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Epistemic Trespassing

Mind 128 (510):367-395 (2019)

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  1. From Epistemic Trespassing to Transdisciplinary Cooperation: The Role of Expertise in the Identification of Usual Care.Joseph Michael Vukov, Kit Rempala, Molly Klug & Marley Hornewer - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (1):52-54.
    According to Macklin & Natanson (2019), one reason unusual practices can be misidentified as usual care is that “instead of using pertinent, accurate information describing usual care, investigators may rely on the opinion of ‘experts’ in the field, whose information may be out of date or otherwise inaccurate." We find Macklin & Natanson’s insights about misattributed expertise crucial, and suggest their discussion can be elucidated further by characterizing it in the context of Ballantyne (2018)’s recent exploration of what he calls (...)
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  • Traditional, Not the Usual: On Misrepresenting Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome Network Lower Tidal Volume Trial.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (1):54-56.
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  • Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy.Leonie Smith & Alfred Archer - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):777-795.
    In recent years, a significant body of literature has emerged on the subject of epistemic injustice: wrongful harms done to people in their capacities as knowers. Up to now this literature has ignored the role that attention has to play in epistemic injustice. This paper makes a first step towards addressing this gap. We argue that giving someone less attention than they are due, which we call an epistemic attention deficit, is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. We begin by (...)
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  • The Humility Heuristic, Or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don’T Know.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (3):323-336.
    People don't always speak the truth. When they don't, we do better not to trust them. Unfortunately, that's often easier said than done. People don't usually wear a ‘Not to be trusted!’ badge on their sleeves, which lights up every time they depart from the truth. Given this, what can we do to figure out whom to trust, and whom not? My aim in this paper is to offer a partial answer to this question. I propose a heuristic—the “Humility Heuristic”—which (...)
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  • Epistemic Trepassing and Expert Witness Testimony.Mark Satta - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2).
    Epistemic trespassers have competence in one field but pass judgment on matters in other fields where they lack competence. I examine philosophical questions related to epistemic trespassing by expert witnesses in courtroom trials and argue for the following positions. Expert witnesses are required to avoid epistemic trespassing. When testifying as an expert witness, merely qualifying one’s statements to indicate that one is not speaking as an expert is insufficient to avoid epistemic trespassing. Judges, litigators, and jurors can often recognize epistemic (...)
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  • Watching People Watching People: Culture, Prestige, and Epistemic Authority.Charles Lassiter - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (5):601-612.
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  • Peer Idealization and Internal Examples in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Tim Kenyon - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (1):69-79.
    The epistemology of disagreement has developed around a highly idealized notion of epistemic peers. The analysis of examples in the literature has somewhat entrenched this idealization, when using cases of extant philosophical disputes between named interlocutors. These examples make it hard to emphasize the ordinary ways in which discussants, as disciplinary colleagues, may be wrong. Overlooking these possibilities is probably made easier by widespread attitudes in philosophy about the importance of genius or raw intelligence in doing philosophy. The use of (...)
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  • The Moral Incompetence of Anti-Corruption Experts.Mario I. Juarez-Garcia - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):537-557.
    This paper studies the lessons of principled anti-corruption experts who dared to fulfill their duty of justice in highly corrupt societies, through the true story of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Finance Minister of Nigeria. My thesis is that when principled anti-corruption experts are epistemic trespassers, they show moral incompetence. Okonjo-Iweala shows moral incompetence in two ways: she misread the opposition to her strategies and misled other honest reformers. Both actions bungled her efforts to eradicate corruption inasmuch as they hindered the (...)
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  • Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):299-318.
    Scientific expert testimony is crucial to public deliberation, but it is associated with many pitfalls. This article identifies one—namely, expert trespassing testimony—which may be characterized, crudely, as the phenomenon of experts testifying outside their domain of expertise. My agenda is to provide a more precise characterization of this phenomenon and consider its ramifications for the role of science in society. I argue that expert trespassing testimony is both epistemically problematic and morally problematic. Specifically, I will argue that scientific experts are (...)
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  • Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.
    Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial (...)
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  • Second-Person Perspective in Interdisciplinary Research: A Cognitive Approach for Understanding and Improving the Dynamics of Collaborative Research Teams.Claudia E. Vanney & J. Ignacio Aguinalde Sáenz - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (2):155-178.
    In this paper, we argue that to reverse the excess of specialization and to create room for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, it seems necessary to move the existing epistemic plurality towards a collaborative process of social cognition. In order to achieve this, we propose to extend the psychological notion of joint attention towards what we call joint intellectual attention. This special kind of joint attention involves a shared awareness of sharing the cognitive process of knowledge. We claim that if an interdisciplinary research (...)
