Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

What is the nature and what is the role of trust between teacher and student in academic education at school? Providing a philosophically informed answer to these questions is the aim of this paper. In its first part, I present a relationship account of trust based on two fundamental assumptions: first, trust between teacher and student is essentially about them being in a trust relationship, and second, the reasons for trust are relationship dependent. The second part explores the role of (...) trust by looking at two aspects of academic education at school: the student's acquisition of knowledge from the teacher's testimony and the student's development of epistemic confidence, the latter being a key constituent of competent epistemic agency. Drawing on findings from developmental psychology, I explain how trust is involved in successful academic education at school. My aim is to provide a detailed conception of trust in the teacher–student relationship, as well as a conclusive argument for the importance and the value of trust in academic education at school. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There is growing interest in epistemic injustice and its connection to education. However, the relation between social studies and epistemic injustice has not yet been adequately explored and this topic has been given insufficient attention by social studies educators. But it is regarded as an important resource for students who are socially disadvantaged to render their experiences intelligible. However, due to its unique status, it has also been an effective tool for those who are in power and want to (...) maintain social inequalities. For that reason, social studies is the subject most likely to give rise to epistemic injustice in the classroom. In this paper, we address this issue that is currently coming to the fore in social studies. We argue that cultivating moral sensitivity plays a substantive role in overcoming epistemic injustice and this cultivation comes with shaping student’s schemas by integrating the interpretive resources into social studies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There is growing interest in epistemic injustice and its connection to education. However, the relation between social studies and epistemic injustice has not yet been adequately explored and this topic has been given insufficient attention by social studies educators. But it is regarded as an important resource for students who are socially disadvantaged to render their experiences intelligible. However, due to its unique status, it has also been an effective tool for those who are in power and want to (...) maintain social inequalities. For that reason, social studies is the subject most likely to give rise to epistemic injustice in the classroom. In this paper, we address this issue that is currently coming to the fore in social studies. We argue that cultivating moral sensitivity plays a substantive role in overcoming epistemic injustice and this cultivation comes with shaping student’s schemas by integrating the interpretive resources into social studies. (shrink)

In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argue, in producing reasons we are not trying to ‘get (...) things right’; instead our aims are to justify ourselves and persuade others to accept our views. I will argue that even if interactionism has played a crucial role in bringing about the ‘social turn’ in our thinking about reasoning, it does not convince in its claim that reasoning is not a normative activity. Moreover, I argue that it is in fact perfectly possible to understand reasoning as a social tool that is also aimed at getting things right. I will propose that Gilbert Ryle’s conceptualization of reasoning as ‘didactic discourse’ offers one possible way to understand reasoning as both social and normative activity, and that as such his ideas could be of great value for the social turn in our thinking about reasoning. (shrink)

This paper explores Ilyenkov’s conception of imagination as it is expressed in his writings on aesthetics and in his 1968 book Ob idolakh i idealakh (Of Idols and Ideals). Ilyenkov deemed imagination and creativity to be central to the character of distinctively human forms of mental activity. After examining the many different contexts in which Ilyenkov sees imagination at work—from the most basic operations of perception to the expression of artistic and scientific genius—I bring his ideas into dialogue with the (...) account of imagination developed in Vygotsky’s writings. I argue that, though there are significant differences, their respective approaches are complementary. Both see imagination not simply as a vehicle of fantasy, but as intimately involved in disclosing reality. Moreover, both thinkers are reluctant to cast imagination as a discrete mental function on a par with reason, memory, will, etc. Imagination, rather, is critical to the way in which mental functions express themselves. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of whether children can be taught to be creative and imaginative. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.