Scholars have widely discussed the paradigm of integration of Islam and science. Still, a model of integration of Islam and science that uses the reasoning of Martabat Tujuh [seven grades] has not been found. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the manuscripts of Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani’s Martabat Tujuh in the integration of Islam and science. This study used a descriptive qualitative approach, and data collection techniques were documentation and interviews. This study found two spiritual reasons in the manuscript of Shaykh (...) Abdussamad al-Palimbani’s Martabat Tujuh: tanazzul [move down] deductive reasoning and taraqqi [move up] inductive reasoning. Contribution: The article contributed to developing the integration of Islam and science in Indonesia. The manuscripts of Martabat Tujuh [seven grades] by Shaykh Abdussamad al-Palimbani offer the circular motion of Martabat Tujuh as a model for integrating knowledge. The circular motion model of Martabat Tujuh is expected to be used as a theoretical basis for applying knowledge integration at various Islamic universities in Indonesia. (shrink)

This article argues for acknowledging the existence of an absolute distinction between faith and science. It is often assumed in the science and religion debate that such a distinction would be ahistorical and uncontextual. After discussing this critique, the analogy with love and facts will be used to explain how an absolute distinction between faith and science may exist nonetheless. This contrast, however, does not imply compartmentalization. It is shown that the absolute distinction between faith and science is of crucial (...) importance to understand the historical contexts that so many contributors to the science and religion debate refer to in their argument against the approaches of Independence or Contrast. The article concludes that within our messy and complex practices there is an absolute distinction between faith and science—our historical contexts cannot be understood without it. (shrink)

Typologies like Ian Barbour's have been widely used—and critiqued—in religion-and-science. Several alternatives have been proposed by, for example, John Haught, Willem Drees, Mikael Stenmark, and Shoaib Ahmed Malik. However, there has been a surprising deficit in discussion of what we wish typologies to do in religion and science in the first place. In this article, I provide a general analysis of typologies in religion-and-science by (1) providing a classification of existing typologies as conclusion- or concept-oriented; (2) showing that typologies are (...) used, or expected to be used, as first-order categorizations of how religion and science are related and as second-order classifications of scholars/scholarly works; (3) discussing several aims which we might want typologies to achieve in their second-order usage; and (4) presenting a new kind of typology focused on the methods used by scholars which achieves those aims in a unique way. (shrink)

I reconstruct Bruno Latour's ideas about science and religion and compare them to Ian G. Barbour's and Mikael Stenmark's models, as well as to the discussion of technology and religion developed by John C. Caiazza and Antje Jackelén. I show how using “Latour's App” enlightens some aspects of said models which Barbour and Stenmark themselves were seemingly struggling with, and that Caiazza's and Jackelén's views can be reconciled despite their apparent opposition. The result of such tests is an overall assessment (...) of Latour's proposal. I argue that, under the disguise of a flamboyant and original language, Latour's method is not that distant from those of the other authors analyzed here, and that his discussion might conceal some unwelcome philosophical shortcomings. (shrink)

Abstract Despite various criticisms, Ian Barbour's fourfold classification of the possible relationships between religion and science remains influential. I compare Barbour's taxonomy with the theories of four authors who, in the last four decades, have addressed the relationship between science and religion from a Muslim perspective. The aim of my analysis is twofold. First, I offer a comparative perspective to the debate on science and Islam. Second, following Barbour's suggestion, I test the general applicability of his categories by comparing them (...) with a discourse on science and religion that is not focused on Christianity. In the first section, I reconstruct Barbour's typologies, recalling some major objections to them, and arguing why despite the latter, Barbour's model is employed for the present analysis. I also reconstruct Barbour's parallel model for the relationships between different religions. In the second section, I reconstruct the discourse on science and religion developed by the Palestinian-American scholar Ismail Raji al-Faruqi. The third section is devoted to the ideas of the Persian-American scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr. In the fourth section, I examine the views of the Iranian author Mehdi Golshani. The fifth section reconstructs the theories of the Algerian author Nidhal Guessoum. In the final section, I argue that a generalized use of the “integration” concept to refer to the entire debate on Islam and science is unhelpful. While these positions do not appear to instantiate Barbourian integration of science and religion, they do move toward what Barbour (skeptically) describes as integration between religions. (shrink)