This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, (...) and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter 2 argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I also develop a novel topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel dynamic epistemic two-dimensional hyperintensional semantics. Chapter 3 provides an abstraction principle for epistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter 4 advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter 5 applies the fixed points of the modal μ-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal μ-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal μ-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter 6 advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter 7 provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters 2 and 4 are availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. -/- Chapters 8-12 provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter 8 examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of Ω-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter 9 examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. I countenance a hyperintensional semantics for novel epistemic abstractionist modalities. I suggest, too, that observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter 10 examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional Ω-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter 11 provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter 12 avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities and truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals while bypassing the category of Set in category theory. Chapter 13 examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter 14 examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

We show that, assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, the first inaccessible cardinal can satisfy a strong form of a Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic L, a logic introduced in [5] strictly between first order logic and second order logic. On the other hand we show that in the light of present day inner model technology, nothing short of a supercompact cardinal suffices for this result. In particular, we show that the Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic at (...) κ implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ as well as Projective Determinacy. (shrink)

Alfred Tarski’s influence on computer science was indirect but significant in a number of directions and was in certain respects fundamental. Here surveyed is Tarski’s work on the decision procedure for algebra and geometry, the method of elimination of quantifiers, the semantics of formal languages, model-theoretic preservation theorems, and algebraic logic; various connections of each with computer science are taken up.

Charles Sanders Peirce was one of the United States’ most original and profound thinkers, and a prolific writer. Peirce’s game theory-based approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of signs and language, to the theory of communication, and to the evolutionary emergence of signs, provide a toolkit for contemporary scholars and philosophers. Drawing on unpublished manuscripts, the book offers a rich, fresh picture of the achievements of a remarkable man.

The book provides a historical and systematic exposition of the semantic theory of truth formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. This theory became famous very soon and inspired logicians and philosophers. It has two different, but interconnected aspects: formal-logical and philosophical. The book deals with both, but it is intended mostly as a philosophical monograph. It explains Tarski’s motivation and presents discussions about his ideas as well as points out various applications of the semantic theory of truth to philosophical (...) problems. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The dissertation demonstrates how phenomenal consciousness and gradational possible-worlds models in Bayesian perceptual psychology relate to epistemic modal space. The dissertation demonstrates, then, how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; deontic modality; logical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the (...) epistemic status of undecidable propositions and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the apriori-aposteriori distinction; to the modal profile of rational propositional intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Examining the nature of epistemic logic itself, I develop a novel approach to conditions of self-knowledge in the setting of the modal μ-calculus, as well as novel epistemicist solutions to Curry's, the liar, and the knowability paradoxes. Solutions to previously intransigent issues concerning the first-person concept; the distinction between fundamental and derivative truths; and the unity of intention and its role in decision theory, are developed along the way. (shrink)

Necessitism is the view that necessarily everything is necessarily something; contingentism is the negation of necessitism. The dispute between them is reminiscent of, but clearer than, the more familiar one between possibilism and actualism. A mapping often used to ‘translate’ actualist discourse into possibilist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of a first-order modal language to a sentence the contingentist (but not the necessitist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables (...) the necessitist to extract a ‘cash value’ from what the contingentist says. Similarly, a mapping often used to ‘translate’ possibilist discourse into actualist discourse is adapted to map every sentence of the language to a sentence the necessitist (but not the contingentist) may regard as equivalent to it but which is neutral in the dispute. This mapping enables the contingentist to extract a ‘cash value’ from what the necessitist says. Neither mapping is a translation in the usual sense, since necessitists and contingentists use the same language with the same meanings. The former mapping is extended to a second-order modal language under a plural interpretation of the second-order variables. It is proved that the latter mapping cannot be. Thus although the necessitist can extract a ‘cash value’ from what the contingentist says in the second-order language, the contingentist cannot extract a ‘cash value’ from some of what the necessitist says, even when it raises significant questions. This poses contingentism a serious challenge. (shrink)

The project of integrated HPS has occupied philosophers of science in one form or another since at least the 1960s. Yet, despite this substantial interest in bringing together philosophical and historical reflections on the nature of science, history of science and formal philosophy of science remain as divided as ever. In this paper, I will argue that the continuing separation between historical and formal philosophy of science is ill-founded. I will argue for this in both abstract and concrete terms. At (...) the abstract level, I reconstruct two possible arguments for the incompatibility of historical and formal philosophy of science and argue that they are both wanting. At the concrete level, I discuss how historical and formal philosophy of science have been brought together in practice, namely: in the form of a largely forgotten research tradition that I will refer to here as the study of formalized macro-units. After a brief exposition, I argue that this research tradition has been unduly overlooked by historically minded philosophers of science. Bringing together these observations, I argue that the divide between historical and formal philosophy of science is not grounded in any substantive arguments, but can be primarily attributed to disciplinary happenstance. (shrink)

