Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. De-synthesizing the relative a priori.Thomas Uebel - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):7-17.
    This paper considers the question whether the notion of the relative apriori, central to Michael Friedman’s transcendentalist programme for philosophy of science, is available also to philosophers who reject appeals to a synthetic a priori. After tracing the rediscovery of the relative a priori and delineating its potential, the question is considered whether Friedman’s arguments against Quinean naturalism and Carnap’s attenuated logicism tell against a conception of philosophy as scientific metatheory that combines logical and empirical inquiries. Finding an opening here (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Carnap and the compulsions of interpretation: Reining in the liberalization of empiricism. [REVIEW]Sahotra Sarkar - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):353-372.
    Carnap’s work was instrumental to the liberalization of empiricism in the 1930s that transformed the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle to what came to be known as logical empiricism. A central feature of this liberalization was the deployment of the Principle of Tolerance, originally introduced in logic, but now invoked in an epistemological context in “Testability and Meaning”. Immediately afterwards, starting with Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, Carnap embraced semantics and turned to interpretation to guide the choice of a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Carnap’s dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein, and Logical, Syntax.S. Awodey & A. W. Carus - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):23-45.
    In Carnap’s autobiography, he tells the story how one night in January 1931, “the whole theory of language structure” in all its ramifications “came to [him] like a vision”. The shorthand manuscript he produced immediately thereafter, he says, “was the first version” of Logical Syntax of Language. This document, which has never been examined since Carnap’s death, turns out not to resemble Logical Syntax at all, at least on the surface. Wherein, then, did the momentous insight of 21 January 1931 (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Hitting a Moving Target: Gödel, Carnap, and Mathematics as Logical Syntax.Gregory Lavers - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):219-243.
    From 1953 to 1959 Gödel worked on a response to Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. The drafts display Gödel’s familiarity with Carnap’s position from The Logical Syntax of Language, but they received a dismissive reaction on their eventual, posthumous, publication. Gödel’s two principal points, however, will here be defended. Gödel, though, had wished simply to append a few paragraphs to show that the same arguments apply to Carnap’s later views. Carnap’s position, however, had changed significantly in the intervening years, and to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Multitude, tolerance and language-transcendence.Matti Eklund - 2012 - Synthese 187 (3):833-847.
    Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Carnap and ontological pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 130--56.
    My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I turn to some (...)
    $18.01 used   $24.99 new   (collection)    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Vienna circle.Thomas Uebel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Kurt gödel.Juliette Kennedy - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
    The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • The Methodological Roles of Tolerance and Conventionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Reconsidering Carnap's Logic of Science.Emerson P. Doyle - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•