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  • What’s Wrong with Epistemic Trespassing?Joshua DiPaolo - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):223-243.
    Epistemic trespassers are experts who pass judgment on questions in fields where they lack expertise. What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing? I identify several limitations with a seminal analysis to isolate three desiderata on an answer to this question and motivate my own answer. An answer should explain what’s wrong in the cases that motivate inquiry into epistemic trespassing, should explain what’s wrong with epistemic trespassing even if trespassers do not acknowledge their trespassing, and these explanations should not be independent of (...)
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  • Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty.Emmalon Davis - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    Novelty—the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this, however, novelty functions as a metric of success. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one. As I show, the pursuit of novelty is neither as desirable nor as feasible as it might initially seem.
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  • Can Novices Trust Themselves to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Reasons for (Reserved) Optimism.Johnny Brennan - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):227-240.
    Novices face a problem when it comes to forming true beliefs about controversial issues that they cannot assess themselves: Who are the trustworthy experts? Elizabeth Anderson offers a set of criteria intended to allow novices to form reliable assessments of expert trustworthiness. All they need to assess experts is a high-school education and access to the internet. In this paper, I argue that novices face a much harder time using her criteria effectively than we would expect or hope. This problem (...)
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  • Second-Order Assessment of Scientific Expert Claims and Sharing Epistemic Burdens in Science Communication.George Kwasi Barimah - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    When laypersons are presented with scientific information which seeks to modify their way of life, they are expected to believe, suspend belief, or reject it. Second-order assessment of scientific experts helps laypersons to make an informed decision in such situations. This is an assessment of the trustworthiness of the person making the scientific claim. In this paper I challenge the optimistic view of Anderson, regarding the ease with which laypersons can perform second-order assessment of experts, by pointing out some of (...)
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  • Populism, Expertise, and Intellectual Autonomy.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In M. Berhow, G. Petersen & G. Tsakiridis (eds.), Engaging Populism: Democracy and the Intellectual Virtues. Palgrave.
    Populism, as I shall understand the term here, is a style of political rhetoric that posits a Manichean conflict between the people and corrupt elites. In the present decade, populism has played a particularly salient role in the politics of the United States and Europe. Moreover, populism is commonly associated with a kind of skepticism about expertise, on which the opinions of non- experts are to be preferred to any expert consensus. In light of all this, populist expertise skepticism appears (...)
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  • Electronic Coins.Craig Warmke - 2022 - Cryptoeconomic Systems 2 (1).
    In the bitcoin whitepaper, Satoshi Nakamoto (2008: 2) defines an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Many have since defined a bitcoin as a chain of digital signatures. This latter definition continues to appear in reports from central banks, advocacy centers, and governments, as well as in academic papers across the disciplines of law, economics, computer science, cryptography, management, and philosophy. Some have even used it to argue that what we now call bitcoin is not the real bitcoin. (...)
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  • What is Bitcoin?Craig Warmke - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Many want to know what bitcoin is and how it works. But bitcoin is as complex as it is controversial, and relatively few have the technical background to understand it. In this paper, I offer an accessible on-ramp for understanding bitcoin in the form of a model. My model reveals both what bitcoin is and how it works. More specifically, it reveals that bitcoin is a fictional substance in a massively coauthored story on a network that automates and distributes jobs (...)
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  • Recent Work on Intellectual Humility: A Philosopher’s Perspective.Nathan Ballantyne - forthcoming - Journal of Positive Psychology 17.
    Intellectual humility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectual humility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multidisciplinary investigation.
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  • A Panpsychist Interpretation of Anne Conway's Metaphysics.Andrew Fyffe - 2020 - Aporia 20:1-9.
    This paper proposes a panpsychist interpretation of Anne Conway’s (1631-1679) metaphysics, as elucidated in 'The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy.' Contemporary versions of panpsychism attempt to explain how consciousness is realised in the natural world. They posit that matter is intrinsically experiential, such that when it is arranged into the form of a human brain, it gives rise to human consciousness. Similarly, Conway argues that substance is constituted by both Body and Spirit. The former serves as an (...)
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  • Moral Market Design.Sam Fox Krauss - 2019 - Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 28 (2).
    We often encounter people who we believe are behaving immorally. We routinely try to change minds and often donate to charitable organizations that do the same. Of course, this does not always work. In a liberal, rights-based society, we have to tolerate this. But legal entitlements to act in ways that others find immoral are inefficiently allocated. For example, some meat-eaters value eating meat less than some vegetarians would be willing to pay them to stop. While many have written about (...)
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