erroneous distortions of memory. (shrink)

Memory is modified through the act of retrieval. Although retrieving a target piece of information may strengthen the retrieved information itself, it may also serve to weaken retention of related information. This phenomenon, termed retrieval-induced forgetting, has garnered substantial interest for its implications as to why forgetting occurs. The present study attempted to replicate the seminal work by Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork (1994) on retrieval-induced forgetting, given the apparent sensitivity of the effect to certain deviations from the original paradigm developed (...) to study the phenomenon. The study extends the conditions under which retrieval-induced forgetting has been examined by utilizing both a traditional college undergraduate sample (Experiment 1), along with a more diverse internet sample (Experiment 2). In addition, Experiment 3 details a replication attempt of retrieval-induced forgetting using Anderson and Spellman’s (1995) independent cue procedure. Retrieval-induced forgetting was observed when using the traditional retrieval practice paradigm with undergraduate (Experiment 1) and internet (Experiment 2) samples, though the effect was not found when using the independent cue procedure (Experiment 3). Thus, the study can provide an indication as to the robustness of retrieval-induced forgetting to deviations from the traditional college undergraduate samples that have been used in the majority of existing research on the effect. (shrink)

Three experiments, adopting an evolutionary biology perspective, investigated subjects’ inferences about living things. Subjects were told that different enzymes help regulate cell function in two taxa and asked which enzyme a third taxon most likely uses. Experiment 1 and its follow-up, with college students, used triads involving amphibians, reptiles, and mammals (reptiles and mammals are most closely related evolutionarily) and plants, fungi, and animals (fungi are more closely related to animals than to plants). Experiment 2, with 10th graders, also included (...) triads involving mammals, birds, and snakes/crocodilians (birds and snakes/crocodilians are most closely related). Some subjects received cladograms (hierarchical diagrams) depicting the evolutionary relationships among the taxa. The effect of providing cladograms depended on students’ background in biology. The results illuminate students’ misconceptions concerning common taxa and constraints on their willingness to override faulty knowledge when given appropriate evolutionary evidence. Implications for introducing tree thinking into biology curricula are discussed. (shrink)

Changes in environmental context between encoding and retrieval often affect explicit memory but research on implicit memory is equivocal. One proposal is that conceptual but not perceptual priming is influenced by context manipulations. However, findings with conceptual priming may be compromised by explicit contamination. The present study examined the effects of environmental context on conceptual explicit and implicit memory . Explicit recall was reduced by context change. The implicit test results depended on test awareness . Among test-unaware participants, priming was (...) equivalent for same-context and different-context groups, whereas for the test-aware, the same-context group produced more priming. Thus, when explicit contamination is controlled, changes in environmental context do not impair conceptual priming. Context dependency appears to be a general difference between implicit and explicit memory rather than a difference between conceptual and perceptual implicit memory. Finally, measures of mood indicated no changes in affect across contexts, arguing against mood mediation for the context effects in explicit recall. (shrink)

Real-world judgements and decisions often require choosing from an open-ended set of options which cannot be exhaustively considered before a choice is made. Recent work has found that the options people do consider tend to have particular features, such as high historical value. Here, we pursue the idea that option generation during decision making may reflect a more general mechanism for calling things to mind, by which relevant features in a context-appropriate representational space guide what comes to mind. In this (...) paper, we evaluate this proposal primarily based on what comes to mind in different familiar categories. We first introduce an empirical approach for deriving the space of features that people use to represent items in a particular category and for locating the category members that come to mind within that space. We show that in both familiar and ad hoc categories, a category member’s location along certain dimensions of the derived feature space predicts its likelihood of coming to mind. Next, we show that category members from these feature space locations come to mind by default in a way that is somewhat impervious to conscious control. We then demonstrate that the extent to which a given dimension is a predictor of what comes to mind within a category is related to how relevant that feature is for representing the category in question, using a novel measure of general feature relevance. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of this framework in the context of a decision making task. We close with the proposal that people call category members to mind according to their location in representational space, specifically based on the predicted usefulness of considering category members with particular features. (shrink)