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Top-down facilitation of visual object recognition

In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 140--145 (2005)

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  1. How the intentions of the draftsman shape perception of a drawing.Alessandro Pignocchi - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):887-898.
    The interaction between the recovery of the artist’s intentions and the perception of an artwork is a classic topic for philosophy and history of art. It also frequently, albeit sometimes implicitly, comes up in everyday thought and conversation about art and artworks. Since recent work in cognitive science can help us understand how we perceive and understand the intentions of others, this discipline could fruitfully participate in a multidisciplinary investigation of the role of intention recovery in art perception. The method (...)
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  • Patients with Schizophrenia Do Not Preserve Automatic Grouping When Mentally Re-Grouping Figures: Shedding Light on an Ignored Difficulty.Anne Giersch, Mitsouko van Assche, Rémi L. Capa, Corinne Marrer & Daniel Gounot - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
    Looking at a pair of objects is easy when automatic grouping mechanisms bind these objects together, but visual exploration can also be more flexible. It is possible to mentally “re-group” two objects that are not only separate but belong to different pairs of objects. “Re-grouping” is in conflict with automatic grouping, since it entails a separation of each item from the set it belongs to. This ability appears to be impaired in patients with schizophrenia. Here we check if this impairment (...)
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  • Seeing absence.Anna Farennikova - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):429-454.
    Intuitively, we often see absences. For example, if someone steals your laptop at a café, you may see its absence from your table. However, absence perception presents a paradox. On prevailing models of perception, we see only present objects and scenes (Marr, Gibson, Dretske). So, we cannot literally see something that is not present. This suggests that we never literally perceive absences; instead, we come to believe that something is absent cognitively on the basis of what we perceive. But this (...)
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