This paper aims to reassess the philosophical puzzle of the “applicability of mathematics to physical sciences” as a misunderstood disciplinary interplay. If the border isolating mathematics from the empirical world is based on appropriate criteria, how does one explain the fruitfulness of its systematic crossings in recent centuries? An analysis of the evolution of the criteria used to separate mathematics from experimental sciences will shed some light on this question. In this respect, we will highlight the historical influence of three (...) major disciplinary paradigms. According to the Aristotelian classification of the sciences, the separation of mathematics from physics is based on their respective objects of study. The Baconian system distinguishes these sciences by the type of knowledge involved in each field. Finally, the Whewellian disciplinary layout categorises these disciplines by their respective methods. In this paper, we argue that the cascading effect of such disciplinary categorisations—based successively on ontological, epistemological, and heuristic criteria—resulted in a profound redefinition of the border between mathematics and physics, with the consequence of obscuring the foundations of the interplay between these fields. Our approach intends to put forward such a mechanism as a constitutive piece of the puzzle of the applicability of mathematics. (shrink)

Obsah této studie se zaměřuje na mýtus o prvotním hříchu a jeho dopadu na encyklopedické práce v raném novověku. Jejím hlavním cílem je zde zodpovězení otázky do jaké míry byly encyklopedie tímto příběhem ovlivněny a následně popsat konkrétní změny, které byly tímto mýtem zapříčeněny. Hlavní pozornost je věnována zejména nejvýznamnějším anglickým encyklopedickým pracím v raném novověku a to Cyclopaedii (1728) od Ephraim Chamberse a Lexiconu Technicumu (1704) od Johna Harrise.

Locke’s porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconstruction, Locke argues from the premise that porphyry undergoes a mere Cambridge change of color in different lighting conditions to the conclusion that porphyry’s colors do not belong to it as it is in itself. I argue that his argument is not quite sound, but it would be if Locke chose a different stone, alexandrite. Examining his argument teaches us something about the relation between explanatory (...) qualities and real alterations and something about the ways that colors inhere in bodies. (shrink)

This essay seeks to contribute to the critical reception of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives by tracing the Taxonomy’s underlying philosophical assumptions. Identifying Bloom’s work as consistent with the legacy of Cartesian thought, I argue that its hierarchy of behavioral objectives provides a framework for certainty and communicability in ascertaining student learning. However, its implicit rejection of intuitive knowledge as well as its antagonism between the human subject and the known object promote the Enlightenment ideal of education as “intellectual work.” (...) When embodied in the Taxonomy, Cartesian assumptions foster a fundamental disposition in front of reality that is ultimately alienating. The paper begins with an explication of the Taxonomy’s affordances and philosophical assumptions. I then identify the Cartesian elements of these assumptions, particularly the Taxonomy’s inherent mind–body dualism and primacy of method. Finally, the paper employs these elements as an explanatory factor for the predominant critiques of the Taxonomy in educational theory literature. An addendum questions the possibility or plausibility of distance from objectives frameworks in the contemporary classroom. (shrink)

This article illustrates how during early modernity Italian and Dutch cultures and particularly artistic traditions contributed differently to both the theoretical and practical developments of science. To achieve this goal, it will firstly compare the two forms of detextualization of space operated by Italian artists and by Dutch artists. Finally, it will indicate how each detextualization allowed for the development within the science of the mathematical tradition by the Italian Culture and the experimental tradition by the Dutch culture.

This chapter considers the encounter of skepticism with the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical enterprise and focuses on the intriguing feature whereby it is assimilated into this enterprise. In this period, skepticism becomes interchangeable with its other, which helps understand the proliferation of many kinds of views under its name and which forms the background for transforming skepticism into an anonymous, routine practice of raising objections and counter-objections to one’s own view. German philosophers of this era counterpose skepticism to dogmatism and (...) criticism, ancient to modern skepticism, and, importantly, conceptualize the transitions from one form to another, which forms the conceptual matrix in which new disciplinary forms, such as psychology, anthropology, and historicism contend for cultural-intellectual standing beside philosophy. I present this assimilationist trajectory by reviewing three well-known moments of this encounter of skepticism and idealism: (1) Kant’s idealization of skepticism as a floating position amidst various philosophical positions through the dialectic, polemics, systematics, and history of pure reason; (2) Fichte’s schematic conception of skepticism as a dispute of systems in the early Wissenschaftslehre following his review of the skeptic G. E. Schulze’s attacks on Critical philosophy; (3) Hegel’s historicizing conception of skepticism in the context of differences between subjective idealism and speculative thought and his early Jena review of another work by the same skeptic Schulze. (shrink)

The behavior/structure methodological dichotomy as locus of scientific inquiry is closely related to the issue of modeling and theory change in scientific explanation. Given that the traditional tension between structure and behavior in scientific modeling is likely here to stay, considering the relevant precedents in the history of ideas could help us better understand this theoretical struggle. This better understanding might open up unforeseen possibilities and new instantiations, particularly in what concerns the proposed technological modification of the human condition. The (...) sequential structure of this paper is twofold. The contribution of three philosophers better known in the humanities than in the study of science proper are laid out. The key theoretical notions interweaving the whole narrative are those of mechanization, constructability and simulation. They shall provide the conceptual bridge between these classical thinkers and the following section. Here, a panoramic view of three significant experimental approaches in contemporary scientific research is displayed, suggesting that their undisclosed ontological premises have deep roots in the Western tradition of the humanities. This ontological lock between core humanist ideals and late research in biology and nanoscience is ultimately suggested as responsible for pervasively altering what is canonically understood as “human”. (shrink)

It has been often claimed that the scientific process is quite opposite to the design process, mainly based on the former’s analysis of existing phenomena in order to develop a theory, while the design process is an act of synthesis that creates something new in the world. In the light of the developments that led to this conception, and with reference to the current views of the scientific process, we maintain that the scientific process has more similarities with the design (...) process than differences from it. As parallels can be drawn between the two processes, some implications for further research into the fundamentals of the design activity are discussed. (shrink)