The Craig Interpolation Theorem is intimately connected with the emergence of abstract logic and continues to be the driving force of the field. I will argue in this paper that the interpolation property is an important litmus test in abstract model theory for identifying “natural,” robust extensions of first order logic. My argument is supported by the observation that logics which satisfy the interpolation property usually also satisfy a Lindström type maximality theorem. Admittedly, the range of such logics is small.

Logics for generally were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions,such as generally, most, several, etc., by generalized quantifiers, ultrafilter logic being an interesting case. Here, we show that ultrafilter logic can be faithfully embedded into a first-order theory of certain functions, called coherent. We also use generic functions (akin to Skolem functions) to enable elimination of the generalized quantifier. These devices permit using methods for classical first-order logic to reason about consequence in ultrafilter logic.

We present a number of, somewhat unusual, ways of describing what Craig’s interpolation theorem achieves, and use them to identify some open problems and further directions.

Frege’s project has been characterized as an attempt to formulate a complete system of logic adequate to characterize mathematical theories such as arithmetic and set theory. As such, it was seen to fail by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem of 1931. It is argued, however, that this is to impose a later interpretation on the word ‘complete’ it is clear from Dedekind’s writings that at least as good as interpretation of completeness is categoricity. Whereas few interesting first-order mathematical theories are categorical or (...) complete, there are logical extensions of these theories into second-order and by the addition of generalized quantifiers which are categorical. Frege’s project really found success through Gödel’s completeness theorem of 1930 and the subsequent development of first- and higher-order model theory. (shrink)

Lindström’s Theorem characterizes first order logic as the maximal logic satisfying the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. If we do not assume that logics are closed under negation, there is an obvious extension of first order logic with the two model theoretic properties mentioned, namely existential second order logic. We show that existential second order logic has a whole family of proper extensions satisfying the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Furthermore, we show that in the context (...) of negation-less logics, _positive logics_, as we call them, there is no strongest extension of first order logic with the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. (shrink)

The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief (...) outlook on the "family" of theories of truth generated by the new methodology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAIan Rumfitt's new book presents a distinctive and intriguing philosophy of logic, one that ultimately settles on classical logic as the uniquely correct one–or at least rebuts some prominent arguments against classical logic. The purpose of this note is to evaluate Rumfitt's perspective by focusing on some themes that have occupied me for some time: the role and importance of model theory and, in particular, the place of counter-arguments in establishing invalidity, higher-order logic, and the logical pluralism/relativism articulated in my (...) own recent *Varieties of logic*. (shrink)

Given a class \ of models, a binary relation \ between models, and a model-theoretic language L, we consider the modal logic and the modal algebra of the theory of \ in L where the modal operator is interpreted via \. We discuss how modal theories of \ and \ depend on the model-theoretic language, their Kripke completeness, and expressibility of the modality inside L. We calculate such theories for the submodel and the quotient relations. We prove a downward Löwenheim–Skolem (...) theorem for first-order language expanded with the modal operator for the extension relation between models. (shrink)

We show that a coherent theory of partially ordered connectives can be developed along the same line as partially ordered quantification. We estimate the expressive power of various partially ordered connectives and use methods like Ehrenfeucht games and infinitary logic to get various undefinability results.

In standard model-theoretic semantics, the meaning of logical terms is said to be fixed in the system while that of nonlogical terms remains variable. Much effort has been devoted to characterizing logical terms, those terms that should be fixed, but little has been said on their role in logical systems: on what fixing their meaning precisely amounts to. My proposal is that when a term is considered logical in model theory, what gets fixed is its intension rather than its extension. (...) I provide a rigorous way of spelling out this idea, and show that it leads to a graded account of logicality: the less structure a term requires in order for its intension to be fixed, the more logical it is. Finally, I focus on the class of terms that are invariant under isomorphisms, as they render themselves more easily to mathematical treatment. I propose a mathematical measure for the logicality of such terms based on their associated Löwenheim numbers. (shrink)

