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  1. Free Will, the Self, and Video Game Actions.Andrew Kissel - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):177-183.
    In this paper, I raise several concerns for what I call the willing endorsement view of moral responsibility in videogames. Briefly, the willing endorsement view holds that players are appropriate targets of moral judgments when their actions reflect their true, real-world selves. In the first section of the paper, I argue that core features of the willing endorsement view are widely implicitly accepted among philosophers engaging in discussions of morality in games. I then focus on a particularly clear recent version (...)
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  • The Amoralist Challenge to Gaming and the Gamer’s Moral Obligation.Sebastian Ostritsch - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (2):117-128.
    According to the amoralist, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation because morality applies to reality only, and games are not real but “just games”. This challenges our everyday moralist intuition that some games are to be met with moral criticism. I discuss and reject the two most common answers to the amoralist challenge and argue that the amoralist is right in claiming that there is nothing intrinsically wrong in simply playing a game. I go on to argue for (...)
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  • Value, Violence, and the Ethics of Gaming.Michael Goerger - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (2):95-105.
    I argue for two theses. First, many arguments against violent gaming rely on what I call the contamination thesis, drawing their conclusions by claiming that violent gaming contaminates real world interactions. I argue that this thesis is empirically and philosophically problematic. Second, I argue that rejecting the contamination thesis does not entail that all video games are morally unobjectionable. The violence within a game can be evaluated in terms of the values the game cultivates, reinforces, denigrates, or disrespects. Games which (...)
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  • Me and My Avatar: Player-Character as Fictional Proxy.Matt Carlson & Logan Taylor - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Games 1.
    Players of videogames describe their gameplay in the first person, e.g. “I took cover behind a barricade.” Such descriptions of gameplay experiences are commonplace, but also puzzling because players are actually just pushing buttons, not engaging in the activities described by their first-person reports. According to a view defended by Robson and Meskin (2016), which we call the fictional identity view, this puzzle is solved by claiming that the player is fictionally identical with the player character. Hence, on this view, (...)
     
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  • Players, Characters, and the Gamer's Dilemma.Craig Bourne & Emily Caddick Bourne - 2019 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (2):133-143.
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  • Getting Away with Murder: Why Virtual Murder in MMORPGs Can Be Wrong on Kantian Grounds.Helen Ryland - 2019 - Ethics and Information Technology (2).
    Ali (Ethics and Information Technology 17:267–274, 2015) and McCormick (Ethics and Information Technology 3:277–287, 2001) claim that virtual murders are objectionable when they show inappropriate engagement with the game or bad sportsmanship. McCormick argues that such virtual murders cannot be wrong on Kantian grounds because virtual murders only violate indirect moral duties, and bad sportsmanship is shown across competitive sports in the same way. To condemn virtual murder on grounds of bad sportsmanship, we would need to also condemn other competitive (...)
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