This paper is about the reference or denotation of the concepts and descriptions of modern physics in contrast to Galilean-Newtonian physics and some reflections therein of some widely influential misunderstandings of Einstein's empiricism.

This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and the (...) dominance principle. (shrink)

Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) was immediately regarded as a clear and faithful presentation of the views of the Vienna Circle to English-speaking readers. Since Ayer wrote this book after his visit to Vienna, where he participated in the meetings of the Circle, one may often hear to this day that he brought logical positivism to England. However, while Ayer’s conception was a form of logical positivism, it significantly differed from its Viennese counterpart(s). The key discrepancies are related to (...) verificationism: this article aims to analyse these discrepancies. It will be claimed that upon his return from Vienna Ayer assumed positions that were no longer, or had never been, held in the Circle: regarding the verification principle, test-statements, phenomenalist reductionism and analyticity. (shrink)

There is a famous quip of F.P. Ramsey's, which is my second epigraph. According to a widespread legend, the quip is a criticism of Wittgenstein's treatment in the Tractatus of what cannot be said. The remark is indeed Ramsey's, but he didn't mean what he is taken to mean in the legend. His quip, looked at in context, means something quite different. The legend is sometimes taken to provide support for a reading of the Tractatus according to which the nonsensical (...) propositions of the book were intended to convey what cannot be said. But, since the legend has no basis in reality, it provides no evidence in favor of any such reading of the Tractatus. The quip has great interest if it is read in the context of Ramsey's discussion of generality; it is closely related to issues of importance in the development of Wittgenstein's thought. (shrink)