There exist two known types of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models, both in a certain sense canonical. One of them comes from modal logic and universal algebra, and in fact goes back to Jónsson and Tarski :891–939, 1951; 74:127–162, 1952). Another one The infinity project proceeding, Barcelona, 2012) comes from model theory and algebra of ultrafilters, with ultrafilter extensions of semigroups as its main precursor. By a classical fact of general topology, the space of ultrafilters over a discrete space is (...) its largest compactification. The main result of Saveliev The infinity project proceeding, Barcelona, 2012), which confirms a canonicity of this extension, generalizes this fact to discrete spaces endowed with an arbitrary first-order structure. An analogous result for the former type of ultrafilter extensions was obtained in Saveliev. Results of such kind are referred to as extension theorems. After a brief introduction, we offer a uniform approach to both types of extensions based on the idea to extend the extension procedure itself. We propose a generalization of the standard concept of first-order interpretations in which functional and relational symbols are interpreted rather by ultrafilters over sets of functions and relations than by functions and relations themselves, and define ultrafilter models with an appropriate semantics for them. We provide two specific operations which turn ultrafilter models into ordinary models, establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the latter are the two canonical ultrafilter extensions of some ordinary models, and obtain a topological characterization of ultrafilter models. We generalize a restricted version of the extension theorem to ultrafilter models. To formulate the full version, we propose a wider concept of ultrafilter models with their semantics based on limits of ultrafilters, and show that the former concept can be identified, in a certain way, with a particular case of the latter; moreover, the new concept absorbs the ordinary concept of models. We provide two more specific operations which turn ultrafilter models in the narrow sense into ones in the wide sense, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which ultrafilter models in the wide sense are the images of ones in the narrow sense under these operations, and also are two canonical ultrafilter extensions of some ordinary models. Finally, we establish three full versions of the extension theorem for ultrafilter models in the wide sense. The results of the first three sections of this paper were partially announced in Poliakov and Saveliev On two concepts of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models and their generalizations, Springer, Berlin, 2017). (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Ernst Zermelo’s ideas concerning the possibility of developing a system of infinitary logic that, in his opinion, should be suitable for mathematical inferences. The presentation of Zermelo’s ideas is accompanied with some remarks concerning the development of infinitary logic. I also stress the fact that the second axiomatization of set theory provided by Zermelo in 1930 involved the use of extremal axioms of a very specific sort.1.

This paper addresses the theoretical notion of a game as it arisesacross scientific inquiries, exploring its uses as a technical andformal asset in logic and science versus an explanatory mechanism. Whilegames comprise a widely used method in a broad intellectual realm(including, but not limited to, philosophy, logic, mathematics,cognitive science, artificial intelligence, computation, linguistics,physics, economics), each discipline advocates its own methodology and aunified understanding is lacking. In the first part of this paper, anumber of game theories in formal studies are critically (...) surveyed. Inthe second part, the doctrine of games as explanations for logic isassessed, and the relevance of a conceptual analysis of games tocognition discussed. It is suggested that the notion of evolution playsa part in the game-theoretic concept of meaning. (shrink)

Adding certain cardinality quantifiers into first-order language will give substantially more expressive languages. Thus, many mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic can be handled. Since basic modal logic can be seen as the bisimular invariant fragment of first-order logic on the level of models, it has no ability to handle modally these mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic. By adding modalities regarding the cardinalities of successor states, we can, in principle, investigate modal logics of all cardinalities. Thus ways of exploring model-theoretic logics (...) can be transferred to modal logics. (shrink)

This article begins by exploring a lost topic in the philosophy of science:the properties of the relations evidence confirming h confirmsh'' and, more generally, evidence confirming each ofh1, h2, ..., hm confirms at least one of h1, h2,ldots;, hn''.The Bayesian understanding of confirmation as positive evidential relevanceis employed throughout. The resulting formal system is, to say the least, oddlybehaved. Some aspects of this odd behaviour the system has in common withsome of the non-classical logics developed in the twentieth century. Oneaspect (...) – its ``parasitism'''' on classical logic – it does not, and it is this featurethat makes the system an interesting focus for discussion of questions in thephilosophy of logic. We gain some purchase on an answer to a recently prominentquestion, namely, what is a logical system? More exactly, we ask whether satisfaction of formal constraints is sufficient for a relation to be considered a (logical) consequence relation. The question whether confirmation transfer yields a logical system is answered in the negative, despite confirmation transfer having the standard properties of a consequence relation, on the grounds that validity of sequents in the system is not determined by the meanings of the connectives that occur in formulas. Developing the system in a different direction, we find it bears on the project of ``proof-theoretic semantics'''': conferring meaning on connectives by means of introduction (and possibly elimination) rules is not an autonomous activity, rather it presupposes a prior, non-formal,notion of consequence. Some historical ramifications are alsoaddressed briefly. (shrink)

Adding certain cardinality quantifiers into first-order language will give substantially more expressive languages. Thus, many mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic can be handled. Since basic modal logic can be seen as the bisimular invariant fragment of first-order logic on the level of models, it has no ability to handle modally these mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic. By adding modalities regarding the cardinalities of successor states, we can, in principle, investigate modal logics of all cardinalities. Thus ways of exploring model-theoretic logics (...) can be transferred to modal logics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The two main directions pursued in the present paper are the following. The first direction was started by Pigozzi in 1969. In [Mak 91] and [Mak 79] Maksimova proved that a normal modal logic has the Craig interpolation property iff the corresponding class of algebras has the superamalgamation property. In this paper we extend Maksimova's theorem to normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many, not necessarily unary modalities, and to not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with modalities of ranks smaller than (...) 2. To extend the characterization beyond multi-modal logics, we look at arbitrary algebraizable logics. We will introduce an algebraic property equivalent with the Craig interpolation property in algebraizable logics, and prove that the superamalgamation property implies the Craig interpolation property. The problem of extending the characterization result to non-normal non-unary modal logics also will be discussed. In the second direction pursued herein: for non-normal modal logic with one unary modality Lemmon [Lem 66] gave a possible worlds semantics. Here we give a more general possible worlds semantics for not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many not necessarily unary modalities. Strongly related to the above is the theorem, proved, e.g., in Jóns son-Tarski [JT 52] and Henkin-Monk-Tarski [HMT 71], that every normal Boolean algebra with operators can be represented as a subalgebra of the complex algebra of some relational structure. We extend this result to not necessarily normal BAO's as follows. We define partial relational structures and show that every not necessarily normal BAO is embeddable into the complex algebra of a partial relational structure. This gives a possible worlds semantics for not necessarily normal multi-modal logics. (shrink)

Continuing work initiated by Jónsson, Daigneault, Pigozzi and others; Maksimova proved that a normal modal logic (with a single unary modality) has the Craig interpolation property iff the corresponding class of algebras has the superamalgamation property (cf. [Mak 91], [Mak 79]). The aim of this paper is to extend the latter result to a large class of logics. We will prove that the characterization can be extended to all algebraizable logics containing Boolean fragment and having a certain kind of local (...) deduction property. We also extend this characterization of the interpolation property to arbitrary logics under the condition that their algebraic counterparts are discriminator varieties. We also extend Maksimova's result to normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many, not necessarily unary modalities, and to not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with modalities of ranks smaller than 2, too.The problem of extending the above characterization result to no n-normal non-unary modal logics remains open. (shrink)

We prove, in ZFC alone, some new results on regularity and decomposability of ultrafilters; among them: If m ≥ 1 and the ultrafilter D is , equation imagem)-regular, then D is κ -decomposable for some κ with λ ≤ κ ≤ 2λ ). If λ is a strong limit cardinal and D is , equation imagem)-regular, then either D is -regular or there are arbitrarily large κ < λ for which D is κ -decomposable ). Suppose that λ is singular, (...) λ < κ, cf κ ≠ cf λ and D is -regular. Then: D is either -regular, or -regular for some λ' < λ . If κ is regular, then D is either -regular, or -regular for every κ' < κ . If either λ is a strong limit cardinal and λ<λ < 2κ, or λ<λ < κ, then D is either λ -decomposable, or -regular for some λ' < λ . If λ is singular, D is -regular and there are arbitrarily large ν < λ for which D is ν -decomposable, then D is κ -decomposable for some κ with λ ≤ κ ≤ λ<μ . D × D' is -regular if and only if there is a ν such that D is -regular and D' is -regular for all ν∼ < ν .We also list some problems, and furnish applications to topological spaces and to extended logics. (shrink)

We use Shelah's theory of possible cofinalities in order to solve some problems about ultrafilters. Theorem: Suppose that $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, $\lambda ' \lessthan \lambda$, and the ultrafilter $D$ is $\kappa$ -decomposable for all regular cardinals $\kappa$ with $\lambda '\lessthan \kappa \lessthan \lambda$. Then $D$ is either $\lambda$-decomposable or $\lambda ^+$-decomposable. Corollary: If $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, then an ultrafilter is ($\lambda$,$\lambda$)-regular if and only if it is either $\operator{cf} \lambda$-decomposable or $\lambda^+$-decomposable. We also give applications to (...) topological spaces and to abstract logics. (shrink)

Russell’s paradox is purely logical in the following sense: a contradiction can be formally deduced from the proposition that there is a set of all non-self-membered sets, in pure first-order logic—the first-order logical form of this proposition is inconsistent. This explains why Russell’s paradox is portable—why versions of the paradox arise in contexts unrelated to set theory, from propositions with the same logical form as the claim that there is a set of all non-self-membered sets. Burali-Forti’s paradox, like Russell’s paradox, (...) is portable. I offer the following explanation for this fact: Burali-Forti’s paradox, like Russell’s, is purely logical. Concretely, I show that if we enrich the language \ of first-order logic with a well-foundedness quantifier W and adopt certain minimal inference rules for this quantifier, then a contradiction can be formally deduced from the proposition that there is a greatest ordinal. Moreover, a proposition with the same logical form as the claim that there is a greatest ordinal can be found at the heart of several other paradoxes that resemble Burali-Forti’s. The reductio of Burali-Forti can be repeated verbatim to establish the inconsistency of these other propositions. Hence, the portability of the Burali-Forti’s paradox is explained in the same way as the portability of Russell’s: both paradoxes involve an inconsistent logical form—Russell’s involves an inconsistent form expressible in \ and Burali-Forti’s involves an inconsistent form expressible in \. (shrink)

Fix a cardinal κ. We can ask the question: what kind of a logic L is needed to characterize all models of cardinality κ up to isomorphism by their L-theories? In other words: for which logics L it is true that if any models A and B of cardinality κ satisfy the same L-theory then they are isomorphic?It is always possible to characterize models of cardinality κ by their Lκ+,κ+-theories, but we are interested in finding a “small” logic L, i.e., (...) the sentences of L are hereditarily of smaller cardinality than κ. For any cardinal κ it is independent of ZFC whether any such small definable logic L exists. If it exists it can be second order logic for κ=ω and fourth order logic or certain infinitary second order logic Lκ,ω source for uncountable κ. All models of cardinality κ can always be characterized by their theories in a small logic with generalized quantifiers, but the logic may be not definable in the language of set theory. Our work continues and extends the work of Ajtai [Miklos Ajtai, Isomorphism and higher order equivalence, Ann. Math. Logic 16 181–203]. (shrink)

Two new infinitary modal logics are simply obtained from a Gentzen-type sequent calculus for infinitary logic by adding a next-time operator, and a program operator, respectively. It is shown that an any-time operator and a program-iteration operator can respectively be expressed using infinitary conjunction in these logics. The cut-elimination and completeness theorems for these logics are proved using some theorems for embedding these logics into (classical) infinitary logic.

I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue against formalist approaches in the philosophy (...) of science and for a greater role for perceptual knowledge rather than propositional knowledge in scientific empiricism. (shrink)

In this paper it will be shown that the Beth definability property corresponds to surjectiveness of epimorphisms in abstract algebraic logic. This generalizes a result by I. Németi (cf. [11, Theorem 5.6.10]). Moreover, an equally general characterization of the weak Beth property will be given. This gives a solution to Problem 14 in [20]. Finally, the characterization of the projective Beth property for varieties of modal algebras by L. Maksimova (see [15]) will be shown to hold for the larger class (...) of semantically algebraizable logics. (shrink)

This paper argues against Oaksford and Chater's claim that logicist cognitive science is not possible. It suggests that there arguments against logicist cognitive science are too closely tied to the account of Pylyshyn and of Fodor, and that the correct way of thinking about logicist cognitive science is in a mental models framework.

Timothy Williamson has argued that in the debate on modal ontology, the familiar distinction between actualism and possibilism should be replaced by a distinction between positions he calls contingentism and necessitism. He has also argued in favor of necessitism, using results on quantified modal logic with plurally interpreted second-order quantifiers showing that necessitists can draw distinctions contingentists cannot draw. Some of these results are similar to well-known results on the relative expressivity of quantified modal logics with so-called inner and outer (...) quantifiers. The present paper deals with these issues in the context of quantified modal logics with generalized quantifiers. Its main aim is to establish two results for such a logic: Firstly, contingentists can draw the distinctions necessitists can draw if and only if the logic with inner quantifiers is at least as expressive as the logic with outer quantifiers, and necessitists can draw the distinctions contingentists can draw if and only if the logic with outer quantifiers is at least as expressive as the logic with inner quantifiers. Secondly, the former two items are the case if and only if all of the generalized quantifiers are first-order definable, and the latter two items are the case if and only if first-order logic with these generalized quantifiers relativizes. (shrink)

We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases (...) are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all. (shrink)

The paper starts with an examination and critique of Tarski’s wellknown proposed explication of the notion of logical operation in the type structure over a given domain of individuals as one which is invariant with respect to arbitrary permutations of the domain. The class of such operations has been characterized by McGee as exactly those definable in the language L∞,∞. Also characterized similarly is a natural generalization of Tarski’s thesis, due to Sher, in terms of bijections between domains. My main (...) objections are that on the one hand, the Tarski-Sher thesis thus assimilates logic to mathematics, and on the other hand fails to explain the notion of same logical operation across domains of different sizes. A new notion of homomorphism invariant operation over functional type structures (with domains M0 of individuals and {T, F} at their base) is introduced to accomplish the latter. The main result is that an operation is definable from.. (shrink)

Though deceptively simple and plausible on the face of it, Craig's interpolation theorem (published 50 years ago) has proved to be a central logical property that has been used to reveal a deep harmony between the syntax and semantics of first order logic. Craig's theorem was generalized soon after by Lyndon, with application to the characterization of first order properties preserved under homomorphism. After retracing the early history, this article is mainly devoted to a survey of subsequent generalizations and applications, (...) especially of many-sorted interpolation theorems. Attention is also paid to methodological considerations, since the Craig theorem and its generalizations were initially obtained by proof-theoretic arguments while most of the applications are model-theoretic in nature. The article concludes with the role of the interpolation property in the quest for "reasonable" logics extending first-order logic within the framework of abstract model theory. (shrink)

There are several known Lindström-style characterization results for basic modal logic. This paper proves a generic Lindström theorem that covers any normal modal logic corresponding to a class of Kripke frames definable by a set of formulas called strict universal Horn formulas. The result is a generalization of a recent characterization of modal logic with the global modality. A negative result is also proved in an appendix showing that the result cannot be strengthened to cover every first-order elementary class of (...) frames. This is shown by constructing an explicit counterexample. (shrink)

O czterech typach argumentacji na rzecz logiki klasycznej Moim celem w tym artykule jest analiza argumentacji pod kątem poprawności standardowej logiki. Formułuję też kilka uwag krytycznych i porównawczych. Skupiam się na czterech najbardziej spójnych i kompletnych argumentach, które próbują uzasadnić wyróżnione stanowisko logiki klasycznej. Istnieją następujące argumenty: argumentacja pragmatyczno-metodologiczna Willarda van O. Quine’a, argumentacja filozoficzno-metalogiczna Jana Woleńskiego, argumentacja ontologiczno-semantyczna Stanisława Kiczuka, argumentacja metalogiczna. Moim zdaniem teza o poprawności logiki klasycznej jest racjonalnie uzasadniona tymi argumentacjami. Pozostaje problem, czy analizowana logika standardowa (...) jest jedyną właściwą logiką. (shrink)

We introduce a natural class of quantifiersTh containing all monadic type quantifiers, all quantifiers for linear orders, quantifiers for isomorphism, Ramsey type quantifiers, and plenty more, showing that no sublogic ofL ωω (Th) or countably compact regular sublogic ofL ∞ω (Th), properly extendingL ωω , satisfies the uniform reduction property for quotients. As a consequence, none of these logics satisfies eitherΔ-interpolation or Beth's definability theorem when closed under relativizations. We also show the failure of both properties for any sublogic ofL (...) ∞ω (Th) in which Chang's quantifier or some cardinality quantifierQ α, with α≧1, is definable. (shrink)

Combining logics has become a rapidly expanding enterprise that is inspired mainly by concerns about modularity and the wish to join together tailor made logical tools into more powerful but still manageable ones. A natural question is whether it offers anything new over and above existing standard languages. By analysing a number of applications where combined logics arise, we argue that combined logics are a potentially valuable tool in applied logic, and that endorsements of standard languages often miss the point. (...) Using the history of quantified modal logic as our main example, we also show that the use of combined structures and logics is a recurring theme in the analysis of existing logical systems. (shrink)

We present a number of, somewhat unusual, ways of describing what Craig’s interpolation theorem achieves, and use them to identify some open problems and further directions.